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Abstract
This study examines some of the potential underlying conditions that trigger
prejudice against immigrants in Western Europe. The specific factors of economic
concerns and perceptions of immigration population are used to generate three
hypotheses 1) that economic concerns and perceptions of large immigrant
populations drive negative attitude formation toward immigrants, and these factors
are especially acute when they interact, 2) the two factors contribute to negative
attitude formation regardless of societal context, and 3) that the two factors of study
are not spurious and are able to withstand the factoring in of exclusionary variables.
The study uses the 2008 wave of the European Social Survey for testing and finds that
the hypotheses are partially confirmed. Economic concern is a factor when an
individual is thinking about their country at large and when personal concerns
interact with perceptions of high immigration, however the degree to which these
factors influence negative attitude formation may be tempered by societal context.
The larger finding of this study is that negative attitude formation toward immigrants
is largely affected by an individual’s personal level of happiness, life satisfaction, and
general feelings of fairness and trust. This study is left to conclude that animosity or
negative feelings toward immigrants is an external demonstration of internal
dissatisfaction, in other words a symptom of an underlying problem rather than a
substantial problem unto itself.
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Introduction
Prejudice can apply to almost any sub-set of the human experience. Prejudice
towards foods, places, experiences, but the most influential and the most damaging is
prejudice towards other people. Prejudice towards others is a prevalent topic in social
science because it is so vast and so important. One could not hope to address all the lines of
research possible in the area of prejudice, so one must choose what avenue to take. The
current study will focus on prejudice towards immigrants.
The many societies of people across the Earth are becoming more and more
interconnected through technological means; that make communication and travel faster and
easier to access than ever before. As such, people who live in less than satisfactory or
indeed, harsh situations will seek better living conditions and a better life in increasing
numbers. Depending on the environment of a receiving country the mixing of native and
incoming population can almost be seamless or it can cause social turbulence, which has
major political and social ramifications.
This study follows a steadily developing literature on prejudice and immigration in
Europe. The close proximity of multiple countries with varying political systems and
political histories makes prejudice and immigration a key topic for both policy debate and
academic study. The issue has become an increasingly controversial and hotly debated topic
as the former communist bloc countries, with their highly restrictive immigration policies,
sought to transform and morph into more liberal countries at the outset of the early 1990’s
and beyond; as large segments of the Balkan population are still displaced as refugees from
various severe conflicts throughout the 1990’s; as the European Union continues to develop

an ever-expanding Schengen agreement, which eases the movement between Schengen
countries (Kunovich, 2004 p.22). As these events continue to evolve so too will immigration
and its implications. The academic study of majority attitudes toward immigrants has
yielded interesting results but there is still room for contributions as the literature is far from
reaching a unanimous consensus (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010).
Even though there are many definitions of prejudice, the current study will use but
one as its guide. The definition given by Ashmore (1970) is simple and effective, “Prejudice
is a negative attitude toward a socially defined group and toward any person perceived to be
a member of that group” (p. 253). This study uses this definition to guide it in an attempt to
find answers about attitude formation toward immigrants in Western Europe. Indeed, it is the
quandary of immigration in Western Europe that drives this research, this study attempts to
answer what the underlying factors for negative attitudes towards immigrants are. This study
presents three hypotheses: (1) both perceived economic troubles and perceived immigrant
group size will have a positive, statistically significant relationship with animosity towards
immigrants. This relationship will increase in strength and significance when both
independent variables are combined to form an interaction term. (2) This relationship will be
confirmed in all country citizen-regime typologies in the study. (3) This relationship will
remain significant after controlling for both individual level variables and state-level
aggregate variables. This study finds partial evidence to support the first two hypotheses,
while finding evidence that requires the rejection of the third.
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Immigration Motivation
Perhaps not surprisingly the motivation for immigrants to move into new home
countries is the desire to improve their economic standing; for most this means staying in
their adopted home country, yet for some, the arrangement is only meant to be temporary
with a future return to their previous homes intended (Quillian, p.590-91). Even less
surprising, these movements of people generally flock towards countries with more affluent
economies and wherever they settle, new migrants are directly competitive with low-wage
and manual workers because most immigrants find employment in manual labor jobs
(Quillian, p.591); indeed, there is a geographic mobility among immigrants from lower
developed countries to industrially developed ones (Safran 1997) The manual labor the
immigrants are able to find are often unpleasant and sometimes dangerous to the point where
there is resistance from the native population to perform it (Sides and Citrin, p.478).
This process really started in the 1950s and 1960s when many Western European
nations started to enjoy immense economic growth; with such rapid growth these countries
faced labor shortages (McLaren, p.909). To address the potential labor shortage problem
these countries started importing people from countries where the supply of laborers was in
abundance (McLaren, p.909). Standard labor-market dynamics provide all the motivation
immigrants needed to pursue work on foreign soil. When the gains of labor in a foreign
country offset the costs of migrating the rational actor, in this case the immigrant will migrate
to try to earn higher wages (Cornelius and Rosenblum, p.100).
The situation has since ballooned to enormous proportions. As the 21st century drew
nearer approximately 200 million people around the year 2005 lived as migrants outside their
3

area of birth (Cornelius and Rosenblum, p.99). The figure of 200 million is an increase from
154 million in 1990; it is also worth noting that 1 in 10 of the residents in advanced
industrialized societies is an immigrant (Cornelius and Rosenblum, p.99).

4

Real World Consequences of Prejudice Towards
Immigrants
Public opposition to the presence of ethnic minorities and immigrants has swelled in
many Western European countries since the Second World War (Karapin, p. 312). The
tension has only increased as over the last several decades immigration has become a more
and more visible and problematic issue (Rustenbach, p.53). For most developed nations
there has been a rise of anti-immigrant attitudes, which are often associated with economic
conditions and a rising number of immigrants (Rustenbach, p.53). As the number of global
migrants continues to grow, there is also a growing need to understand the foundational rootcauses of hostility and resentment toward immigrants (Rustenbach, p.54). Developing an
understanding of these root causes can have implications for policy makers; it can perhaps
aid nations to become more effective and efficient in integrating immigrants in a manner that
can be seen as culturally and economically beneficial while decreasing conflict and turmoil
(Rustenbach, p.54).
A visible example of public turmoil fueled by angst surrounding the immigration
issues are riots1 that have occurred at various points in time in some European countries. In
Britain for example, there have been at least six major riots in the 20th century (Karapin, p.
318). Episodes occurring in Liverpool (1948), the Deptford neighborhood of London (1949),
the Notting Hill neighborhood of London (1958), Nottingham (1958), Middlesbrough (1961),
and Dudley (1962) (Karapin, p. 318) are illustrative of the extremely violate affect the
1

Here defined by Karapin (2000) as “intense physical violence, with an ethnic or racial motive, by a large
number of people belonging to a dominant ethnic group against members of a minority group or their property”
(p. 212).
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immigration can have. As it pertains to the current study it is informative to try and explore
the reasons behind the eruption of these riots.
The riots in Liverpool and Deptford had up to 2,000 and 1,000 whites participate in
attacking Black residents of hostels (Karapin, p. 321). Other examples of riots appear in
Germany. In the case of Liverpool the sudden arrival and settlement of black, West Indians
caused an already festering conflict between black and white sailors over ship jobs to sour
further (Karapin, p. 322). In both cases, concentration of the black population into hostels
seemed to intensify cultural differences between the new residents and the white population
in the neighboring areas (Karapin, p. 322). Discrimination in the housing system forced the
new residents into the hostels; after the black population rose to a high enough number the
increased visibility made them a target for attackers (Karapin, p.322). After 1950 it became
less common to have new settlers forced into hostels as policies on housing introduced
quotas to keep concentration down and newer settlers increasingly settled with previously
established residents (Karapin, p. 322-23).
At the end of August of 1958 in Nottingham violence began to brew and would only
grow as a anti-immigrant campaign began; shortly thereafter, the violence would spill to the
Notting Hill neighborhood of London (Karapin, p. 325). As local political leadership (much
of which was far-right) and sensationalistic media immersed themselves in the situation the
rioting became prolonged and intensified (Karapin, p. 325-26). While the turmoil which
began in Nottingham would eventually capture national attention it initially started away
from the spotlight (Karapin, p. 325). The factors that ignited the rioting were said to be
cultural conflicts, which were made worse by competition for material gains in conjunction
6

with aggression pursued by young local working-class whites as well a general passivity of
local police; these factors were even more intense in the Notting Hill situation (Karapin, p.
325-26). Ironically, as far as the fear of economic competition is concerned, although rumors
of increased competition would help fan the proverbial flames of the riots it seems that these
fears were generally unfounded as the comparisons of the unemployment rate indicates
(about 14 percent for the black population and about 1 percent for the white population)
(Karapin, p.326).
In August 1961 in Middlesborough shops that belonged to Pakistanis and “Arabs”
were victimized (Karapin, p. 328). The Middlesborough incident was sparked by the arrest
of an “Arab” in connection to a murder of a local youth (Karapin, p.328). Shortly thereafter
in Dudley in late July and early August of 1962 crowds gathered with the specific purpose of
targeting black members of the population (Karapin, p.328). As far as Middlesborough is
concerned it is likely that the fact that the ballooning population of immigrants from South
Asia during 1960-1961 (which itself was in response to the fear that immigration controls
would soon tighten) and a marginal increase in unemployment as a result of newly passed
austerity measures in July of 1961 fueled hostilities that led to rioting (Karapin, p. 329).
However, perhaps more important than the above mentioned factors in relation to the riots is
the fact the burgeoning cultural conflicts were blossoming; especially after the release of the
Arab who had been arrested on suspicion of a fatal stabbing of a local white youth (Karapin,
p.329). The Dudley riots on the other hand can almost entirely be traced back to the passage
of the immigration act of 1962, with the possible goal that more violence would lead to
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further political action against the black population that was already present not just any new
members that may want to enter the country (Karapin, p.329).
From 1986 to 1997 six notable riots occurred in Germany via the catalyst of
immigration, especially during the August-September period of 1992 (Karapin, p.319).
Briefly these riots occurred in: Hoyerswerda (May 1, 1990), Hoyerswerda (Sept. 18-22,
1991), Rostock (Aug. 22-26, 1992), Cottbus (Aug. 28-30, 1992), Eisenhuttenstadt (Sept. 5-6,
1992) and Quedinburg (Sept. 7-11, 1992). The first incident in Hoyerswerda on May 1, 1990
was a brief but volatile event which saw between 150 to 200 German youths violently engage
fifty foreign nationals from Mozambique; who were in the country for labor purposes
(Karapin, p. 331). The initial incident in Hoyerswerda can be attributed to long-standing
cultural conflicts between the German population and the increasingly arriving African
workforce (Karapin, p. 331). The repressive structure of the former communist East
Germany separated the native and foreign populations, thus fanning the flames of mistrust; as
the old system fell there was no system in place as yet to keep conflict from forming
(Karapin, p. 331).
The second event in Hoyerswerda occurred as several German youths attacked
Vietnamese laborers (Karapin, p. 332). Much like the first riot, cultural conflicts were
responsible for much of the violence that occurred, especially as foreign workers were
concentrated to certain neighborhoods (Karapin, p.332-33). The riots in Hoyerswerda were
significant but it is the events that occurred in Rostock that retain the most notoriety.
Occurring in August 1992 hundreds of German youths would storm a foreign worker hostel
in Lichtenhagen eventually setting it on fire (Karapin, p. 334). The national political
8

environment, dominated by the anti-asylum campaign contributed heavily to the aggression
displayed in Rostock (Karapin, p. 334). The political environment inspired action by
extreme-right groups who were already hostile towards foreigners for reasons similar to the
Hoyerswerda events; the events of Rostock suggest coordination on the part of extreme-right
groups on the attack of the hostel (Karapin, p.334-35). In the weeks following Rostock, three
other riots occurred that were minor in comparison, all of which followed the pattern of
German youths attacking hostels housing foreign workers (Karapin, p. 337).
Riots are not the only phenomenon that has political ramifications for immigrants. If
a perception exists that there is sufficient public support there might also be national
legislative campaigns2 targeting immigrants. In Britain, for example the first such campaign
was small in scope occurring between 1954 and 1955; when some conservative members of
parliament began to openly question the Churchill administration on the issue of
immigration, leading to a formal debate on the matter in November 1944 (Karapin, p. 316).
The second notable campaign to occur in Britain took place in 1958 as Cyril Osborne, with
assistance from conservative members of parliament and some members of Prime Minister
Harold Macmillan’s administration; led the call to curb immigration from the Caribbean,
India, and Pakistan (Karapin, p.316 & 318). The third and fourth campaigns of note occurred
from 1960-62 as conservatives campaigned vigorously for controls on immigration (Karapin,
p.318). The last campaign ended with the passage of the Commonwealth Immigration Act in
April 1962; which effectively cut immigration from about 90,000 per year to 40,000
(Karapin, p.318). Interestingly, even as the Labour party took power in 1964, immigrations
2

Here defined by Karapin (2000) as “a series of efforts by individual politicians, political parties, national
interest groups, and/or local residents groups to change national laws or regulations in order to reduce foreign
immigration rates” (p. 212).
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controls were maintained at status quo and in 1965 tightened through increased regulations
(Karapin, p.318). It is useful to probe deeper into these campaigns in attempt to ascertain
how immigration played a role in their occurrence.
In 1954 reports of increasing conflicts between whites and blacks involving issues
such as: discrimination in employment, housing, and dance halls coincided with an
increasing population of new black residents, thus fueling a campaign aimed at curtailing
immigration (Karapin, p. 323). As the new black settlers attempted to gain entry in the
normal environment that whites enjoyed (such as jobs and social establishments), efforts
were made by white residents to exclude them (Karapin, p. 325). The racial conflict
presented itself in many different cities thus, gaining legislative attention at the national
level; mainly, the attention revolved around anti-immigrant positions (Karapin, p.325).
The violence that would occur in Nottingham served as a launching pad for two
members of parliament from the city to begin a campaign for immigration-control (Karapin,
p. 325). As violence worsened in Nottingham and Notting Hill national politicians used the
opportunity to both denounce the violence and call for the first-major post war immigrationcontrol initiative (Karapin, p.325).
The next significant period of anti-immigrant campaigning in Britain came in 1960
and lasted through 1962. Starting in 1960 members of parliament pushed the notion of
controls on immigration; the campaign for immigration control would intensify in November
of 1961 and this period of intensity would last until April of 1962 (Karapin, p. 325). This
period would ultimately conclude with the passage of the immigration act of 1962, but the
passage of the act would not signal the end of vigorous debate. Two more anti-immigrant
10

campaigns would occur from September 1964 and December 1965 (Karapin, p.330). These
campaigns were used by some conservative parliament members as active campaign issues;
the strategy would have some success and even as the Labour party which generally disliked
the new anti-immigrant policies came into power the successful use of the immigrant issue
would force Labour to bend closer to the conservative position as it increased in popularity
among the public (Karapin, p.330). Britain is not the only West European country to have
campaigns against immigration as Germany has also seen its share of anti-immigrant
campaigns.
Campaigns to put limitations on the rights of asylum seekers were present in West
Germany in 1978; these were followed by periods of debate in 1980, 1982, and 1986
(Karapin, p. 319). While these periods could be informative, there have been campaigns that
occurred soon before and well after re-unification that are more informative. Between 1989
and 1994 there have been six periods of notable campaigns against immigration, especially
from asylum seekers (Karapin, p.318). For Germany, the basic conflict arose between the
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in conjunction with the Christian Social Union (CSU)
against the Social Democratic Party (SPD) over the amending over the national constitution
(Karapin, p. 319).
In February 1989 there was a unexpected vote share of 7.5 percent for the far-right
Republikaner Party in the elections of West Berlin, this event served as a partial catalyst for
debate (Karapin, p. 319). Another event the further pushed the debate about restrictions was
the national elections campaign of August-October 1990 which saw SPD leader Oskar
Lafontaine support restrictions (Karapin, p. 319). Another notable period of contention came
11

in September-November 1991 when the CSU and CDU lead the charge for the amendment
change (Karapin, p. 319). Contentions arose once more in January-June 1992 (reaching a
zenith in April) as the amendment issue was used to success by far-right parties for the state
elections held in Baden-Württemberg and Schleswig-Holstein (Karapin, p. 319). Another
period of debate occurred between August 1992 and January 1993 when the amendment
campaign of the CSU and CDU earned the support of the SPD leadership (Karapin, p. 319).
Finally, there was a brief spike in debate in May of 1993 when internal arguments about the
amendment issue occurred within the SPD shortly before the amendment would be passed
(Karapin, p. 319). Ultimately, the amendment would reduce the applications for asylum
down to 100,000 a year, from a high of about 300,000 a year that occurred from 19901993(Karapin, p. 319).
Whether one is discussing riots or legislative campaigns this much is certain, these
forms of political action are potent in gaining space in the national political conversation; and
thusly, help increase chances of increasingly restrictive immigration policies, especially
when the two actions are combined to strengthen one another (Karapin, p. 212).
Modern riots in France in October and November of 2005 and the violence provoked
by the anti-Muslim cartoons that appeared in print in Denmark in 2005 (Rustenbach, p.54)
are some of the latest examples of antagonistic action that has the potential of upsetting the
political orders of those nations. However, these examples are somewhat isolated incidents;
political parties have infinitely more potential in influencing the political order of any given
society. Prejudice is the most damaging when it is allowed to seep into a nation’s institutions
and institutionalized discrimination becomes manifest (Quillian, p.588). Institutionalized,
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prejudice can be self-perpetuating. Institutions can generate and fuel political conflict by
opening opportunities and creating incentives for elites to gather and steer the population
towards one potential threat or another (Weldon, p.331) (in this case permanently towards
immigration); also institutions help form the characteristics and environment of political
discourse (Weldon, p.331).
Carried out to its logical conclusion, if prejudice is institutionalized then, the political
environment toward minority groups would become permanently hostile and venomous.
Increased support for anti-immigrant political parties like the Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs
in Austria or Front National in France (Rustenbach, p.54) and parties in the Flanders portion
of Belgium (van der Brug, Fennema, Tillie, p. 537) demonstrates the weight the immigration
issue carries among the polities of Europe and how potential exists for prejudice to seep into
the various political institutions. For instance, as extreme right parties gain continued and
increased success, other parties in response shift closer to the positions of the extreme right,
thus, legitimizing the extreme right in the mainstream political discussion (Jackman and
Volpert, p.503). For example in France in 1991 as a result of relentless pressure by extreme
right parties to repeal benefits that immigrants (particularly illegal) received; Socialist Prime
Minister Edith Cresson uncharacteristically, became voluntarily aggressive against illegal
immigrants (Jackman and Volpert, p.503-504).
To illustrate the importance of the immigration issue for some European electorates,
it is effective to turn toward some previous research. Given the history of the Europe in the
20th century it comes as little surprise that the factors that determine the success (to the extent
that there is any) of extreme right parties. Golder (2003) differentiates extreme right parties
13

into two categories: neo-fascist and populist parties. Among a sample of both parties
immigration played a positive statistically significant role in gaining vote share for extremeright parties (Golder, p.451). When tested separately, immigration did not play a statistically
significant role among neo-fascist parties but it does play a positive significant role among
populist extreme-right parties in gaining vote share, only losing significance when the
interaction term of unemployment and immigration is factored in, which was also a positive
significant factor in extreme right populist parties gaining vote share (Golder, p.451).
Lubbers, Gijsberts & Scheepers (2002) also studied extreme-right voting in Western
Europe. Their findings indicate that an immigration-restrictive climate increases extremeright wing voting (Lubbers et al., p. 363); however they found this result to be spurious upon
factoring in the strength of extreme-right wing parties (Lubbers et al., p.365). The findings
seem to indicate that the stronger the organization of extreme-right parties in a given country
the less explanatory power an restrictive immigration environment has (Lubbers et al.,
p.365). Most importantly as it relates to this study is that Lubbers et al. (2002) found that
individuals possessing anti-immigrant attitudes are more likely to vote for extreme-right
parties (Lubbers et al., p.363 & 365); this finding thus begs the question of, what are the
factors that would influence an individual to form anti-immigrant attitudes? It is precisely
this question the current study works to address.
The link between immigration issues and right-wing populist parties is further
established by Ivarsflaten (2008). Ivarsflaten (2008) posits that right-wing populist parties
did not find success without using the immigration mobilization grievance (Ivarsflaten, p.
14). Evidence further suggests that as restrictive immigration policies become increasingly
14

popular the probability electorally successful populist right-wing parties rises, for seven
countries across Western Europe (Ivarsflaten, p. 16-17). Once again, the question is what
makes the idea of more restrictive policy preferences more appealing? The research
undertaken in the current study aims to shed some light on the matter. By attempting to find
the factors behind the formation of negative attitudes toward immigrants there can be further
understanding as to why a restrictive immigration may or may not be appealing.
As can be seen from research issues relating to immigration are becoming an
important part of the European political agenda, contributing to the importance of the
immigration issue is the ever evolving phenomenon of the continued integration of more and
more societies into an overarching whole (the modern day European Union for example),
while citizens of these societies remain loyal to their national identities (Sides and Citrin,
p.477).
As recently as the year 2000, according to one poll, 39 percent of Europeans think
that friction between different ethnic groups will diminish if immigration is also diminished
(Hjerm, p.1254). Perhaps this number can be attributed to the visibility of contentious
debate. Arguments about immigration and the part anti-immigrant parties play in the
political environment have generated some of the most intense and emotionally-laden
debates, in addition to political and social turmoil in many societies (van der Brug et al.,
p.538). While, the percentage of the aggregate vote tally for parties on the extreme right in
Europe since the 1980’s has usually been small, extreme right parties have done much better
than expected in raising electoral support (Jackman and Volpert, p.502). The small but
growing success of extreme right parties are a subject of focus because the synthesis of
15

xenophobia and populist anti-system attitudes is in direct opposition to the ideals and norms
of tolerance in liberal-democratic polities (Jackman and Volpert, p.502).
Another cause for concern about institutionalized prejudice is the effect on citizenship
policy. Citizenship policy could become exclusionary, preventing wide swaths of ethnic
minorities membership and thus access to the country in question (Weldon, p.334). In less
extreme circumstances an allowance of ethnic minorities could continue, but a requirement
could be instituted that allows conditional citizenship based on the strict adherence to the
duties, rights, and cultural norms of the majority ethnic group (Weldon, p.334).
The process of this potential outcome starts with policy makers factoring in mass
opinion into their decisions (Citrin and Sides, p.49). However, even if policy makers do not
take the full weight of mass opinion into consideration, there are still potential political
effects to be felt. If there is mass dissatisfaction with immigration in a given nation then
opportunistic candidates can use the environment to their advantage and make repeated
appeals to the populist fervor; if the appeal to populism works then there could be a period of
repeated and prolonged election of increasingly right-wing (at least on the immigration issue)
officials. This danger has become a very real concern as, in recent decades; there have been
gains of extreme right-wing electoral parties (McLaren, p.910, Weldon, p.331). The
continued and prolonged success of extreme right parties are far from a certainty, but if they
should continue to find success then their influence will grow and the aforementioned
institutionalized discrimination becomes ever the more likely. Thus, because public opinion
has the potential to carry serious political effects it is important to study the foundation upon
which public opinion rests (Sides and Citrin, p.477).
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As minority groups grow in number their power of political mobilization increases
and this can be seen as threatening to the majority and/or the powerful (Quillian, p.589). Not
only is the election of extreme right-wing officials a possibility but also the occurrence of
violence towards ethnic and racial minorities which has been occurring with increased
frequency (Weldon, p.331).
Aside from prejudice affecting the political institutions in a direct and formal way,
prejudice can also potentially have an influence on subtler, more personal policies in a
society. Take for instance the issue of different religions like Islam, Buddhism, and
Hinduism. The differences between these religions and traditional Western religious
institutions are usually quite noticeable and stark particularly through standards and practices
in attire (McLaren, p.917). The clash of religious cultures between the traditionally Christian
(yet, ever more secular) Western Europe and the non-Western religions may generate
suspicion and distrust and thus, prejudice (McLaren, p.917). Whether motivated by a sense
of secular multiculturalism or fear of foreign cultural takeover, government (particularly if
right-wing parties are elected) might opt to impose sanctions against certain practices and
manners of dress.
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Prejudice Theory
For a topic such as prejudice it is unsurprising to discover that there are many theories
to try to explain such a weighty and potentially problematic phenomenon. Some theorize
that prejudice exists, specifically in the case of immigrants, simply because of the inability of
the host population to relate to the new population. As proposed in the past by Blumer
(1958), it can be said that prejudice is a reaction to challenges to the privileges of a group;
this is not to say that these privileges are always connected to the individual interests of
members of the group (Quillian, p.586). It can also be said, as set forth by Pettigrew (1980),
that prejudice is hostility coupled by erroneous generalization; in this way, prejudice is
indicative of irrationality and emotional investment (animosity) (Quillian, p.587).
The study of prejudice, especially racial prejudice, historically, has three main
avenues of research: a tradition following a social-psychological approach, a path that
follows individual- level correlates of prejudice, and investigations based upon theories of
self-interest (Quillian, p.587). These three avenues have yielded a large volume of theories
and corresponding research. It is informative to briefly discuss the general areas of theory.
A general area of focus stems from a social-psychological perspective prejudice is
seen as a result of individual emotional and/or cognitive capacity and functioning that lay
underneath the total control of a person’s consciousness (Quillian, p.587). Similarly, this line
of research has investigated sources of prejudice as the psychological projection of fear
and/or anxiety onto other people, a variation of psycho-pathology generated by certain
personality characteristics developed as a child or as a demonstration of a reliance on
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stereotypes due to limited cognitive functionality and mistaken or misplaced attribution
(Quillian, p.587).
Another general approach to the study of prejudice is the use of attitudinal surveys to
gauge the effect of background variables. Survey analysis uses statistical procedures and
techniques to link a respondent’s answers to questions on attitudes about race with
individual-level variables like income, marriage status, or education level; past research has
demonstrated that there is a fair amount of consistency in the results of this line of study; the
working class, older respondents, and the less educated demonstrate more prejudice
(Quillian, p.587).
A different line of research on prejudice explores the notion that people form negative
feelings and inflexible perceptions toward others with whom they compete with (Quillian,
p.587). This field of research posits that individuals form prejudices to serve their interests,
and this concern of self interest follows closely with theories of rational-choice; a classic
example of this line is the split labor-market theory proposed by Edna Bonacich (Quillian,
p.587). A split-labor market occurs when the price for labor varies across ethnic or racial
lines; the usual manifestation of these phenomena occurs when members of the majority
group actively try to exclude the members of minority groups who are willing to perform
comparable labor for lower wages (Kunovich, p.22-23).
One of the most vexing things about the development and practice of prejudicial
attitudes is that members of the dominant social group in a society may express a desire for
restrictions on immigration or proclaim the aforementioned prejudicial attitudes, even though
they may benefit from the low costs associated with employing immigrants who work for
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low wages (Quillian, p.588). The three general areas of research have generated multiple
theories, it is prudent to discuss eight of them here.
There have been several versions of the first general theory but it can be synthesized
under the banner of cultural marginality theory, in that, different cultures, different historical
struggles, etc. prevent host and immigrant populations from relating to one another
(Rustenbach, p. 55). The key to this line of thinking lies in the lack of trust between
individuals based upon a lack of common factors (Rustenbach, p.56). Alternatively, when
there is a certain amount of common ground affinity can develop between those in the host
population and the immigrant population (Rustenbach, p.56). Scheepers, Gijsberts, and
Coenders (2002) proposed an alternative viewpoint in that an extreme form of hostility
(ethnic exclusionism) can be explained using a hybrid of realistic conflict theory and social
identity theory which they dubbed ethnic competition theory (Scheepers, et al. p.18). Simply
stated Scheepers et al. (2002) proposed that competition both on an individual and societal
scale, may buttress the factors of social (contra-) identification, as a result, eventually ethnic
exclusionism will occur.
Some theorists postulate that tolerance and prejudicial attitudes are dependent on the
second general theory, human capital. The two main arguments that support human capital
theory are: 1) education provides individuals with skills so that they do not have to compete
with immigrants for occupational positions and a greater ratio of unskilled immigrants in the
population gives the implication of higher wages for skilled workers (Rustenbach, p.57). 2)
Higher levels of education provide an individual with an expanded worldview which breeds
tolerance of different races and cultures (Rustenbach, p.57).
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The third theory parsimoniously attributes prejudice to political affiliation and is
concerned with two factors. This theory would suggest that an individual’s political leaning
(left vs. right) and political involvement dictates either tolerance or prejudice, in relation to
immigration (Rustenbach, p.57). Simply put, leftists tend to be more tolerant whereas those
on the right tend to be more restrictive and prejudicial; each side is intensified with the more
involved and engaged an individual is with the political climate and apparatus in the country
(Rustenbach, p.57).
The fourth theory provides a straightforward explanation in social attachment.
Theories concerned about variations in the individual’s level of trust. Those with higher
levels of trust (interpersonal, to the government, etc.) will probably be less likely to blame
immigrants for societal problems (Rustenbach, p.57). Conversely, those with little trust are
probably expressing prejudicial sentiments from either an isolated incident with a member of
that particular social group or is just expressing general life dissatisfaction through the prism
of prejudice (Rutenbach, p.57). There is however, an alternative definition of social
attachment. Social attachment can also mean how concerned an individual is with the
continuation of society itself. For instance, if a someone married with three children would
be considerably more invested in the general health of society and be wary of anything that
could conceivably disrupt that health (like immigration) (Rustenbach, p.58). Therefore one
has more familial attachments may be more likely to express prejudice (especially toward
immigrants) as a result of a concern that the different social group will be disruptive or
damaging to the overall welfare of society (Rusenbach, p.58).
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In a related vein to the second meaning of social attachment and the fifth theory is the
concern for neighborhood safety. An influx of immigrants may create a feeling of
uncertainty into the host population and especially if there is a sense of a rising immigrant
population, altercations and incidents of violence and crime may be attributed to the
immigrant population (Rustenbach, p.58). Therefore, concern about neighborhood safety
may make native population more wary of “outsiders” and thus be more suspicious of and
prejudicial toward perceived outsiders including immigrants (Rustenbach, p.58).
The sixth line of inquiry is the exploration of the contact hypothesis. The contact
hypothesis, first introduced by Robin M. Williams in 1947 and later emphasized and
expounded upon by Gordon Allport in 1954 (McLaren, p. 911), is actually an hypothesis on
how to alleviate prejudicial attitudes among individuals. The hypothesis is that contact with
members of external or unfavorable (subordinate) groups will diminish prejudicial tendencies
against these groups (McLaren, p.911). The key factor in the connection between friendships
with minority group members and prejudice relates to the idea that prejudice is the product of
a perception of difference in belief systems, cultures, and norms between a person and other
people from different groups (McLaren, p.913). If members of different groups interact and
realize that they actually share more similarities than differences then prejudicial attitudes
should wane (McLaren, p.913). Necessarily, for contact to truly be effective it must be of an
intimate nature, as exemplified in friendships (McLaren, p.913). If the assumption is that the
contact hypothesis is true than it would follow that its converse, the lack of contact, would
then be a factor in increased prejudicial tendencies. Whether, one is studying prejudice under
a framework of interest or identity based theories, the common thread that is a necessary
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prior condition to prejudice toward immigration (and thus toward immigrants) is a sense of
threat (Sides and Citrin, p.478). Where there is a difference and what scholars still debate is
the nature of threat and whether the threat is based on an objective sense of economic and
social conditions or if the threat is influenced by cultural and psychological orientations
(Sides and Citrin, p.478).
In a somewhat less explored line of inquiry the seventh theory offers a focus on
foreign direct investment. The argument is that the more that a comparatively wealthy
country decides to invest in poorer nations information on those nations becomes more
available and publicized and thus the more the citizenry learns and understands about the
plight of the people in the poorer nation they will be less likely to act harshly towards people
from that nation (Rustenbach, p.59).
The above theories are interesting propositions and in the interest of due diligence
this study attempts to test variables that related to the theories; however the above theories
are not the specific focus of this study. Instead this study focuses on the eighth general
theory area, the effects of economic competition and population ratio which is a specific take
on the group threat theory that will be discussed below. Of all the potential reasons why a
feeling of threat may or may not present itself it is the opinion in this study that economic
considerations and population numbers are the most tangible aspects of a threat an individual
will experience with immigrants. If an individual in the native population is having difficulty
finding work or work that they feel they deserve, or having financial concerns and they hear
or see of immigrants coming and finding work then the person can very easily start to feel
threatened by the incoming immigrants. Likewise, if an individual hears or simply believes
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that the immigration population is on the rise then they may feel the thereat of material
competition but they might also feel the threat of cultural (language, religion, societal norms
etc.) competition. Either one of these factors might be potent on their own but they are likely
to be especially acute when they interact with one another. It is this possibility that makes
the two factors intriguing for research; indeed, it is the potential explanatory power of the
two factors that inspired this study.
The overarching three lines of prejudice research tend to focus on the individual.
However, there is also a line of research that focuses on groups writ large; indeed many
previous theories have slight differences when the unit of analysis is an individual or the
group (McLaren, p.915). These theories tend to consolidate around the concept of group
threat, prejudice that stems from perceived challenges to the groups position and not
necessarily the individual (Quillian, p.588).
Perhaps the most notable scholar of group level prejudicial research was also among
its original proponents, Herbert Blumer (Quillian, p. 588). Blumer proposed that prejudice
by the dominant group in society was the result of a general sense of threat to the group;
prejudice is generated because groups jockey for social positioning against each other
(Quillian, p.588). This jockeying for social position can then create fear and anxiety towards
other groups or “outgroups”; therefore individuals who identify with their “ingroup” may be
fearful of all those that do not belong and it is this fear that is an important predictor of
intolerance (Weldon, p.333).
According to Blumer four essential “feelings” are needed for the development of
prejudice among members of the dominant group. The first feeling is that the dominant group
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needs to feel superior than other groups; the second feeling is a stark and rigid sense of
difference between the dominant group and other groups, moreover this sense of difference is
an inherent one; third the dominant group feels they are entitled to exclusive claims on
certain privileges; lastly, a feeling among the dominant group that subordinate groups want to
encroach on the entitled privileges of the dominant group (Quillian, p.588). The underlying
point is that the dominant group feels certain benefits that are their exclusive domain, stated
otherwise as a sense of group position (Quillian, p.588). Among these potential benefits are
higher income, governmental resources and access (McLaren, p.915)
The dominant group and the subordinate groups are according to Blumer, by
historically unequal, inter-group power relations (Quillian, p.588). Prejudice is a defensive
response to this power struggle, in the sense that there is either an explicit or (most often)
implicit challenge to the dominant group’s sense of exclusive entitlement (Quillian, p.588).
Members of the dominant group are not automatically inclined to respond to challenges with
prejudice; however, members of the dominant group are linked by an awareness of group
position in comparison to subordinate groups (Quillian, p.588). This theory and line of
research has been called “group-threat theory” because, the focus is entirely on threats felt
and responded to at a group level (Quillian, p.588). This approach is buttressed by research
that demonstrates individuals are not necessarily driven by a strict sense of rational decisionmaking and are very often focused more on the collective society than themselves (McLaren,
p.915).
Over time, “group-threat theory” has been modified and adapted. One of the more
notable modification’s of Blumer’s work is that of Lawrence Bobo. Bobo has proposed that
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subordinate groups present a real and tangible threat to the resources available and the
preferred practices of the dominant group; Bobo has called this “realistic conflict theory”
(Quillian, p.588). What sets Bobo’s work apart from Blumer’s is that Bobo sees a tight
coupling of subjective perceptions of group interest and objective, measurable group
interests; therefore, to the extent that prejudice exists, it is a result of concerns over real
interests and not just the perception of interests that may or may not be tethered to an actual
interest of the group (Quillian, p.588-89). Kunovich (2004) also offers a slight variation;
disadvantaged groups may actually feel less prejudice than advantage groups if the sense of
group threat is lower, which is to say that members of the majority group who are
disadvantaged may be less prejudiced than members of the majority group who have more
advantage (re: high income) if those with more advantage actually feel a greater sense of
threat (Kunovich, p.25). The emphasis of Kunovich’s alteration is that the feeling of being
threatened supersedes any individual or even group level variable in predicting prejudice
toward immigration.
Considerable weight is given to the multiple variations of group threat theory because
it has been shown to be meritorious, at least on a surface level; indeed, research has provided
evidence that the concept of intergroup threat is a predictor of antipathetic attitudes toward
outgroups (Riek, Mania and Gaertner 2006). This finding continues to drive group-threat
research. Continued research is needed because if intergroup threat is a predictor of negative
attitudes it is imperative to learn which threats contribute the most towards negativity, so that
perhaps solutions can be proposed to alleviate these threats. This task is made ever the more
difficult, and therefore more important, when the evidence suggests that there are multiple
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threat factors that are a significant indicator of negative attitudes toward outgroups (Riek,
Mania and Gaertner 2006).
Another aspect of research on prejudice and on potential indicator of negative
attitudes concerns the size of subordinate groups. Perhaps the most famous scholar to
explore this area of investigation is Hubert Blalock. Blalock primarily emphasized the
importance of the effects of the size of minority group on discrimination and prejudice
(Quillian, p.589). According to Blalock two factors link intergroup threat and prejudice; the
first factor is that contestation for finite resources is increased with the size of a minority
group relative to the dominant group; the second factor, is the potential for political
mobilization through the force of numbers; if the numbers of a minority group grow then the
strength of their political mobilized population grows as well to the determinant of the
political mobilization efforts of the dominant group (Quillian, p.589). When using Blalock’s
work for research one must be careful because a positive correlation between minority group
size and racial inequality does not necessarily mean that there is a causal relationship
between minority group size discrimination by the majority group (Quillian, p.589).
In a related line of inquiry in the study of prejudice is centered on economic
condition. There has been much speculation in the literature on this connection, although
surprisingly, as late as 1995 little research had been performed in this area (Quillian, p.590).
The main argument in this line of research is that the connection between economic condition
and prejudice produces either blame to the subordinate group(s) for economic difficulty, or
from the competitive struggle between groups for finite resources (Quillian, p.590). Either
one or both of the above processes can occur among individuals but the collective threat
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perspective would suggest that a decrease of economic standing among a few dominant
group members would increase prejudice among all group members, not just those in direct
competition with minority group members. (Quillian, p.590) If members of the dominant
group are fearful or concerned about their economic position, they become fretful that they
will lose their relatively higher position over the members of the subordinate group; if there
is an improvement of economic circumstances there should be a concurrent reduction of
perceived competition and thus there should also be a decrease in feelings of threat and
hostility (Quillian, p.590). Indeed, scholars argue that higher amounts of income act as an
insulator from competition toward others be they a minority group member or otherwise;
therefore the common expectation is that wealth reduces prejudice those with greater
resources feel more secure in their social position (Kunovich, p.23).
The main important theoretical idea behind this line of inquiry is that economic
conditions are key in varying levels of prejudice because economic conditions have a direct
influence on the amount and severity of competition between a society’s dominant group and
subordinate groups (Quillian, p.591). At least some variation on this idea is what is meant
when scholars discuss “interest-based” theories (Sides and Citrin, p.478). Often the political
dialogue in any given nation-state reflects this focus on interest (Sides and Citrin, p.478).
Contentious debates about jobs, wages, crime, schools, and welfare programs are some of the
topics where immigrants are regularly introduced into the discussion (Sides and Citrin,
p.478). Also, another part of the discussion on interest based theories revolves around the
previously mentioned distinction between personal (threat to “me”) and collective (to “us”);
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consensus is difficult to reach because evidence as to which (personal vs. collective) is more
accurate in predicting prejudice, has been mixed (Sides and Citrin, p.479).
However, economic conditions pitting members of the majority group against those in
minority groups is not the only possible outcome. To the extent that economic frustration is
felt, it could be directed towards political elites and the feelings may intensify as conditions
worsen, as a result, members of minority groups could be ignored altogether (Kunovich, p.
21). In fact as far as disadvantaged groups are concerned members’ prejudice may actually
decrease as a sense of threat increases (Kunovich, p.25). This is plausible because members
in a disadvantaged group may feel despair as the overriding emotion with worsening
economic conditions, relegating other emotions (like hostility toward immigrants) to
secondary status; or, if economic conditions are exceptionally burdensome toward
immigrants, even those in disadvantaged situations may be less inclined to feel animosity
towards individuals who are faring even worse than they; or it could simply be the case that
disadvantaged groups reserve their animosity in worsening conditions for political elites who
could be perceived as being “responsible” for the worsening conditions (Kunovich, p.25). If
animosity is directed elsewhere, worsening economic conditions could be a catalyst for
solidarity between groups and create a unified class of people (Kunovich, p.26). Conversely,
advantaged groups may actually be more prejudiced because they may perceive that there is
economic competition between groups, even if they are not directly involved or impacted in
such competition; or advantaged groups can simply be fearful that worsening economic
conditions will dissolve the factors that make them advantaged and therefore they will soon
have to compete (Kunovich, p.26). Therefore any study aiming to address the question of
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opinion towards immigrants would do well to include measurements for economic
conditions.
However although economic conditions affect (or not) attitudes toward immigrants
certain factors within the economic framework should have an impact on attitudes. For
example, the simple variable of income, (which has a forceful influence on an individual’s
social standing) or, a person’s education or labor market position should have an effect on an
individual’s attitude toward immigrants because they all contribute to social standing (and
therefore, arguably, quality of life) (Kunovich, p.22).
From the discussion of these lines of investigation it would seem logical that both
economic conditions and minority population size would have an impact on perceived threats
to the dominant group (Quillian, p.591). While the combination of economic conditions and
minority group size is expected to have its impact on perceptions on a group level; this does
not mean that there are not individual level indicators that may predispose some towards
prejudicial attitudes (Quillian, p.591). It can even be argued that that there is a coupling
(albeit possibly a loose one) between individual level indicators of prejudice and a feeling of
being threatened (Quillian, p.591). Indeed, depending on the indicator, individual-level
indicators may be informative in revealing who may be more predisposed to forming
prejudicial attitudes when threatened; this is so because, depending on the person’s social
position or psychological processes they may feel threatened in a more direct and personal
way and thus likelier to express prejudicial sentiments (Quillian, p.591).
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Previous Findings
Research on attitudes toward immigrants has been performed on a case by case (or in
this case country by country) basis as well as the European continent at large. One example
of a specific test case is found in the work of Schlueter and Scheepers (2010) and their work
in the Netherlands. Schlueter and Scheepers (2010) found that outgroup size (in this case
again, immigrants being the outgroup) both on an aggregate municipal level (re: official
measurements) and as perceived by the majority both relate positively to feelings of group
threat. To go further, perceived group threat has a positive association with discriminatory
intentions toward immigrants and immigrant disapproval (Schlueter and Scheepers 2010).
However, the evidence also finds that group threat is tempered by contact with immigrants.
Not only has research of this kind been conducted in the Netherlands but, in Germany as
well. Wagner, Christ, Pettigrew, Stellmacher, and Wolf (2006) found that in Germany
evidence exists that suggests that intergroup contact has a powerful and positive effect on the
attitudes of group members; thus, providing support for the propagation of contact theory.
Perhaps more interesting then the apparent support for contact theory is how contact theory
works in Germany. Findings suggest that it is the proportion of people in minority groups in
the population of a country that leads to a decrease of prejudice in people of the majority
group (Wagner et al. 2006). Although these findings can only be attributed to Germany it is
nonetheless interesting that they are opposite of what Blumer and Blalock would expect.
A European at large perspective is found in the work of Quillian (1995). Quillian
(1995) finds that education and age have the strongest and most significant effects (p. 597).
Prejudice diminishes with higher education and increases among older responders (Quillian,
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p.597). Quillian (1995) found that most individual-level effects are small in nature (p. 599).
Quillian (1995) concludes that differences in individual-level characteristics do not explain
variation among countries on the national level (p. 599). Indeed, Quillian (1995) finds that
the specific parameters of group-threat theory are the drivers of prejudice across countries in
that dominant group economic condition (re: country-level unit of analysis) and the relative
population of a subordinate group compared to the dominant group spur prejudicial attitudes
across countries; so, the metrics to gauge perceived group threat are good predictors of
prejudice (p. 601-02). Quillian (1995) concludes that to the extent certain individual-level
traits of dominant group members have an effect on prejudicial attitudes their impact is
dependent on the presence or absence of group level perceived threat (p. 605).
Further research has demonstrated that an extreme form of prejudicial attitude
(supportive of ethnic exclusion) is fueled by those with a low level of education, manual
workers, as well as the unemployed (Scheepers et al. p.25-27). As far as income is
concerned, there is a minor yet statistically significant relation, in that, the lower an
individual’s income the more likely they are to support ethnic exclusionism (Scheepers et al.
p.27). Several social classes were found to support ethnic exclusion including routine nonmanual workers, the petty bourgeoisie, housekeepers, and the retired; the service class was
less inclined to support ethnic exclusion (Scheepers et al. p.27). Men supported exclusion
more than women, and Christians more than those who claimed to be non-religious
(Scheepers et al. p.27). Ethnic exclusion also found more support among those identifying
with a conservative political orientation (Scheepers et al. p.27). The size of the proportion of
non-EU citizens in the population was also positively related to more support for ethnic
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exclusion (Scheepers et al. p.27). In fact, it seems the more non-EU citizens there are in a
country, the more those working in manual labor were likely to be supportive of ethnic
exclusionism (Scheepers et al. p.28). Also the level of unemployment or changes in
unemployment has no impact on support for ethnic exclusionism (Scheepers et al. p.27).
McLaren (2003) goes beyond simple prejudicial attitudes and gauges respondents’
willingness to remove members of a subordinate group from their country (p.911). McLaren
(2003) controls for population of minorities, much like other studies, yet a distinction is
made. McLaren (2003) separately controls for dominant group members who do not have
contact with immigrants and live in areas heavily populated by immigrants and those who do
have contact (p. 916). McLaren (2003) finds that widely across Europe those with friends
who are in subordinate social groups are significantly less likely to be hostile towards
immigrants (p. 922).
Kunovich (2004) finds that there are differences in levels of prejudice depending on
an individuals’ labor market position (p.33). Generally, education decreases prejudice, and
income has a faint, negative effect on prejudice (Kunovich, p.33). Those who are selfemployed, “blue collar”, unemployed, or those generally not in the labor force show more
prejudice than those in “white collar” positions (Kunovich, p.33). Of those not in the labor
force there is one group that shows a negative association with prejudicial feelings toward
immigrants. Students are substantially less prejudiced than even “white collar” workers.
If one were to build a hierarchical structure based on these findings, at the bottom,
where the most prejudice lies, would be the self-employed, “blue collar”, unemployed or
non-workforce (i.e. retired) individuals. In the middle would be individuals with “white
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collar” jobs. At the top, where there is the least amount of prejudice, would be students.
Men demonstrate more prejudice than women, age tends to increase prejudice, those who are
married show more prejudice, respondents’ whose parents are both citizens show more
prejudice, individuals who have ever lived abroad demonstrate less prejudice, and the length
of time spent in current residence also increases prejudice (Kunovich, p.33). Although both
education and income showed a general tendency to lower prejudice the size of the effect
differs depending on the country in question (Kunovich, p.34). The size of the immigrant
population is shown to have an intensifier effect.
In countries with large immigrant populations the previously mentioned hierarchy is
still intact but those at the bottom would feel prejudice more intensely (Kunovich, p.38).
Those with “white-collar” positions would feel more or less the same amount of prejudice
but the interesting observation is that students seem to feel substantially more threatened in
countries with large immigrant populations, so they would likely remain at the top but, the
strength of their anti-prejudice attitude would be considerably diminished (Kunovich, p.38).
Countries that have poor economic conditions have a chilling effect on prejudice toward
immigrants. Students and “white collar” workers remain negatively associated with antiimmigrant attitudes but the strength of the variable diminishes; interestingly, in a similar
fashion “blue collar”, self-employed etc. individuals maintain a negative attitude towards
immigrants but the magnitude of the variable is decreased (Kunovich, p.38).
Weldon finds low levels of tolerance across Europe (p. 337). The results in
Weldon’s (2006) study showed that political tolerance for ethnic minorities is significantly
higher than social tolerance for ethnic minorities; however there is still a bloc of the citizenry
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in all countries that were surveyed who are willing to deny minorities even the most basic of
rights (p.337). Using the basic typologies set forth by Liah Greenfeld, Weldon tests to see if
citizenship-regime forms the amount of tolerance for ethnic minorities; collectivistic-ethnic
nations demonstrate the lowest amount of tolerance (Weldon, p. 337). This typology clusters
societies into citizen-regime types, which reflect the general expectations of what it means to
be a proper citizen in that society. What follows is an explanation of the citizenship-regime
types.
The collectivistic-ethnic type is essentially identical to the more traditional ethnic
categorization (Weldon, p.334). The focus with this type is that there are somewhat natural
lines of division that create objective differences between people; this difference which
national identities and distinctions are built from is ethnicity (Weldon, p.334). Under the
collectivistic-ethnic point of view the nation is seen as an all encompassing whole with its
own unique spirit that is greater than any individual member; members are expected to have
a sense of connectivity among one another in recognition of their common ancestry and thus
form solidarity with each other and remain at least somewhat distant from outsiders (Weldon,
p.334). Unsurprisingly, with this perspective citizenship becomes exclusive, it become
entwined with one’s sense of self and not merely a sign of membership in a polity (Weldon,
p.334). The jus sanguinis perspective on citizenship heavily informs this citizenship-regime
type, under jus sanguinis citizenship is largely decided on “bloodline” (Weldon, p.334). The
importance of bloodline is that it serves as the proverbial anchor that ties a person’s ethnicity
to their nation (Weldon, p.334). With such an ethnic-oriented dynamic, one cannot simply
choose to be or not to be a citizen; it is a characteristic of their condition (not unlike hair or
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eye color). Germany is a popular example of this sort of citizenship perspective, but
Switzerland, and Belgium are examples as well (Weldon, p.334); as such these three
countries are included in the current study and are classified under the collectivistic-ethnic
citizenship-regime type.
Secondly, there is the collectivistic-civic regime type. This approach to citizenship
reflects an assimilationist or republican disposition in that, predominately the viewpoint is
that the nation-state is a collective but unlike the collectivistic-ethnic perspective there is a
rejection of the idea that the collective has to be centered on ethnic concerns (Weldon,
p.334). The nation-state is defined through a secular and political prism, and citizenship
simply means loyalty to the larger political community (Weldon, p.334). The focus on the
political community through a secular and political lens is meant to supersede any concerns
about ethnicity (Weldon, p.334). Foreigners under this citizenship-regime are able to obtain
citizenship; however there is an expectation that any new citizens discard the unique cultural
norms of their past and accept the norms of the native population (Weldon, p.334). In
furtherance of this ideal, the state is to facilitate effort to blend the cultural characteristics of
the native population and incoming foreigners; if new members of the population wish to
retain their former cultural background they must do so in private. France’s ban on Muslim
headwear in public schools is an example; other than France, Portugal and Denmark are
examples (Weldon, p.334 & 338). Although the collectivistic-civic regime type seeks to
remove ethnicity as a matter of competition, success in this effort is of varying degrees
(Weldon, p.334-35). The problem with blending cultures is that often it is only minority
groups who have to sacrifice any part of their cultural heritage and the majority group, while
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the dominant ethnic group can claim legitimacy and domain over the political community
and thus the acceptable norms (Weldon, p.334-35).
Lastly, there is the individualistic-civic regime type. The individualistic-civic regime
type of citizenship regime functions under the ideal of “pluralism” (Weldon, p.335). Under
this view the nation-state is not an all encompassing factor that is a foundational cornerstone
in a person’s makeup or a collective to which allegiance must be sworn to; instead, the
emphasis is placed on the individual (Weldon, p.335). Individuals are free to choose which
ethnic and cultural heritage they most identify with and are allowed to proceed accordingly;
the state is there to protect the rights of different ethnic backgrounds and the expressions
thereof and sometimes actively pursues methods of supporting ethnic minority cultures
(Weldon, p.335). The main point with this citizen-regime type is that no sacrifice is, or
should be, called for on the part of minorities to give up their former way of life should they
choose not to. Presumably so long as the laws for the general welfare are being followed,
each person is left to decide how to express their ethnicity and culture. Examples of this
regime-type include Great Britain, Spain, and The Netherlands (Weldon, p. 338).
Research shows that Collectivistic-civic regime types have more tolerance than
collectivistic-ethnic and individualistic-civic has the highest level tolerance of all (Weldon, p.
337). Individual-level factors demonstrate that working class status and age are not a factor
and education is only marginally beneficial for improving political tolerance (Weldon, p.34243). Factors such as a perception of threat or a strong sense of in-group identification were
strong predictors of political intolerance (Weldon, p.342-43). Those who would prefer a
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more authoritarian style of government, are politically conservative, or are dissatisfied with
the democratic process are also more likely to be politically intolerant (Weldon, p.343).
In terms of social intolerance the individual-level factors are stronger predictors but
demographic variables still yield less influence than psychological variables (Weldon,
p.345). When it relates to social tolerance age is a statistically significant factor but the
overall strength of the variable is marginal (Weldon, p.345). Already a strong indicator as it
relates to political tolerance, a perception of threat becomes an even more telling indicator
when social tolerance is the dependent variable (Weldon, p.345). Ultimately Weldon (2006)
concludes that the citizenship-regime type acts as a facilitator for individual-level variables
as it relates to either political or social tolerance against ethnic minorities (Weldon, p.345).
Individual-level factors that are thought to contribute to intolerance are exacerbated or
mitigated depending on the citizenship-regime type (Weldon, p.345).
In one study when asked what the biggest concern regarding immigrants is, 68 % of
respondents replied that they believed immigrants make crime worse (Sides and Citrin,
p.484). In this particular study, in no county surveyed was there any indication of support for
a more accepting immigration policy, regardless of the origin of the immigrants (Sides and
Citrin, p.485). In the same study evidence was found that suggests that economic concerns
both on a personal and societal level have significant effects on opposition to immigration; in
short, those who are more economically satisfied are less opposed to immigration and
societal economic concerns trump personal financial concerns when factoring opposition to
immigration (Sides and Citrin, p.489-91).
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Interestingly in the study mentioned above, objective measures of economic standing,
either personal or societal (GDP for example) have smaller effects when compared to
subjective evaluations. This finding is also present with absolute numbers of immigrants
(Sides and Citrin, p.491). This is reflected in the finding that in nations that have a
demonstrably higher (comparatively speaking) percentage of unemployment and a larger
immigrant population there are lower levels of opposition to immigration (Sides and Citrin,
p.496). Also, anxiety about cultural pluralism has strong associations with negative
evaluations on immigration (Sides and Citrin, p.491).
As it relates to the number of immigrants and its effects on opinions about immigrants
and immigration, Sides and Citrin (2007) find a negative association between perceptions of
the immigrant population and negative attitudes toward immigrants (p. 491). However, the
perception variable has a comparative element. If respondents believe their country receives
fewer immigrants than other nations then there is no statistically significant impact on
opinions towards immigrants or immigration (Sides and Citrin, p.492).
In terms of education and social trust or having immigrant friends (a measure of the
“contact” hypothesis), high levels of these variables diminish negative feelings and can
generate positive feelings toward immigrants (Sides and Citrin, p.493). In general it is the
cultural factors that carry the most weight (as opposed to economic) in determining attitudes
toward immigration and immigrants, although both are important (Sides and Citrin, p.494).
Evidence exists that demonstrate that a feeling of cultural threat combined with
preferences of linguistic unity and a general cohesion of society significantly correlates with
hostility toward immigrants (Citrin and Sides, p.37). Some evidence also suggests that
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country-level factors are of minimal use in explaining hostility toward immigrants (Citrin and
Sides, p.37). As it relates to issues regarding religion, certain evidence suggests that
“Western” countries are more or less distributed evenly across the spectrum of opposition
and support for religious homogeneity (Citrin and Sides, p.37). There seems to be more
agreement on cultural homogeneity however, as the majority of nations support it (Citrin and
Sides, p.37).
Other results indicate that the ability to speak the language of the host country is the
most important factor in being accepted while racial considerations (i.e. being “white”) was
of least importance (Citrin and Sides, p.39). However, it is noted that results reflecting the
minimal importance of racial characteristics could be a result of respondents giving a socially
desirable answer (Citrin and Sides, p.39). Opinions on the value of cultural homogeneity,
social trust and education are particularly influential (Citrin and Sides, p.46). Financial
concerns have comparatively less impact on findings which suggests that attitudes toward
immigrants are based largely on cultural symbolism than concerns about material standing
(Citrin and Sides, p.46). The factors that are perhaps the most influential were social trust
and cultural and religious homogeneity; these factors remain significant across countries and
have a larger magnitude than other factors (Citrin and Sides, p.48).
As it relates to financial concerns, some results suggests that there is more concern
about immigrants among nations that can be considered “wealthier” or are making gains to
becoming wealthier, however again, according to these results the overall strength of the
financial factor is minimal (Citrin and Sides, p.49). As for specific financially-related factors
like unemployment; there is a mild negative association between immigrants and the
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unemployment rate but a relationship between changes in unemployment and immigrants is
practically non-existent (Citrin and Sides, p.49-50). Perhaps most surprisingly, according to
some evidence there is no relationship between attitudes toward immigrants and the size
and/or configuration of the immigration population (Citrin and Sides, p.50).
Hjerm (2007) similarly finds those with a higher education and healthy private
financial situations are less xenophobic; also, those with immigrant friends or co-workers
tend to be less xenophobic than those who do not have similar relations (p.1267). Those who
perceive higher proportions of immigration tend to express more xenophobia (within a
specific country) (Hjerm, p.1267). However, actual measurements of the foreign-born
population have no affect on xenophobia (Hjerm, p.1267). When both actual and perceived
measurements were examined comparatively across countries on a group level neither factor
related to xenophobia, this remained so even after the two were formed into an interaction
variable (Hjerm, p.1269). This also remains so after political context and GDP were taken
into account (Hjerm, p.1269). GDP remained an ineffective indicator (in either a negative or
positive direction) of xenophobia when tested alone but variables relating to immigration
politics and political articulation were viable indicators of xenophobia (Hjerm, p.1269).
Some research has come across findings that run counter to what theorists would
believe to be true. Such an example is found in Green’s (2009) work. Some theorists would
predict that the higher the immigration or, of arguably greater concern, refugee population is
the more hostile attitudes should proliferate. However Green (2009) found that the lower a
country’s refugee rate the higher the chance of endorsement of ascribed immigration criteria,
ascribed immigration criteria being an aspect of xenophobia. Findings like this are intriguing
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and help to propel continued study forward because if findings like this are consistent then a
re-evaluation of the population theory needs to be undertaken.
Research performed by Herreros and Criado (2009) have provided interesting results.
Specifically, as it relates to the current study, those who are satisfied with the economy have
positive attitudes toward immigrants, this effect is statistically significant across both models
tested (Herreros and Criado, p.348). Also, it seems that the more immigrants there are in a
country the poorer the attitude toward immigrants; yet, positive growth trends in immigration
demonstrates a statistically significant relationship with positive attitudes toward immigrants
(Herreros and Criado, p.348). The finding about the immigration trends is especially
intriguing because it runs counter to what the authors’ hypothesized; perhaps this finding
illustrates a disjuncture between those in the population and current population trends. In
other words, just because a country is experiencing growth in the immigration population
does not necessarily mean that members of the native population realize growth is occurring,
lending all the more importance to theoretical power of perception.
Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet (2009) performed research that centered on attitude
change toward immigration in Europe. Meuleman et al. found that in the five year period
between 2002 and 2007 there were significant attitude changes found in a majority of the
countries being tested (p. 359). The authors found some evidence that short-term changes in
the size of the immigrant population contribute in attitude change (Meuleman et al., p. 361).
Moreover, the evidence suggest that those countries with high immigrant populations,
attitudes tend to be more restrictive (Meuleman et al., p. 361). The economic indicator found
to be most predictive in attitude change is changes to unemployment. Evidence suggests that
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decreasing unemployment is indicative of increasingly positive attitudes toward immigration
(Meuleman et al., p. 363). Overall the findings of Meuleman et al. (2009) indicate that, at
least from the 2002-2007 period, high immigration population and labor force position are
the key ingredients in the presence and prevalence of group threat.
Rustenbach (2010) found, similar to most scholars, that higher education was related
to more favorable attitudes toward immigrants (p. 63). Likewise, having a left-leaning
political orientation or being a member in a left-leaning nation and being interested in politics
leads to positive attitudes towards immigrants (Rustenabch, p.63). Additionally, evidence
suggests that members of a country that give foreign direct investment are less prejudicial
(Rustenbach, p.63). Those demonstrating more interpersonal trust demonstrated less
prejudicial attitudes. Results pertaining to those who developed familial connections were
non-significant (Rustenbach, p.64). Those who are concerned about neighborhood safety
show a positive association with prejudicial feelings toward immigrants (Rustenbach, p.63).
National unemployment also had an effect on anti-immigrant attitudes (Rustenbach, p.66).
Those with a right-leaning political orientation are shown to demonstrate prejudicial attitudes
as well (Rustenbach, p.66). This result is also present in those that have little interest in
politics (Rustenbach, p.68).
With economic measurements the effect seems to vary depending on which variable
is being measured. For instance, lower income per capita and regional GDP was shown to
have a positive relationship with anti-immigrant attitudes but, individual unemployment and
national GDP were not significantly related to anti-immigrant opinions (Rustenbach, p.64).
Interestingly, regional and national-level unemployment levels demonstrated a relationship
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opposite of what one would expect in that, as rates increased animosity decreased
(Rustenbach, p.65). Perhaps even more interestingly, no significant evidence was found to
support cultural marginality theory; those who had been discriminated against (and were
therefore theoretically likely to discriminate against others) did not hold anti-immigrant
attitudes (Rustenbach, p.65). Similarly, the number of immigrants at the regional and
national level had no relation to anti-immigrant attitudes, which according to Rustenbach’s
study (2010) calls into question the validity of contact theory (p.65).
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Data & Methods
The current study uses the parsimonious definition of prejudice set forth by Ashmore
(1970).
Quillian (1995) combined certain theoretical elements from multiple theorists;
following Blumer’s work Quillian (1995) perceived racial prejudice as the result of the
dominant group feeling that their exclusive privileges are being challenged by subordinate; as
such prejudicial attitudes are a reaction to this challenge (p. 591). Following Blalock,
Quillian (1995) incorporates relative group size into a prejudicial heuristic; hypothesizing
that the relative size of the subordinate group to the dominant one should impact perceived
threat, and thus prejudicial attitudes (p. 591). As subordinate groups grow larger relative to
the dominant group the feeling of threat, and as a consequence, prejudice should grow;
conversely the smaller the minority group relative to the dominant group the feeling of threat,
and thus, prejudice should decrease (Quillian, p.591). Continuing with the work of Blalock
(as well as other researchers) subordinate groups will most likely appear more threatening
and offering a greater challenge when the economic conditions within the receiving nation
are either on the precipice of negative movement or already trending negatively; therefore,
the worse economic conditions are in a receiving nation, the more threatened the dominant
group will be and the higher the likelihood that members of that group will express
prejudicial attitudes (Quillian, p.591). The underlying fear that connects a country’s general
economic well-being and dominant group members’ concern about immigrants is one of
positioning (Quillian, p.592). Members of the dominant group are concerned that their
superior economic position will erode through competition with subordinate groups; this fear
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is compounded in an unstable or negatively trending economic climate, and resources
become even scarcer (Quillian, p.592). In Europe, wealth tends to diminish competition
between immigrants and members of the dominant group and thus tends to neutralize a sense
of threat among dominant group members (Quillian, p.592). This study will follow in the
footsteps of Quillian (1995) in regards to the synthesis of theories.
Also like Quillian (1995) the current study will focus on certain individual-level traits
that pose a potential risk for the generation of prejudicial attitudes, especially as group
privileges are challenged. Focusing on the individual level is a justified exercise as studies
have found that the majority of the variance (of xenophobia, hostility, etc.) can be explained
on the individual level; for example, Hjerm (2007) found that 10% of the variance of
xenophobia can be attributed by country level factors whereas individual level factors explain
about 90% (p. 1266). In another study (Rustenbach 2010) it has been further demonstrated
that the majority of the variance in anti-immigrant attitude takes place at the individual level;
which would suggest that appeals for a change in beliefs would be most effective at that level
(p.69). It is prudent therefore, to focus on the individual as the unit of analysis, where it
seems prejudice has the strongest influence. Certain individual characteristics will be
predictive of prejudicial leanings and this will be felt more intensely among individuals who
are concerned, either on a personal level or on a group level, about economic well-being.
Unlike Quillian (1995) this study follows McLaren (2003) and focuses more on the
individual level of analysis than on the assumption of uniformity of behavior of the dominant
group population. Whatever the factors that may contribute to its generation prejudice is
created and felt as a personal, individual experience, and therefore this study argues that they
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are the most appropriate unit of analysis. This is not to say that the importance of the
differentiation that dominant group members engage in to separate themselves between
themselves (“us”) and subordinate groups (“them”), what Quillian (1995, p. 592) labels as
“group threat theory”, should be ignored but rather, group threat theory is most likely an
element and not the overarching cause of prejudicial tendencies. With this in mind,
Quillian’s (1995) version of “group threat theory” is incorporated into the current study.
While the individual’s perception of themselves is the focus, there is also an attempt in this
study to gauge the individual’s perception of the group; this is done in an attempt to further
understand what, if any, level breeds more prejudice. Despite the noted distinction between
the two testable threat categories (personal and collective) both are capable of being tested
concurrently because the logic behind both distinctions is identical (Sides and Citrin, p.479).
A large theoretical focus of this study is concerns about individual perception.
Studies have demonstrated that there is solid reason to think that individuals’ perceptions
about the number of immigrants will lead to overestimation; indeed, citizens (of any nation)
have a tendency to overestimate the size of minority populations (Citrin and Sides, p.39).
Moreover interestingly, it would seem that overestimation is more severe in countries with
few immigrants (Citrin and Sides, p.42). Therefore testing strictly aggregate immigration
population numbers against individuals will probably lead to misleading results. Also, if
individuals tend to be inaccurate in their estimation about immigration it stands to reason
they will be inaccurate with other national level phenomena. Therefore, the concern will be
of individuals’ perceptions of certain variables.
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Whether or not an individual’s perception are in line with the facts, the perception
will fuel how a person feels about a certain variable and therefore become a major factor in
the actions and behavior of the individual. Indeed, a person’s perception may be
significantly divorced from reality, in that rumors or specific incidents can ignite a general
consensus that immigrants are the source of economic difficulties (Rustenbach, p.60).
Alternatively, it is possible that in times of economic trouble members of the native
population are simply searching for a scapegoat and their perceptions are adjusted to that end
(Rustenbach, p.60). However, for the sake of thoroughness national-level aggregate
variables will also be tested. Also, in this line of study testing for country-level variables has
been shown to contribute to a more complete account of the total variance (Weldon, 2006).
The current study also tests for the role of perceptions of immigrant population size in
prejudice formation. Perceptions of a growing immigrant population would be a likely
catalyst for feelings of hostility and anxiety towards immigrants (Sides and Citrin, p.480).
In many studies there is a noted concern over political environment and/or institution
as a variable. There is a widely held argument that attitudes are context dependent, and that
dynamic shifts in attitudes are not due to individual factors alone, but also contextual factors
(Ceobanu, Escandell 2008, p. 1154). However, there is considerable variation as to how to
best measure this variable. Many studies use aggregate variables in an attempt to control for
contextual factors, but this study follows Weldon (2006) in using the citizenship-regime
typologies largely created by Liah Greenfeld. Of course, no society serves as a perfect
template for their particular category, but it is best to remember that typologies such as this
are heuristics used to aid in the study of what can be difficult phenomena to study.
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Following Weldon’s (2006) lead, the nine countries in this study (Germany, Belgium,
Switzerland, France, Portugal, Denmark, Great Britain, Spain, and the Netherlands) are thus
parceled to the corresponding citizenship-regime type that it most closely resembles.
The argument that contextual plays an important role in attitude formation is popular
(Ceobanu and Escandell 2008, Weldon 2006, etc.) and indeed, contextual factors may play
an important role. Societal/political contexts may be important because they institutionalize
the common notions of rights and responsibilities of individuals in order to become
legitimate members of society (Weldon, p.335). These notions are distributed through the
school system and the workplace and they are internalized, and eventually they are reinforced
through familial experiences (Weldon, p.335). Moreover they inform the policies and
acceptable political rhetoric of the nation-state’s leaders and potential candidates (Weldon,
p.335).
Due to the importance attributed to factors like economic indicators (Ceobanu and
Escandell 2008, Kehrberg 2007, Schneider 2008, Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky
2006, and Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2008), immigrant population factors
(Ceobanu and Escandell 2008, Kehrberg 2007, Schneider 2008, Semyonov et al. 2006, and
Semyonov et al. 2008) and generally perception (Green 2007, Schneider 2008, and
Semyonov et al. 2008) the second hypothesis in this study maintains that the key independent
variables will have more explanatory power and therefore have similar effects regardless of
political environment. It is difficult to find an effective way to measure the effect of political
environment hence, the usual use of aggregate variables. Citizenship-regime types provide a
conceptually sound way to differentiate as well as gauge political environments and pool
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countries that have similar environments. Therefore this study uses the citizenship-regime
types in an attempt to control for any potential effect that political environment might have
on the main independent variables.

Given the factors previously mentioned this study therefore sets out to test the following
hypotheses:

H1: Both perceived economic troubles and perceived immigrant group size will
have a positive, statistically significant relationship with animosity toward
immigrants. This relationship will increase in strength and significance when
both independent variables are combined to form an interaction term.
H2: This relationship will be confirmed in all country citizen-regime typologies in
the study.
H3: This relationship will remain significant after controlling for both individual
level variables and state-level aggregate variables.
Many studies in this line of research make use of the Eurobarometer (Quillian, 1995,
McLaren 2003, Weldon 2006, Scheepers et al. 2002) some even make use of the
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) (Kunovich 2004). However, over recent
years many others have started to use the European Social Survey (Citrin and Sides, 2008,
Sides and Citrin 2007, Hjerm 2007, Rustenbach 2010,). This study follows the line of use of
the European Social Survey.
Following a litany of other studies (Quillian, 1995) this study tests for certain
individual-level variables that have become somewhat standard in the field.
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Education: Since Samuel Stouffer (1955) it has since been widely recognized that
respondents with higher level education backgrounds are less likely to express prejudicial
attitudes (Quillian, p.595). Following Quillian (1995), Weldon (2006), Sides and Citrin
(2007), Kunovich (2004), Hjerm (2007) the current study will control for educational
attainment.

Age: The simple logic here is that older individuals will express more prejudicial attitudes
(Quillian, p.595). Following Quillian (1995), Sides and Citrin (2007), and Hjerm (2007) this
study will also control for age.

Class Status: People who are more directly competitive with immigrants, so-called “blue
collar” workers, should be more likely to be prejudiced towards immigrants (Quillian, p.595).
Following Quillian (1995), and Scheepers et al. (2002) this study will take class status into
account as a possible intervening variable.

Change in Economic Status: The implications of psychological frustration-aggression
hypotheses would predict that those experiencing a recent decline in economic standing
would increase frustration and thus increase prejudicial inclinations towards members of
subordinate groups (Quillian, p.595).

Income: The logic here is straightforward, those with less means, lower income, will
experience competition in a more intense way, moreover, they will be competitive against a
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greater multitude, like members of various subordinate groups (Quillian, p.595). Following
Quillian (1995), Kunovich (2004), Hjerm (2007), and Scheepers et al. (2002) this study will
use personal income as a control factor.

Sex: It is hypothesized in much of the literature (Quillian, 1995) that men will have more
prejudicial attitudes than women. Following Quillian (1995), Kunovich (2004), and Hjerm
(2007) this study will also control for sex.

Life Satisfaction: Recalling psychological frustration-aggression hypotheses and following
Quillian (1995) people who are generally frustrated with their station in life will develop
prejudicial attitudes. Following Quillian (1995), and others (Sides and Citrin 2007) this
study will factor in life satisfaction.

Contact: Following much of the previous literature, (Quillian, 1995, McLaren, 2003) people
who have or have had steady contact with members of subordinate social groups should have
a better understanding of those groups and be less compelled by stereotypes and rumor and
thus, be more rational and less prejudicial. Over time, the contact hypothesis has been
amended, almost to the point of being rendered unhelpful but most researchers in this line of
research maintain that under the right conditions contact is able to alleviate prejudice
(McLaren, p.911). The ESS module that the current study uses measured contact mainly
through one variable, working abroad; this style of measurement is not entirely without
precedent as Kunovich (2004) used a similar variable “living abroad” to gauge the contact
52

hypothesis. The two variables are similar in that unless an individual’s native country and
destination are close enough to commute to, then working abroad essentially means living
abroad as well. This study will use the ESS measure of working abroad to gauge contact.

Political Ideology: At least on a conceptual level it could very well be that prejudice (or the
lack thereof) is a manifestation of political ideology. Therefore this study follows many
scholars (Sides and Citrin 2007, Weldon 2006, Scheepers et al. 2002) in controlling for this
variable.

Democratic Process: It is possible that individuals who are dissatisfied with the democratic
processes are merely expressing this dissatisfaction through a negative focus and opinion of
minorities, particularly immigrants (Weldon, p.339). Following Weldon (2006) this study
will control for an individual’s satisfaction with the democratic process in their country.

Political Awareness: Individuals who are more politically aware may have a more nuanced
and sophisticated appreciation for the political issues of the day, including immigration;
therefore, those that are politically aware may be less inclined to feel animosity towards
immigrants. On the other hand, it could be that raised political awareness only stokes the
emotions the individual previously held, thus acting as an intensifier. In either case, it is
prudent to test for this variable and the current study follows others who have also done so
(Sides and Citrin 2007).
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Social Trust: Hostility towards immigrants could be a symptom of a general misanthropy or
suspicion on the part of an individual towards others. Any animosity felt would not be
simply because other people are immigrants but because other people are simply people and
they are not to be trusted. Conversely, if someone feels positively towards other people then
they may be less likely to feel hostility towards anyone, be they an immigrant or otherwise.
It is prudent to test for this variable and following Sides and Citrin (2007) the current study
will do so.

Location: It may be possible that attitudes are at least partially dependent on area of
residence. Those who live in larger metropolitan cities may have more exposure and
familiarity with multiple cultures, and points of view and therefore may be less bothered by
diversity in the population. Comparatively, those who live in small suburban or rural areas
may be culturally isolated and therefore be more suspicious and less trusting of members of a
different group, and thus, be more likely to express prejudicial attitudes. Following
Scheepers et al. (2002), this study will factor in an individual’s place of residence (e.g.
metropolitan area or countryside) as a control variable.

Religion: The exact affect of religion on prejudicial attitudes is uncertain. It could be that
because many of the world’s largest religions teach lessons of peace and hospitality that the
more religious an individual is the less likely they will be to express prejudicial attitudes. On
the other hand those who are highly religious and spend a great deal of time in a specific
cultural setting may become culturally isolated and become less trusting and more suspicious
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of other groups, especially those that do not share the individual’s particular religious beliefs.
Therefore following Scheepers et al. (2002) this study will control for both a person’s selfdescribed “religiosity” and the frequency with which that person attend religious services.

Values: It would not be a great stretch to imagine that an individual’s personal thought
process would be informed on their personal values. Research has been undertaken to try
and measure different categories of values and how they might affect attitudes. Using the
first wave of the European Social Survey (2002-03) Davidov, Meuleman, Billiet and Schmidt
(2008) constructed two dimensions of value-orientations; “Self-transcendence” is comprised
of values of “universalism” and “benevolence” as gauged by questions in the survey
(Davidov et al., p.587). The other value-orientation identified is “Conservation” comprised
by the values of “tradition”, “conformity”, and “security” also gauged by question held
within the survey (Davidov et al., p.587). Following this line of research value-orientation is
used as a control variable in the present study.
Following Weldon (2006) and others I excluded respondents who self-identified as a
member of an ethnic minority group or who felt discriminated against because of ethnic
background.
Many studies of this nature rely on the tool of multilevel or hierarchical linear
modeling (HLM) (Hjerm, 2007, Weldon 2006, Kunovich 2004, Scheepers et al. 2002). HLM
is used as a technique to reduce the likelihood of underestimated standard errors and identify
where most of the variance lies within nested units of analysis (ex: individuals within
countries) (Hjerm, p.1258, Scheepers et al. p.23). However, the present study will not use
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HLM primarily because the number of countries (N) falls outside of conventional use, which
states that there should be an N of at least 10 (Hjerm, p.1259). The present study is using 9
countries for use as the citizen-regime types. Another reason that HLM is not being utilized
in the present study is because the unit of analysis is the individual, no attempt is being made
to expressly differentiate what level has more explanatory power (the individual or country
level) but macro-level data are included for control purposes, so as to limit any spuriousness
that may result.
Some would argue for the need to try and control for the type of people being
discriminated against. Members of the majority group in France my react differently to
immigrants originating from Middle-Eastern countries than from North African countries
whereas the dynamic may be reversed in another European country. Indeed, there is a strong
logical argument for this position as submitted by Bail (2008). Bail (2008) presents the
notion that citizens living in various cultures are going to have varied views on different
minority types and their “proper” social position. The symbolic boundaries prevalent in
some nations are of little interest in others (Bail 2008). The argument is extended further by
stating that the differentiation of set definitions is so wide that even the official overarching
immigration philosophies of nations can differ with the general public’s understanding of the
various symbolic boundaries (Bail 2008). Bail’s arguments are compelling and because of
that it makes it tempting to try and conceive of variables to measure what symbolic
boundaries the public draws in different countries; this study maintains that such an endeavor
would be productive but for present purposes would be irrelevant.
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This study argues that while members of the majority group in different country
might have different groups in mind when they think of the word immigrant but the
underlying social processes are essentially the same when they think of the term; in other
words, the term immigrant is a strong enough trigger word that when it is brought to the
attention of survey takers there will be a specific group in mind. To elaborate further,
currently in the United States when a person of the majority group is surveyed they will
probably think of a person from a Latin American country despite the fact there are
immigrants coming from other parts of the world; similarly, as mentioned before if one is to
survey a member of the majority group in France there is a good chance that the person will
think of a person of Middle-Eastern decent despite the fact that people from all over the
globe immigrate to France. Due to the probability of international populaces attaching
specific associations with the word immigrant there are likely universal processes that
contribute to how populaces form attitudes about the people they think of as immigrants.
When, in a survey setting a respondent is asked about feelings toward immigrants they are
not so much reacting to the nationality of a people but reacting to a social phenomenon. For
example, in the United States during the mid-1800’s when the railroads were being
constructed if a majority group member was asked about immigrants there is a good chance
that what would come to mind is a Chinese national as immigration from that country was
widespread during that time period. There is little reason to think that a person in the
majority group in the United States during the mid-1800’s would feel any different about a
Chinese national than an individual in the present day would feel about a Mexican national
for example, simply because the countries of origin are different. Therefore, this study treats
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the underlying phenomenon of immigration as universal and attitudes about immigrants,
whoever comes to mind at the mention of the word, are shaped by external, environmental
factors.
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Results
The results from this study are based on the comparison of individualistic-civic and
collectivistic-civic regime types with collectivistic-ethnic used as the reference category.
There are two dimensions of animosity that could potentially be measured. One tests the
variables against the dependent variable of animosity toward the perceived effect immigrants
have on society. The other dimension tests animosity that exists against the perceived
allowance of more immigrants into the country. These two dimensions are similar but
distinct, as efforts to combine the two dimensions into a measurable index resulted in
uncorrelated results. For the purposes of this study the dependent variable of the perceived
effect of immigrants is chosen. It seems very likely that how an individual perceives an
immigrant’s impact, either positively or negatively, will serve as the basis for attitude
formation. It would follow that if an individual perceived immigrants positively they would
be more accepting of the allowance of more and vice versa; therefore, since an individual’s
attitude about the allowance of immigrants is probably at least partially predicated on that
person’s attitude about immigrants, it is prudent to test for the factors that contribute to the
formation of attitudes about the effect of immigrants. The sample consists of 7,144
respondents.
As can be seen in table 13 in model I the R-Square value is .056 which means only
about 5% of the variance is explained. Perhaps somewhat interestingly the overarching
citizenship-regime types demonstrate a positive statistically significant relationship with
animosity toward immigrants (P<.001). Showing some support for the hypothesis regarding
3

For Tables displaying full results see appendix
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concerns about personal finances, an index built to measure personal economic condition
perception shows that when an individual has a negative outlook about personal finances

Results Table1-Model I
Variable
CollectivisticCivic Regime
IndividualisticCivic Regime
Personal Level
Negative
Economic
Perception
Borrow
Money to
Make Ends
Meet, Difficult
or Easy
Low Income
High Income
Low
Immigration
Population
Perception
High
Immigrant
Population
Perception

Direction
Positive

Significance
P<.001

Positive

P<.001

Positive

P<.05

Positive

P<.001

Positive
Negative
Negative

P<.05
P<.001
P<.001

Positive

P<.001
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they are likely to develop animosity toward the effect of immigrants; this finding is
significant at the (P<.05) level. Another significant variable (P<.001) is that those who find
it difficult to borrow money (a measure of economic difficulty) are also likely to show
animosity against the perceived effect of immigrants. Those who are among the low income
earners demonstrate a statistically significant (P<.05) relationship with the dependent
variable; whereas, those among the high income level demonstrate a significantly negative
relationship with the dependent variable (P<.001). Perhaps most telling are the two measures
corresponding to the two perceived levels of immigration. Those who think that there is low
immigration show a negative relationship towards animosity of the effect of immigrants
(P<.001), while conversely, those who believe there is a high number of immigrants
demonstrate a positive relationship with animosity toward the effect of immigrants (P<.001).
As seen on table 2 Model II remains the same except for the addition of an interaction
term measuring the interaction between negative personal economic circumstances and the
perception of high immigration; as such, there is little change in the R-Square measurement,
meaning that approximately the same amount of variance is accounted as before. The
interaction term is significant at the (P<.05) level, and it shows a positive relation between
itself and animosity toward the effect of immigrants, although the magnitude is smaller than
one might expect (.154). Not surprisingly, the inclusion of the interaction term renders the
variable of perception of high immigration and personal perception of negative economic
circumstances non-significant. All other factors remain unchanged as to their effect on the
dependent variable.
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Results Table 2-Model II
Variable
CollectivisticCivic Regime
IndividualisticCivic Regime
Borrow
Money to
Make Ends
Meet, Difficult
or Easy
Low Income
High Income
Low
Immigrant
Population
Perception
The
Interaction of
Negative
Personal
Economic
Perception and
the Perception
of a High
Amount of
Immigration

Direction
Positive

Significance
P<.001

Positive

P<.001

Positive

P<.001

Positive
Negative
Negative

P<.05
P<.001
P<.001

Positive

P<.05

Model III switches out the personal level of economic circumstance for an
individual’s perceptions about group-level financial situations. The R-Square is increased
and now about 11% of the variance is explained. When this is performed living in a
collectivistic-civic society no longer is statistically significant, which leads one to suspect
that the political effect of these types of regime-societies is heavily concerned about financial
well-being. Alternately, individualistic-civic societies remain both statistically significant
(P<.01) and positively related with animosity toward the perceived effect immigrants have.
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Those who are dissatisfied with the economic condition of their country demonstrate a
positive relationship with animosity toward the effect of immigrants
Results Table 3- Model III
Variable
IndividualisticCivic Regime
Type
Country
Economy
Dissatisfaction
Group Level
Negative
Economic
Perception
High Income
Low
Immigrant
Population
Perception
High
Immigrant
Population
Perception

Direction
Positive

Significance
P<.01

Positive

P<.001

Positive

P<.001

Negative
Negative

P<.001
P<.001

Positive

P<.01

(significant at the P<.001 level). An index constructed to gauge dissatisfaction with
economic conditions on a group level (peer groups, citizenry, family etc.) demonstrates that
group level negative economic perceptions relate positively with animosity toward the
perceived effect of immigrants, although the magnitude is somewhat smaller than might be
expected (.092), the variable is significant at the (P<.001) level. Results regarding income
are interesting; using the group level criteria yields results that demonstrate that belonging to
the low income strata is a statistically insignificant factor yet, belonging to the high income
strata remains significant (P<.001) and negatively related to the dependent variable. The
variables relating to perceptions about high and low immigration population yield similar
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results as model I; the variables show similar significance (although high immigration
perception drop to the P<.01 level) and direction; although, interestingly, the magnitude of
perceptions of high immigration is lower than the previous model.
On table 4 Model IV can bee seen and it is the same as model III however an
interaction term is added. The interaction term measures the effect of group level negative
economic perceptions and perceptions of high numbers of immigrants. The R-Square does
Results Table 4- Model IV
Variable
IndividualisticCivic Regime
Type
Country
Economy
Dissatisfaction
Group Level
Negative
Economic
Perception
High Income
Low
Immigrant
Population
Perception

Direction
Positive

Significance
P<.01

Positive

P<.001

Positive

P<.001

Negative
Negative

P<.001
P<.001

not change to any noticeable degree, meaning that 11% of the variance is explained.
Surprisingly, the interaction term is not statistically significant, and when added the
interaction term renders the variable for perception of high number of immigrants nonsignificant as well. The variables concerning group level negative economic perception and
dissatisfaction with economic condition of country are still significant.
Model V reverts back to a focus concerning an individual’s view of their personal
situation and adds a litany of control variables in order to be more certain of variable effects
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and in an effort to weed out potentially spurious factors. Model V yields an R-square vale of
.497 percent of the variance meaning that about 49% of the variance is explained. With the
control variables added the collectivistic-civic regime maintains a positive and significant
(P<.01) relationship, however the individualistic-civic regime is rendered non-significant.
The index created to gauge a negative perception of personal economic circumstances has
become non-significant. An individual who perceives a low immigrant population is
disinclined to harbor negative perceptions about the effect of immigrants and this factor is
significant at the P<.001 level; curiously, having a perception of a high amount of
Results Table 5- Model V
Variable
CollectivisticCivic Regime
Type
Low Immigrant
Population
Perception
Large Amount of
TV Viewing
Interpersonal
Trust
Political Interest
National Trust
Supra-National
Trust
Worked for
Organization
Participated in
Demonstration
Boycott Products
Political Left
Political Right
Life
Satisfaction
Tradition,
Conformity,
Security Focused
Immigrants
Receive More or

Direction
Positive

Significance
P<.01

Negative

P<.001

Positive

P<.05

Negative

P<.001

Negative
Negative
Negative

P<.001
P<.001
P<.05

Negative

P<.01

Negative

P<.001

Negative
Negative
Positive
Negative

P<.01
P<.01
P<.01
P<.001

Positive

P<.001

Positive

P<.001
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Less Than They
Contribute
Many Manage to
Obtain
Benefits/Services
Not Entitled To
When Should
Immigrants
Obtain rights to
Social
Benefits/Services
Universalism,
Benevolence
Focus Index #1
Universalism,
Benevolence
Focus Index #2
Social
Benefits/Services
Lead to a More
Equal Society
European
Unification Go
Further or Gone
Too Far
Low Social
Participation
Concern About
Crime
Feeling of Safety
of Walking
Alone in Local
Area After Dark
Father Born in
Country
Mother Born in
Country
Ever Had
Children Living
in Household
R's Father Had
Blue Collar Job

Positive

P<.001

Positive

P<.001

Negative

P<.001

Negative

P<.001

Negative

P<.05

Negative

P<.001

Negative

P<.01

Positive

P<.01

Positive

P<.001

Positive

P<.01

Positive

P<.05

Positive

P<.01

Positive

P<.01
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immigrants is not significant. Showing the potential influence of the media, those who watch
television frequently are demonstrate a positive relationship with the dependent variable and
it is significant (though just barely) at the P<.05 level.
Those who demonstrate interpersonal trust do not seem to be inclined to have a
negative perception of the effect immigrants have and this is significant at the P<.001 level;
likewise, for those individuals whom show an interest in political matters (also P<.001).
Interestingly, the magnitude of effect is greater for those showing political interest (-.421)
than it is for the index for the index of interpersonal trust (-.075), though this could be a
measurement artifact as an index is comprised of multiple items, all having an influence in
one direction or another, in comparison with a single-item indicator. Another index that
shows a negative relationship with the dependent variable and is significant (P<.001) is
national trust; this is not surprising given that if an individual is trustful of the institutions of
their government they are probably going to assume that the immigrant situation is healthy.
This is also true for those who show trust for the supra-national institutions (ex. The
European Union), in fact the magnitude is slightly larger than those who show trust in the
national institutions (-.038 vs. -.036), though the significance is lower (P<.05 as opposed to
P<.01).
A surprisingly significant variable is the negative relationship between those who
have worked for an organization (of a political variety) and the dependent variable, this
variable is highly significant at the P<.01 level. Perhaps, it is reflective of the idea that those
involved in political organizations have exposure to the immigration population and their
plight and therefore are less likely to form negative attitudes; or perhaps, it is a result that
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those who are willing to work for political organizations are already possess a predisposition
to be more accepting and tolerant. Participating in political demonstrations is also negatively
related to the dependent variable and is significant at the (P<.001) value, this is similar to
participating in boycotts of products (P<.01); suggesting, that there is a relationship between
participating in political actions and possessing at more worldly point of view. The effect of
political orientation is practically a mirror image in that, those who identify as being
politically left-leaning have a negative relationship with the dependent variable whereas,
those who identify as being politically right-leaning have a positive relationship with the
dependent variable. Both political orientation variables are significant at the P<.01 level and
both have similar magnitudes albeit in the opposite directions (-.374 for left vs. .367 for
right).
The variable representing a life satisfaction index is negatively associated with the
dependent variable and is significant at the P<.001 level. Those who identify with values of
tradition and conformity show a positive relationship with the dependent variable and it is
significant at the P<.001 level. Similarly, those who feel that immigrants receive more
benefits than they contribute show a positive relationship that is also significant at the P<.001
level; suggesting that perhaps a lot of animosity towards immigrants comes from a
perception of unfairness. This is buttressed by the findings that those who believe that many
members of society manage to obtain benefits that they are not entitled to; and, those who
claim that immigrants should either wait a long period or never receive full citizenship
benefits; both show a positive relationship with the dependent variable and are significantly
significant at the P<.001 level. Alternatively, those who demonstrate either index
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measurement of universalism demonstrate a statistically significant (P<.001) negative
relationship with the dependent variable. Along similar lines, those that believe that social
services and or benefits lead to a more equal society are negatively associated with the
dependent variable, this finding is significant at the P<.05 level but it is barely so (.044).
There is also some evidence that general attitudes with European unification is an
indicator of animosity (or the lack thereof) towards immigrants. The variable measuring
whether European unification has gone too far or not far enough indicates that there is a
negative statistically significant (P<.001) relationship with the dependent variable. What the
unification measurement likely indicates is that those who feel strongly about unification are
those that are for it and those that are for it are more accepting of the ideal of a unified
European people or even a unified world population and therefore are less likely to think
harshly of immigrants. A curious finding comes via social participation. Both those who
participate frequently and infrequently in social life have a negative relationship with the
dependent variable; but, it is only those who have low social participation that demonstrates
statistical significance (P<.01). This study offers no theories as to why social participation
would have such an odd affect, but perhaps this is can be an area for future research.
Variables concerning crime have a visible relationship with the perception that
immigrants have a negative societal impact. An index constructed to gauge respondents’ fear
of crime demonstrates a positive, statistically significant (at the P< .01). Additionally, a
variable the measures a feeling of safety at night is positively related to the dependent
variable and this too is significant at the (P<.001) level. An interesting result illustrates that
there is a positive relationship between fear of a terrorist attack and the dependent variable,
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however it would only be statistically significant at the somewhat generous (P<.10) level;
possibly indicating that fears of more immediate and personal crimes are more pertinent to
immigrant hostility. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, neither of the variables relating to
religion have a significant effect.
Interestingly, origin seems to have some relevance to the dependent variable. Both
variables relating to whether a respondents’ parents were born in country had a positive and
fairly strong (.629 for father and .555 for mother) statistically significant (P<.01 and P<.05
respectively) relationship with the dependent variable. Surprisingly none of the variables for
the different age groups had a statistically significant relationship; perhaps revealing that
perhaps it is not age that has bearing on a respondents attitudes toward immigrants but the
company that an individual keeps that has a bearing on attitude formation. Most of the
household demographic variables reveal no significant relationship to the dependent variable
except for having ever lived in a house with children. Those who have lived in a house with
children show a positive, significant (P<.01) relationship with the dependent variable;
indicating, that perhaps concerns for the future of children are an ingredient for formulating
negative perceptions about immigrants. Another interesting background variable shows that
among respondents whose father had a “blue collar” job, there is a statistically significant
(P<.01) positive relationship with the dependent variable.
Model VI (on table 6) follows the same procedure as Model V only with the addition
of the interaction effect of a high perception of immigrants and a perception of negative
personal economic circumstances. The R-square value does not change to any noticeable
extent at a value of .497. The interaction variable is statistically significant at the P<.05 level
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and demonstrates a positive relationship with the dependent variable. Given the results from
model V it is likely that although, the interaction effect measures the interaction of these two
variables that the perception of high immigration part of the term is of more explanative
power. After the introduction of the interaction term the stand-alone variable for perceptions
of high immigration has reversed direction and become non-significant, due to the presence
of the interaction term. None of the control variables seem to be effected by the interaction
term.

Results Table 6- Model VI
Variable
CollectivisticCivic Regime
Type
Low Immigrant
Population
Perception
The Interaction
of Negative
Personal
Economic
Perception and
The Perception
of a High
Amount of
Immigration
Large Amount of
TV Viewing
Interpersonal
Trust
Political Interest
National Trust
Supra-National
Trust
Worked for
Organization
Participated in
Demonstration
Boycott Products

Direction
Positive

Significance
P<.01

Negative

P<.001

Positive

P<.05

Positive

P<.05

Negative

P<.001

Negative
Negative
Negative

P<.001
P<.001
P<.05

Negative

P<.01

Negative

P<.001

Negative

P<.01
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Political Left
Political Right
Life
Satisfaction
Tradition,
Conformity,
Security Focused
Immigrants
Receive More or
Less Than They
Contribute
Many Manage to
Obtain
Benefits/Services
Not Entitled To
When Should
Immigrants
Obtain rights to
Social
Benefits/Services
Universalism,
Benevolence
Focus Index #1
Universalism,
Benevolence
Focus Index #2
Social
Benefits/Services
Lead to a More
Equal Society
European
Unification Go
Further or Gone
Too Far
Low Social
Participation
Concern About
Crime
Feeling of Safety
of Walking
Alone in Local
Area After Dark
Father Born in
Country
Mother Born in
Country
Ever Had
Children Living

Negative
Positive
Negative

P<.01
P<.01
P<.001

Positive

P<.001

Positive

P<.001

Positive

P<.001

Positive

P<.001

Negative

P<.001

Negative

P<.001

Negative

P<.05

Negative

P<.001

Negative

P<.01

Positive

P<.01

Positive

P<.001

Positive

P<.01

Positive

P<.05

Positive

P<.01
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in Household
R's Father Had
Blue Collar Job

Positive

P<.01

Model VII can be found on table 7 and it follows the same procedure as model V
except the focus turns toward a “group level” of perception. The R-square value is slightly
higher than that of the individual perspective at .498, although this is hardly a substantial
change. The Collectivistic-Civic remains the only significant regime and it is positively
related to the dependent variable. Dissatisfaction with the economic climate of the country is
statistically significant at P<.01 and is positively related the dependent variable. Oddly, the
index to measure group level (i.e. family, friends etc.) is both statistically significant (P<.05)
and negatively related to the dependent variable. The finding about the group level negative
economic perception is surprising and a bit perplexing. This study does not have an
explanation for this finding but seeing as how the magnitude is small (-.026) and the variable
is very close to being non-significant (.040) perhaps, it is the case that the presence of the
control variables as well as the overall country perception variable is influencing the effect
this variable has. As it stands the face value of the results suggest that those with a negative
group level perception of economic circumstances focus any hostility and animosity toward
parties other than immigrants; perhaps this is true as well, it could be the case that
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Results Table 7- Model VII
Variable
CollectivisticCivic Regime
Type
Country
Economy
Dissatisfaction
Group Level
Negative
Economic
Perception
Low Immigrant
Population
Perception
Large Amount of
TV Viewing
Interpersonal
Trust
Political Interest
National Trust
Supra-National
Trust
Worked for
Organization
Participated in
Demonstration
Boycott Products
Political Left
Political Right
Life
Satisfaction
Tradition,
Conformity,
Security Focused
Immigrants
Receive More or
Less Than They
Contribute
Many Manage to
Obtain
Benefits/Services
Not Entitled To
When Should
Immigrants
Obtain rights to
Social

Direction
Positive

Significance
P<.01

Positive

P<.01

Negative

P<.05

Negative

P<.001

Positive

P<.05

Negative

P<.001

Negative
Negative
Negative

P<.001
P<.001
P<.05

Negative

P<.01

Negative

P<.001

Negative
Negative
Positive
Negative

P<.01
P<.01
P<.01
P<.001

Positive

P<.001

Positive

P<.001

Positive

P<.001

Positive

P<.001
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Benefits/Services
Universalism,
Benevolence
Focus Index #1
Universalism,
Benevolence
Focus Index #2
European
Unification Go
Further or Gone
Too Far
Low Social
Participation
Concern About
Crime
Feeling of Safety
of Walking
Alone in Local
Area After Dark
Father Born in
Country
Mother Born in
Country
Ever Had
Children Living
in Household
R's Father Had
Blue Collar Job

Negative

P<.001

Negative

P<.001

Negative

P<.001

Negative

P<.05

Positive

P<.01

Positive

P<.001

Positive

P<.01

Positive

P<.05

Positive

P<.01

Positive

P<.01

government or industrial leaders may be the receivers of resentment and hostility among
those whom this variable applies. As for the control variables two variables are affected, the
measurement gauging the idea of social benefits making society fairer is no longer
significant. Also, the measurement for low social participation drops in significance from
P<.01 to P<.05.
Model VIII repeats model VII only adding an interaction term of group level negative
economic perception and high immigration perception. There is no discernable change in Rsquare value. The only discernable effect is the effect of the stand-alone variable gauging
group level negative economic perceptions. The result remains in a perplexingly negative
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direction but has increased in significance (.014) and slightly strengthened in magnitude (.036). The interaction term demonstrates a positive relationship but it is not significant.
Results Table 8- Model VIII
Variable
CollectivisticCivic Regime
Type
Country
Economy
Dissatisfaction
Group Level
Negative
Economic
Perception
Low Immigrant
Population
Perception
Large Amount of
TV Viewing
Interpersonal
Trust
Political Interest
National Trust
Supra-National
Trust
Worked for
Organization
Participated in
Demonstration
Boycott Products
Political Left
Political Right
Life
Satisfaction
Tradition,
Conformity,
Security Focused
Immigrants
Receive More or
Less Than They
Contribute
Many Manage to
Obtain
Benefits/Services
Not Entitled To

Direction
Positive

Significance
P<.01

Positive

P<.01

Negative

P<.05

Negative

P<.001

Positive

P<.05

Negative

P<.001

Negative
Negative
Negative

P<.001
P<.001
P<.05

Negative

P<.01

Negative

P<.001

Negative
Negative
Positive
Negative

P<.01
P<.01
P<.01
P<.001

Positive

P<.001

Positive

P<.001

Positive

P<.001
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When Should
Immigrants
Obtain rights to
Social
Benefits/Services
Universalism,
Benevolence
Focus Index #1
Universalism,
Benevolence
Focus Index #2
European
Unification Go
Further or Gone
Too Far
Low Social
Participation
Concern About
Crime
Feeling of Safety
of Walking
Alone in Local
Area After Dark
Father Born in
Country
Mother Born in
Country
Ever Had
Children Living
in Household
R's Father Had
Blue Collar Job

Positive

P<.001

Negative

P<.001

Negative

P<.001

Negative

P<.001

Negative

P<.05

Positive

P<.01

Positive

P<.001

Positive

P<.01

Positive

P<.05

Positive

P<.01

Positive

P<.01

Model IX (located on table 9) blends both individual and group levels of perception.
Despite the blending of perspective the R-Square value remains at .498. The regime-type is
not affected by this as Collectivistic-Civic remains the significant regime and is positively
related (P<.01). Under the blended perception model only concerns about country’s
economic status and group level negative economic perceptions are statistically significant
(P<.01 and P<.05 respectively); however the group level perception variable remains in the
opposite direction as hypothesized. On the surface of the situation the results suggest that an
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individual is more concerned about the country at large than themselves as it relates to
attitude formation towards immigrants. Moreover, when an individual is dissatisfied about
the economic situation of the country animosity towards immigrants is present however,
when one is concerned about the economic situation of their group then animosity is sent
elsewhere (future research is needed to address the question of where). There doesn’t seem
to be any further effect when blending the perceptions.
Results Table 9- Model IX
Variable
CollectivisticCivic Regime
Type
Country
Economy
Dissatisfaction
Group Level
Negative
Economic
Perception
Low Immigrant
Population
Perception
Large Amount of
TV Viewing
Interpersonal
Trust
Political Interest
National Trust
Supra-National
Trust
Worked for
Organization
Participated in
Demonstration
Boycott Products
Political Left
Political Right
Life
Satisfaction
Tradition,
Conformity,

Direction
Positive

Significance
P<.01

Positive

P<.01

Negative

P<.05

Negative

P<.001

Positive

P<.05

Negative

P<.001

Negative
Negative
Negative

P<.001
P<.001
P<.05

Negative

P<.01

Negative

P<.001

Negative
Negative
Positive
Negative

P<.01
P<.01
P<.01
P<.001

Positive

P<.001
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Security Focused
Immigrants
Receive More or
Less Than They
Contribute
Many Manage to
Obtain
Benefits/Services
Not Entitled To
When Should
Immigrants
Obtain rights to
Social
Benefits/Services
Universalism,
Benevolence
Focus Index #1
Universalism,
Benevolence
Focus Index #2
European
Unification Go
Further or Gone
Too Far
Low Social
Participation
Concern About
Crime
Feeling of Safety
of Walking
Alone in Local
Area After Dark
Father Born in
Country
Mother Born in
Country
Ever Had
Children Living
in Household
R's Father Had
Blue Collar Job

Positive

P<.001

Positive

P<.001

Positive

P<.001

Negative

P<.001

Negative

P<.001

Negative

P<.001

Negative

P<.05

Positive

P<.01

Positive

P<.001

Positive

P<.01

Positive

P<.05

Positive

P<.01

Positive

P<.01

Model X is found on table 10 and is identical to IX except it adds the interaction
effects of both individual and group level perceptions. This dynamic yields an R-square
value of .499, which indicates that about 49% of the variance is explained. Again, both
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dissatisfaction of the country’s economic climate and group level negative economic
perception are the leading perceptual indicators; both retain their previous significance and
direction. What is interesting is that even in a blended perceptual model the interaction effect
of personal negative economic perception and a perception of high immigration is
statistically significant (P<.05) and positively related to the dependent variable. The finding
about the personal interaction effect is interesting because neither variable on their own has
significant explanatory power, suggesting that the combined effects of the two variables is
more telling and informative than either one on their own. The interaction effect of group
level economic perception and a high perception of immigration is not significant.
Results Table 10- Model X
Variable
CollectivisticCivic Regime
Type
Country
Economy
Dissatisfaction
Group Level
Negative
Economic
Perception
Low Immigrant
Population
Perception
The Interaction
of Negative
Personal
Economic
Perception and
the Perception of
a High Amount
of Immigration
Large Amount of
TV Viewing
Interpersonal
Trust
Political Interest

Direction
Positive

Significance
P<.01

Positive

P<.01

Negative

P<.05

Negative

P<.001

Positive

P<.05

Positive

P<.05

Negative

P<.001

Negative

P<.001
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National Trust
Supra-National
Trust
Worked for
Organization
Participated in
Demonstration
Boycott Products
Political Left
Political Right
Life
Satisfaction
Tradition,
Conformity,
Security Focused
Immigrants
Receive More or
Less Than They
Contribute
Many Manage to
Obtain
Benefits/Services
Not Entitled To
When Should
Immigrants
Obtain rights to
Social
Benefits/Services
Universalism,
Benevolence
Focus Index #1
Universalism,
Benevolence
Focus Index #2
European
Unification Go
Further or Gone
Too Far
Low Social
Participation
Concern About
Crime
Feeling of Safety
of Walking
Alone in Local
Area After Dark
Father Born in
Country

Negative
Negative

P<.001
P<.05

Negative

P<.01

Negative

P<.001

Negative
Negative
Positive
Negative

P<.01
P<.01
P<.01
P<.001

Positive

P<.001

Positive

P<.001

Positive

P<.001

Positive

P<.001

Negative

P<.001

Negative

P<.001

Negative

P<.001

Negative

P<.05

Positive

P<.01

Positive

P<.001

Positive

P<.01
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Mother Born in
Country
Ever Had
Children Living
in Household
R's Father Had
Blue Collar Job

Positive

P<.05

Positive

P<.01

Positive

P<.01

Model XI retains the same procedure as model IX except for the addition of aggregate
country-level variables (GDP, official immigration population etc.). As can be seen on table
4 this model yields a R-square value of .502, which means that about 50% of the variance is
explained. With the aggregate variables included the citizenship-regime types become nonsignificant factors. Those who are dissatisfied with the national economic situation maintain
a significantly (P<.001) positive relationship with the dependent variable. A perception of
low immigration is also a factor that maintains a significant (P>.001) relationship with the
dependent variable, in a negative direction. Interestingly, there is a positive, significant
(P<.05) relationship between the amount of money (USD) in foreign direct investment
(incoming) and the dependent variable; perhaps, this is because countries receiving
significant quantities of foreign capital are countries that are struggling and the perception
may very well be that an influx of immigrants will only make the situation worse. Of the
aggregate variables potentially the most surprising finding is that the official population of
immigrants (according to EUROSTAT figures) has a negative, significant (P<.05)
relationship with the dependent variable. It would seem then, that when one has a firm
Results Table 11- Model XI
Variable
Country
Economy
Dissatisfaction

Direction
Positive

Significance
P<.001
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Low Immigrant
Population
Perception
Foreign Direct
Investment
(Incoming) in
US Millions
Number of
Foreigners(EUROSTAT)
Large Amount of
TV Viewing
Interpersonal
Trust
Political Interest
National Trust
Supra-National
Trust
Worked for
Organization
Participated in
Demonstration
Boycott Products
Political Left
Political Right
Life Satisfaction
Tradition,
Conformity,
Security Focused
Immigrants
Receive More or
Less Than They
Contribute
Many Manage to
Obtain
Benefits/Services
Not Entitled to
When Should
Immigrants
Obtain Rights to
Social
Benefits/Services
Universalism,
Benevolence
Focus Index #1
Universalism,
Benevolence
Focus Index #2

Negative

P<.001

Positive

P<.05

Negative

P<.05

Positive

P<.05

Negative

P<.001

Negative
Negative
Negative

P<.001
P<.001
P<.05

Negative

P<.05

Negative

P<.01

Negative
Negative
Positive
Negative
Positive

P<.01
P<.01
P<.01
P<.001
P<.001

Positive

P<.001

Positive

P<.001

Positive

P<.001

Negative

P<.001

Negative

P<.001
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Social
Benefits/Services
Lead to a More
Equal Society
Europe
Unification Go
Further or Gone
Too Far
Low Social
Participation
Concern About
Crime
Feeling of Safety
of Walking
Alone in Local
Area After Dark
Perception on the
Likelihood of
Terrorism
Father Born in
Country
Mother Born in
Country
Number of
People Living
Regularly as
Member of
Household
Ever Had
Children Living
in Household
R’s Father Had
Blue Collar Job

Negative

P<.05

Negative

P<.001

Negative

P<.01

Positive

P<.01

Positive

P<.001

Positive

P<.01

Positive

P<.01

Positive

P<.01

Positive

P<.05

Positive

P<.05

Positive

P<.01

understanding of what the actual immigrant population is estimated at they are less likely to
develop hostile attitudes. To go further, when one understands the actual population (or what
official agencies estimate it to be) of immigrants they understand that the immigrant
population is most likely a small part of the population and therefore any threats they pose
are also likely to be small.
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Among the control variables an interesting finding that in this model the belief that
social benefits/programs lead to a more equal society is a significant (P<.05) negative factor
in relation to the dependent variable. Another interesting finding is that, for the first time the
index constructed to gauge individuals’ perceptions of the likelihood of terrorist attacks
becomes significant (P<.01) and is positively associated with the dependent variable. This
study offers no explanation as to what could be behind the effect the aggregate variables have
on this factor. Another interesting finding is that the number of people living regularly in the
household is a significant (P<.05) variable and it is positively related to the dependent
variable; suggesting that at least, when you also consider the aggregate variables, the more
people who live in a household raises the concern about the future of the country and this in
turn raises concerns (or makes them more tangible) about the effect immigrants might have
on the future of the country. Or, an alternative explanation of the finding could be that the
more people who live in a household raises and/or intensifies the concern for safety of the
individuals of the home, and it could be that immigrants are viewed as a threat to that safety.
Other than the mentioned factors no changes are noted among the control variables.
Model XII is the last model and it factors in all the previous factors into one Ordinary
Least Squares regression analysis. The final R-square value is .503, which is not much of a
change from the previous model. Interestingly, the Individualistic-civic regime type gains
significance (P<.05), however it is negatively related to the dependent variable, which
suggests that when all the variables are factored citizens in this type of regime are less likely
to form negative attitudes about the perceived negative effect immigrants have. Another
factor that is interesting concerns the interaction effect of a negative perception of personal
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economic circumstances and a perception of a large amount of immigration; this variable, is
positively associated with the dependent variable and is significant at the (P<.05) level. All
other variables retain their significance and direction as found in model XI.
Results Table 12- Model XII
Variable
IndividualisticCivic Regime
Type
Country
Economy
Dissatisfaction
Low Immigrant
Population
Perception
Foreign Direct
Investment
(Incoming) in
US Millions
Number of
Foreigners(EUROSTAT)
The Interaction
of Negative
Personal
Economic
Perception and
the Perception of
a High Amount
of Immigration
Large Amount of
TV Viewing
Interpersonal
Trust
Political Interest
National Trust
Supra-National
Trust
Worked for
Organization
Participated in
Demonstration
Boycott Products
Political Left
Political Right

Direction
Negative

Significance
P<.05

Positive

P<.001

Negative

P<.001

Positive

P<.05

Negative

P<.05

Positive

P<.05

Positive

P<.05

Negative

P<.001

Negative
Negative
Negative

P<.001
P<.001
P<.05

Negative

P<.05

Negative

P<.01

Negative
Negative
Positive

P<.01
P<.01
P<.01
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Life Satisfaction
Tradition,
Conformity,
Security Focused
Immigrants
Receive More or
Less Than They
Contribute
Many Manage to
Obtain
Benefits/Services
Not Entitled to
When Should
Immigrants
Obtain Rights to
Social
Benefits/Services
Universalism,
Benevolence
Focus Index #1
Universalism,
Benevolence
Focus Index #2
Social
Benefits/Services
Lead to a More
Equal Society
Europe
Unification Go
Further or Gone
Too Far
Low Social
Participation
Concern About
Crime
Feeling of Safety
of Walking
Alone in Local
Area After Dark
Perception on the
Likelihood of
Terrorism
Father Born in
Country
Mother Born in
Country
Number of
People Living

Negative
Positive

P<.001
P<.001

Positive

P<.001

Positive

P<.001

Positive

P<.001

Negative

P<.001

Negative

P<.001

Negative

P<.05

Negative

P<.001

Negative

P<.01

Positive

P<.01

Positive

P<.001

Positive

P<.01

Positive

P<.01

Positive

P<.01

Positive

P<.05
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Regularly as
Member of
Household
Ever Had
Children Living
in Household
R’s Father Had
Blue Collar Job

Positive

P<.05

Positive

P<.01
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Discussion
Recall that the hypotheses that have driven the study are the following:
H1: Both perceived economic troubles and perceived immigrant group size will
have a positive, statistically significant relationship with animosity toward
immigrants. This relationship will increase in strength and significance when
both independent variables are combined to form an interaction term.
H2: This relationship will be confirmed in all country citizen-regime typologies in
the study.
H3: This relationship will remain significant after controlling for both individual
level variables and state-level aggregate variables.
The results of this study have demonstrated that to the extent that these hypotheses can be
accepted, they can only be partially so. For example, the results have shown that H1 is
greatly dependent on the perspective of the individual and in what context individuals find
themselves in. As can be seen from model XII those that are concerned about the economic
standing of their country at large (a measurement of group-level concern) are more likely to
develop negative attitudes about immigrants. Additionally those concerned about their
personal economic well-being are also likely to develop animosity toward immigrants, but
only when this concern is paired with a perception of a high level of immigration on the part
of the individual.
As far as H2 is concerned, there is partial evidence to both support and refute this
hypothesis. The variables mentioned above remain significant after controlling for the
citizenship-regime type, yet, there is still some question as to what effect the regime-types
have on individual level perceptual factors. For example, in the last model, it is shown that
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those living in individualistic-civic regime types are at least more likely to develop animosity
towards immigrants where those living in a collectivistic-civic regime type are not, because
according to the results, the concerns of the people living in those types of countries can be
explained by other factors. While offering up any explanation as to why the different regime
types might affect individual perceptual level factors is beyond the scope of this study, it is
within in the realm of possibility that the particular way that norm socialization occurs in
these countries yields suspicion of outsiders; this and similar questions are fertile ground for
further research.
Using the various control variables in the study has essentially refuted H3. Clearly,
there are other factors at work that affect attitude formation towards immigrants, that can
minimize financial and population concerns. Although H3 is essentially rejected, the testing
of the hypothesis has yielded some interesting insight. If one is to take full stock of the
results from model XII one would have to acknowledge the fact that animosity towards
immigrants is often the by-product of some other phenomena. For example, the fact that the
index for interpersonal trust withstood the factoring of all the other variables is telling. If
those with high amounts of interpersonal trust have little animosity towards immigrants than
it is most likely the case that those with little interpersonal trust have some animosity, this is
because of the general sense of suspicion that plays a daily role in these individuals’ lives; it
stands to reason, that this suspicion would only grow in the presence of “strange” outsiders
like immigrants. This is far from the only example.
Variables like national and supra-national trust, life satisfaction, tradition focus, the
measurements regarding fairness (some are able to receive what they did not earn/immigrants
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receive more than they contribute), the universalism measurements, feeling of safety, crime,
terrorism etc. are all indicative of a sense of relationship to the world. The results
demonstrate that those who have a more insecure and/or distrusting relationship with the
world around them are more likely to think that immigrants (the consummate “outsider”)
have a negative impact on society; whereas, those who seem to have a more open and
trusting disposition are less likely to think that immigrants have a negative impact. The
results reveal, at least in part, that attitudes are concerned less with fiscal health or material
competition and are more related with a personal sense of comfort and security; stated
simply, it would seem that those who feel less comfortable and secure feel more suspicious
and distrusting, and part of the way that this discomfort and distrust manifests itself is
through negative attitudes towards immigrants.
So far the discussion has surrounded the factors that have been shown to be of
significance but it is worthwhile to have a discussion about factors that would seem like they
would be important but as far as this study is concerned, turned out not to be. The
measurements concerning religion did not seem to have any sort of impact, which is
somewhat interesting because it would seem logical that those who identify as being
religious or participate in religious activity would receive their normative cues from their
religious source of choice. As far as attitudes towards immigrants are concerned religion
seems to be either concerned with other matters or the cues that are being given about
immigrants are being ignored. Another interesting non-factor is age. None of the age groups
displayed statistical significance, so the mere fact that one is a certain age has little bearing in
comparison to the other daily factors that play into attitude formation, at least as it concerns
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immigrants. To put it another way, the way an individual feels about immigrants is
determined by the current outlook on life that a person holds and has less to do with how old
that person is.
Gender is another interesting non-factor. One might be tempted to think that
biosocial imperatives and gendered social norms may influence the thought process of the
two genders. As far as a negative attitude about immigrants is concerned, this is not the case.
The apparent importance of personal outlook supersedes any influence biology and social
norms seem to have on this subject. Similarly, it is surprising to discover that education and
personal improvement were non-significant factors. The findings in this study seem to speak
against those who would claim that accruing more social capital (such as education and
skills) will make one feel less threatened and therefore view immigrants more positively.
Human capital notwithstanding if personal disposition does not improve it seems unlikely
that immigrants will be looked upon favorably.
Finally, some other factors that are of particular surprise are population area, blue
collar occupation and contact. None of the above listed factors are found to be significant
which seems to fly in the face of what could be considered “common sense”. It would be
easy to think that those living in somewhat isolated rural areas would view immigrants more
harshly than those in the city who see a diverse population daily. It makes sense to think that
those with “blue collar” positions would feel more competitive with incoming populations in
the labor market and therefore take a harsh stance towards new competitors. It would also
make sense to think that contact with foreign populations would open the worldview of an
individual. Yet, as can be seen these factors are reduced in significance by other factors at
92

work, which means if one wishes to attempt to address a problem of negative attitude
formation one would do well to look beyond what would seem to be “obvious” common
factors.
However, it has to be noted that the results the above listed factors have yielded could
be due to the way they are measured. The 2008 version of the ESS has a simple response set
for a respondent’s place of residence. Perhaps, a more nuanced choice selection for this
variable would have produced different results. Choice selection also plays a role in the
classification of “blue collar” worker, if a researcher were to use the same data source but
construct the variable with different criteria then perhaps there would be a different result for
the variable. Perhaps the biggest caveat is reserved for the measure for the contact factor.
As of the writing of this study only one variable of the 2008 wave of the ESS provided a
measure to factor in contact theory. Perhaps if a different measure was formulated by the
ESS or a series of measures were developed for use in a potential index, one could better
ascertain the potential impact that contact with a foreign or “outsider” population has, but as
these results stand, contact has little to do with the formulation of negative attitudes towards
the perceived impact of immigrants.

93

Policy Implications
The findings in this study can be useful to any government that wishes to make their
nation a more welcoming place for immigrants. The first finding reflects a need that
governments seek to fulfill in the course of their regular duties, and that is to provide a good
economic climate. However, to help curb any desire among the native population to blame
or otherwise scapegoat immigrants, there is a need for the native population to know that the
economy is good when it is and see tangible steps for improvement when there are
downturns and recessions. Since people tend not to form negative attitudes about immigrants
when they believe the immigrant population is low, it would be of great benefit to interested
parties to distribute accurate information when there are times when political entrepreneurs
might try to paint the immigrant issue in a negative light for their own interests. Since one of
the factors of negative attitude formation is the interaction of the perception of a large
immigrant population and personal economic concerns, addressing either one in a systematic
way, would dampen the formation of said attitudes.
One prime example of the need for properly functioning political institutions is a
functioning and (at least mostly) uncorrupt police force. Fears of crime, nighttime safety,
and terrorism make people suspicious of one another; especially it seems, against noticeably
different members of the “outsider” immigrant population. This study shows that these fears
play significant roles in the formation of negative attitudes toward immigrants. To address
the concerns about crime with a capable police force also addresses a potential source of
hostility toward immigrants.
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Another one of the findings suggests that an investment in ensuring the proper
functioning of the political institutions would be worthwhile. If there is a general trust in
political institutions, there will be less of a need for the native population to look for
someone to blame because the system is not operating as planned. The same can be said for
supra-national trust, especially in the European context. If a European (particularly Western)
country can get the general population to buy in to a sense of “Europeaness” then, perhaps
there would be less resentment on the part of the native population. Admittedly, the
Europeanization process would have to start very early on in education. Activities, like
frequent field trips to other countries (possible due to the close proximity of many European
countries) and extensive language and culture studies as part of the curriculum. If
individuals internally normalize other ways of life then they will probably be more accepting
of people from foreign lands. Along similar lines, if through social normalization a general
interest in political issues can be formed individuals may seek to understand the issues better
and try to understand either side, and not rely on rumor and hearsay for information and
confuse speculation and conjecture for fact.
It would be a very difficult thing to do for any government to try and establish
inter-personal trust among members of the population. However, the education process once
again provides a potential opportunity to attempt this very feat. Implementing trust and team
building exercises into the routine part of normal school life from small children up through
late teenagers may be a pathway to create a sense of trust among members of the population.
If these exercises are designed and carried out in an effective manner than perhaps enough
trust among members of the native population will build to at least give new members a
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chance to get acclimated and settled, without being the object of resentment and scorn.
Indeed, if there is any action to be taken on the part of governments to try to make their
country a more welcoming place for immigrants, it is through the long term normalization
process. If serious efforts are undertaken to try and encourage the native population to be
more trustful of one another, issues like suspicions that people receive what they do not earn
or immigrants receiving more than they contribute should dissipate as well, thus diminishing
the chances that negative attitudes towards immigrants will form.
Another example of this process is value formation. As is seen those with so-called
“traditional” values (values concerned with tradition, discipline, etc.) are more likely to form
negative attitudes about immigrants. Those who are more universal in their outlook tend to
be less critical of the supposed negative impact immigrants have. Given the fluctuation in
leadership in a democratic system and the different priorities therein, long-term value
formation would be very difficult to achieve. Adding to the difficulty is performing it in
such a way as to not be accused of indoctrination. However, if it is decided that “openmindedness” is among the core virtues for which that nation stands then there is a possibility
that there can be widespread acceptance of that ideal. Ultimately, the underlying factor that a
government needs to address if they want to make their land more welcoming to immigrants
is fear. If people are fearful for one reason or another then it is quite possible and in some
cases (as evidenced by Karapin) quite likely that episodes of aggression and hostility will
occur. If serious efforts are put forth to address the concerns of the population, or in a more
long term scenario make the population less fearful as a people then that more than anything
else will greatly mitigate any hostility that may form.
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Conclusion
This study set out to demonstrate the predictive effect economic concerns and a
perception of a high immigration population had on the formation of negative attitudes
towards immigrants. The importance of immigration becomes quite clear when one
examines the issue at any length. Upon the brief examination of factors that motivate
immigrants and what some real world consequences can be if enough prejudice is formed
against immigrants in a given society; that have been performed here it is apparent that as the
world continues into further integration and globalization that immigration is going to
become an ever more important issue. As economies fluctuate millions of people may find it
more beneficial to locate elsewhere. As migration flows continue to occur it is important that
contingencies be planned for what might occur. Based on what was presented here, populist
anti-immigrant far right parties may rise in political power, or perhaps riots can occur. These
events make the study of attitudes towards immigrants a worthy endeavor.
As part of studying attitude formation towards immigrants one must look to see what
ideas have been presented in the past. This study highlighted eight general theory areas that
demonstrated the possible importance of such factors as contact, human capital, political
orientation, and cultural marginality to name a few. For the purposes of this study a variation
on the idea of group threat was selected as its guiding theory. Group threat is the idea that
members of the majority group will feel threatened if there is material competition (often
seen in the form of jobs) and cultural/political competition (which can manifest through a
rising population of immigrants). Some academic debate exists as to whether this feeling of
threat needs to be thought of as real or if it is enough if there is simply perceived threat.
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More debate takes place as to what level the threat needs to be felt at whether or not an
individual feels threatened or if it is only groups that can feel threatened is another issue.
This study chose to adopt the framework for threats felt on a group level and uses that
framework for individuals.
Before illustrating results of this study, previous results from other studies were
highlighted. Studies revealed consistent results around the effects variables like education,
contact and blue collar work classification. Less consistent results surrounded economic
circumstances and immigrant population. Studies showed that depending on which
economic measurements are used different effects occur. The inconsistency behind
population results are perhaps due to different measures being used on different data samples
during different times. With a firmer understanding of what previous research has found the
study turned attention toward data and methods.
This thesis made use of the 2008 European Social Survey. A typology for citizenshipregime types was introduced to control for societal context. Using Ordinary Least Squares
regression analysis a number of factors were considered. The main hypothesis considering
the perceptions of negative economic conditions (both on a personal and group level) and a
perception of high immigrant population was supplemented by the introduction of various
control variables to help ensure that results were not due to spurious relationships.
The results obtained from the regression analysis were interesting. Individuals who
believe the economic situation in their country is bad are likely to form negative attitudes
towards immigrants. The same is true for those who hold a negative outlook on their
personal economic situation but only if those concerns are combined with a perception that
98

the immigrant population is high. These results indicate a partial acceptance of the
hypothesis given, however it cannot be said that the results are consistent through all
citizenship-regime types. As the models progressed it was seen that the importance
citizenship-regime has fluctuates with the factors being considered, to put it another way,
some concerns override others in developing negative attitudes toward immigrants,
depending on which regime is in question. The variables pertaining to the main hypotheses
are informative but perhaps even more telling are some of the control variables.
Variables regarding outlook on trust, personal satisfaction, and outlooks on fairness
were more statistically significant than any of the primary independent variables. This result
means that there is more certainty of the effect these kinds of variables have than there is
with standard variables of concern (like contact, economic, population etc.). Given the
results, one can not help but to conclude that to the extent an individual forms negative
attitudes toward immigrants, it is very likely that those attitudes are shaped by factors that are
not immediately tangible. It would seem that even if an individual was in good economic
standing and thought that immigration population is low, that person may still develop hostile
attitudes if they are unhappy or distrustful. Therefore, it seems likely that if a person is
exhibiting signs of aggression towards immigrants it could be the case that there is a very
specific catalyst that caused the situation or according to the results here, that person is
lashing out due to some other negative influence. Understanding these results informs what
can possibly be done about negative attitude formation.
Based on the results here it would seem that overt attempts to assuage anger (to the
extent there is any) toward immigrants may only be marginally successful. If the national
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leadership of a country desires a welcoming environment for immigrants, long term
normalization is needed. Particular focus would be needed about trust, values, and personal
worldview. If an individual is trustful, maintains a universalistic perspective and feels that
their country dispenses benefits in a more or less even way then they are less likely to foster
negative attitudes in general least of all towards immigrants. However, the opposite is true if
more and more of the population begins to feel unhappy and jaded and their worldview
narrows it is very likely that animosity will be felt toward a host of segments of the
population, immigrants included.
While this research is far from the final word on attitudes toward immigrants, with
50% of the variance explained it does go a long way in finding an increased amount of
certainty among factors. Commonly held notions of contact, blue collar work, and rural
living area found less support here (albeit there is an argument to be made about
measurement). This is important because it means that perhaps future research can spend
more time investigating the links of personal happiness and seemingly antagonistic attitudes.
It seems that fear is a prime motivator but, this study cast the idea of fear of immigrants in
question. Perhaps fear in other parts of life is what really inspires individuals to take extreme
positions against other individuals.
This study focused solely on Western Europe, it did so, in part, to assess the idea of
an overarching “Western Culture”. Aside from the specific purpose of the study it is hoped
that this study will prove useful in identifying the extent of which Western principles have an
influence on social phenomena. If Western principles have an influence then results should
be similar across Western countries. While a thorough comparison of the results of this study
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and a similar study from the United States is beyond the scope of this study, perhaps the
results found here can aid future researchers in this endeavor. Immigration is an important
topic and will likely remain so for years to come and it is worthwhile to examine if Western
principles affect issues regarding immigration.
As it related to this study, if upon comparison the results are similar to that of
similar research from the United States then there exists an evident link that can be
highlighted as demonstrating the traditionally thought of “Western” culture. If on the other
hand, the evidence presented here finds no similarities when compared to similar work
performed in the United States, then it would be a demonstration of the unique influence of
specific political environments. The idea of a “Western” culture that binds the United States
and Western Europe together would lose support. This study attempted to answer and
address the hypotheses presented but it is also attempted to contribute a small piece to the
ongoing literature that compares similar phenomenon across continents that claim to have
similar ideals.
While the United States is a part of “Western” society; its history with immigration
markedly differs from other “Western” countries. The United States bases its origins on
immigration, therefore its sense of “Americanness” has revolved around ideals of a
commitment to democracy, equality, and other foundational values as outlined by the
Constitution (Safran 1997). Without a deep history of feudalism there is a contractual-like
nature to American society as opposed to a sociobiological and/or a tradition steeped society
that one might find in Europe (Safran 1997). In Europe, immigration does not play such a
foundational role in the histories of nations. To the nations that comprise Western Europe
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and the others that make up the constantly expanding European Union; immigration is
removed from the creation of social identity; instead identities are more bound to ethnic
concerns (Citrin and Sides, p.34).
The ongoing comparison is especially important when you consider the results found
in the present study. Unlike similar research in both Europe and the United States this study
found substantial evidence that negative attitude formation towards immigrants is largely due
to social-psychological factors. It would be enlightening for future research to revisit the
social-psychological paradigm in the social contexts of Europe and the United States, in part
to continually attempt to answer the question of whether an overriding Western culture
exists. Ultimately, future research will have to decide if each country is bound and shaped by
its own unique historical immigration story, or if countries with similar cultural environments
handle social phenomena, like immigration, similarly? Hopefully, this study will be helpful
for future scholars to answer this question.
It is of the upmost importance to realize that the immigration issue is only going to
intensify. As the immigration issues continue to develop it is important that the correct
factors regarding immigration issues be identified. The results found in this study will
hopefully lead to consideration of alternatives in the fact of potential waste of time, energy
and resources in well-intentioned but perhaps ineffective remedies against prejudice,
particularly against immigrants. Given the geopolitical ramifications prejudice can have if
left unchecked it is always of the upmost importance to continue studying this issue from
new angles and perspectives. If individuals and societies can better understand the fear of the
other than perhaps they can know better than fall prey to it.
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Appendix
Tables
Table A-1. Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analysis Predicting Animosity Toward the Effect of Immigrants: European
Social Survey, Self-identified majority population, 2008.

Inclusive variables
Collectivistic-Civic Regime Type

b

Model 1

b

Model 2

0.910***
(0.178)
0.886***
(0.155)

0.906***
(0.178)
0.879***
(0.154)

0.075*
(0. 029)
R has exp. Unemploy. 12 mon. more -0.033
(0.245)
R has exp. unemploy. with. last 5 year. -0.294
(0.243)
Borrow money to make ends meet
0.260***
(0.060)
Low Income
0.467*
(0.195)
High Income
-0.778***
(0.180)
Low Imm. Pop. Percep.
-1.423***
(0.176)

0.046
(0.032)
-0.053
(0.245)
-0.295
(0.243)
0.259***
(0.060)
0.471*
(0.195)
-0.780***
(0.180)
-1.432***
(0.176)

Individualistic-Civic Regime Type
Focal Independent Variables
Per. level negative economic Percep.
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b

Model 3

0.231
(0.176)
0.493**
(0.150)

0.272
(0.188)
-0.694***
(0.174)
-1.063***
(0.176)

High Imm. Pop. Percep.

1.193***
(0.227)

0.102
(0.540)

Neg.Per.Eco X Per. High. Imm. Pop

0.693**
(0.225)

0.154*
(0.069)

Eco. Dis. Country

0.584***
(0.031)
0.092***
(0.016)

Grp. Lvl. Neg. Eco. Per.

Intercept

R2
Model change in R2

12.805***
(0.324)

13.011***
(0.337)

.056

.057
.001

Note: Standard errors for coefficients are in parentheses.
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.
Number of cases = 7,144
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10.073***
(0.285)
.113
.056

Table A-2. Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analysis Predicting Animosity Toward the Effect of Immigrants: European
Social Survey, Self-identified majority population, 2008.

Inclusive variables
Collectivistic-Civic Regime Type
Individualistic-Civic Regime Type
Focal Independent Variables
Per. level negative economic Percep.

b

Model 4

b

0.547**
(0.158)
0.082
(0.129)

0.271
(0.188)
-0.695***
(0.174)
-1.084***
(0.177)
0.273
(0.502)

0.025
(0.027)
-0.232
(0.185)
0.293
(0.191)
-0.013
(0.046)
-0.030
(0.149)
-0.100
(0.140)
-0.550***
(0.132)
0.206
(0.169)

0.002
(0.028)
-0.248
(0.185)
0.298
(0.191)
-0.013
(0.046)
-0.025
(0.149)
-0.101
(0.140)
-0.557***
(0.132)
-0.661
(0.401)

Borrow money to make ends meet

Low Imm. Pop. Percep.
High Imm. Pop. Percep.

Model 6

0.544**
(0.158)
0.089
(0.129)

R has exp. unemploy. with. last 5 year.

High Income

b

0.226
(0.176)
0.481**
(0.151)

R has exp. Unemploy. 12 mon. more

Low Income

Model 5
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Neg.Per.Eco X Per. High. Imm. Pop

0.122*
(0.051)

Eco. Dis. Country

0.585***
(0.031)
Grp. Lvl. Neg. Eco. Per.
0.084***
(0.018)
Neg.Grp.Eco X Per. High. Imm. Pop 0.033
(0.035)
Exclusionary Variables
0.105
(0.137)
0.243*
(0.121)
0.219
(0.150)
0.124
(0.161)
0.125
(0.170)
-0.242
(0.347)
0.235
(0.209)
0.010
(0.191)
-0.075***
(0.012)

Lit. Amt. TV View
Lar. Amt. TV View
Lit. Tim. List. Radio
Lar. Tim. List. Radio
Lit. Tim. Read. News
Lar. Tim. Read. News
Lit. Net. Use
Lar. Net. Use
Intpersonal Trust

106

0.109
(0.137)
0.249*
(0.121)
0.225
(0.150)
0.131
(0.161)
0.132
(0.170)
-0.226
(0.347)
0.245
(0.209)
0.013
(0.191)
-0.075***
(0.012)

Political Interest

-0.421***
(0.073)
0.049
(0.055)
-0.017
(0.060)
-0.036***
(0.006)
-0.038*
(0.017)
-0.127
(0.143)
-0.065
(0.145)
0.135
(0.236)
-0.468**
(0.144)
0.107
(0.209)
-0.125
(0.117)
-0.725***
(0.190)
-0.373**
(0.130)
-0.374**
(0.130)
0.367**
(0.132)

Pol. Easy to Und.
Eas of Pol. Dec.
National Trust
Supra-National Trust
Voter
Cont. Pol.
Wrk. Pol. Party
Wrk. Org.
Disp. Bad/Sticker
Sign. Pet.
Par. Dem
Boycott Prod.
Pol. Left
Pol. Right
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-0.422***
(0.073)
0.045
(0.055)
-0.014
(0.060)
-0.036***
(0.006)
-0.038*
(0.028)
-0.116
(0.143)
-0.067
(0.145)
0.133
(0.262)
-0.474**
(0.144)
0.102
(0.209)
-0.121
(0.117)
-0.729***
(0.190)
-0.369**
(0.130)
-0.373**
(0.130)
0.367**
(0.132)

Life Sat.

-0.117***
(0.018)
0.112***
(0.011)
0.689***
(0.028)
0.339***
(0.060)
0.810***
(0.057)
-0.084***
(0.013)
-0.197***
(0.019)
0.036
(0.054)
-0.048
(0.062)
-0.122*
(0.061)
-0.438***
(0.022)
0.043
(0.170)
0.128
(0.113)
0.062
(0.208)
-0.321**
(0.122)

Trad Val.
Imm. Rec. More than Con.
Man. Obt. Ben. Not Ent.
When Shld. Imm. Rec. Ben./Ser.
Uni. Val. #1
Uni. Val. #2
Dif. Std. Liv. Shld. Be Small
Soc. Ben./Ser. Pre. Pov.
Soc. Ben./Ser. Led. Eq. Soc.
Euro. Uni. Go Fur. Or Too Far
Low Soc. Cont.
High Soc. Cont.
Nobod. Dis. Int. Matters
Low Soc. Par.
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-0.116***
(0.018)
0.112***
(0.011)
0.689***
(0.028)
0.339***
(0.060)
0.811***
(0.056)
-0.083***
(0.013)
-0.196***
(0.019)
0.038
(0.054)
-0.050
(0.062)
-0.124*
(0.061)
-0.438***
(0.022)
0.046
(0.170)
0.132
(0.113)
0.055
(0.208)
-0.324**
(0.122)

High Soc. Par.

-0.094
(0.136)
-0.011
(0.132)
0.065**
(0.021)
0.298***
(0.078)
0.075
(0.039)
0.000
(0.024)
-0.039
(0.022)
0.386
(0.269)
0.629**
(0.231)
0.555*
(0.236)
0.552
(0.514)
-0.248
(0.460)
-0.324
(0.449)
0.019
(0.439)
-0.018
(0.407)

Vic. Burg./Assault last 5 Yr.
Conc. Abt. Crime
Fel. Saf. Wlk. Alo. Aft. Dark
Per. Lik. Of Terr.
How Relig.
Relig. Pract.
R born in country
Father born in country
Mother born in country
Age 15-24
Age 25-34
Age 35-44
Age 45-54
Age 55-64
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-0.096
(0.136)
-0.009
(0.132)
0.065**
(0.021)
0.302***
(0.078)
0.075
(0.039)
0.000
(0.024)
-0.039
(0.022)
0.391
(0.269)
0.618**
(0.231)
0.572*
(0.236)
0.550
(0.514)
-0.242
(0.460)
-0.317
(0.449)
0.027
(0.439)
-0.009
(0.407)

Age 65-74

-0.131
(0.380)
0.618
(0.429)
-0.002
(0.165)
-0.020
(0.140)
-0.143
(0.259)
-0.195
(0.273)
-0.385
(0.222)
0.083
(0.062)
-0.169
(0.119)
0.028
(0.115)
-0.031
(0.042)
-0.117
(0.123)
-0.399
(0.572)
-0.717
(0.636)
0.163
(0.622)

Age 75-80
Weak Sen. Bel. Age Grp.
Str. Sen. Bel. Age Grp.
Only Pd. Wrk. Lst. Mon.
Vol. and Pd. Wrk. Lst. Mon.
Neither Vol. or Pd. Wrk. Lst. Mon.
Num. Reg. Mem. Household
Male
Liv. Small Pop. Area
Highest Lvl. Education
Imp. Ed./Skill Lst. 12 Mon.
Pd. Wrk Lst. 7 Days
Ed. Lst. 7 Days
Unemp. Lst. 7 Days
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-0.129
(0.380)
0.610
(0.428)
0.001
(0.165)
-0.020
(0.140)
-0.134
(0.259)
-0.185
(0.273)
-0.374
(0.222)
0.084
(0.062)
-0.166
(0.119)
0.033
(0.115)
-0.030
(0.042)
-0.112
(0.123)
-0.363
(0.572)
-0.698
(0.636)
0.168
(0.622)

Perm. Sick or Dis. Lst. 7 Days

0.071
(0.632)
0.018
(0.584)
-0.376
(2.504)
0.222
(0.585)
0.119
(0.121)
-0.153
(0.385)
-0.042
(0.377)
-0.178
(0.228)
0.112
(0.169)
-0.134
(0.143)
0.426
(0.225)
-0.020
(0.213)
-0.098
(0.183)
0.011
(0.119)
0.032
(0.029)

Retired Lst. 7 Days
Comm Wrk. or Military Lst. 7 Days
House Duty Lst. 7 Days
Blue Collar
Wrk. for Pub. Org.
Wrk. for Priv. Ent.
Wrk. Outside Count. more 6 mon.
within last 10 Yrs.
Currently Mem. Trd. Union
Nev. Mem. Trd. Union
Leg. Attached to Par.
Nev. Leg. Attached to Par.
Lives with Partner
Nev. Liv. With Par. W/O Leg.
Attachment
Part. Highest Ed.
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0.114
(0.632)
0.049
(0.584)
-0.359
(2.504)
0.252
(0.585)
0.120
(0.121)
-0.164
(0.384)
-0.050
(0.376)
-0.171
(0.228)
0.109
(0.169)
-0.131
(0.143)
0.431
(0.225)
-0.026
(0.213)
-0.110
(0.183)
0.013
(0.119)
0.030
(0.029)

Has Not Been Divorced

-0.232
(0.176)
0.125
(0.177)
0.426**
(0.151)
-0.033
(0.049)
-0.192
(0.221)
0.393**
(0.131)
-0.059
(0.054)
0.072
(0.145)
0.140
(0.157)

Children Liv. at Home
Ever Had Chldrn. Liv. at Home
Father Highest Ed.
Father Wrk. when R was 14
Father had Blue Collar Job
Mother Highest Ed.
Mother Wrk. when R was 14
Mother had Blue Collar Job
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-0.234
(0.176)
0.117
(0.177)
0.419**
(0.151)
-0.033
(0.049)
-0.196
(0.221)
0.394**
(0.131)
-0.059
(0.054)
0.080
(0.145)
0.135
(0.157)

Intercept

R2
Model change in R2

15.123***
(1.288)

10.153***
(0.297)
.113
.000

.497
.384

Note: Standard errors for coefficients are in parentheses.
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.
Number of cases = 7,144
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15.149***
(1.287)
.497
.000

Table A-3. Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analysis Predicting Animosity Toward the Effect of Immigrants: European
Social Survey, Self-identified majority population, 2008.

Inclusive variables
Collectivistic-Civic Regime Type
Individualistic-Civic Regime Type
Focal Independent Variables
Per. level negative economic Percep.

b

Model 7

b

0.503**
(0.160)
0.047
(0.129)

Model 8

0.500**
(0.160)
0.034
(0.129)

0.503**
(0.158)
0.041
(0.129)

-0.008
(0.148)
-0.124
(0.139)
-0.643***
(0.136)
-0.209
(0.384)

0.028
(0.027)
-0.224
(0.185)
0.314
(0.191)
-0.011
(0.046)
-0.032
(0.149)
-0.114
(0.140)
-0.618***
(0.135)
0.271
(0.172)

R has exp. Unemploy. 12 mon. more
R has exp. unemploy. with. last 5 year.
Borrow money to make ends meet
Low Income
High Income
Low Imm. Pop. Percep.
High Imm. Pop. Percep.
Neg.Per.Eco X Per. High. Imm. Pop

-0.007
(0.148)
-0.123
(0.139)
-0.619***
(0.135)
0.264
(0.172)
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b

Model 9

Eco. Dis. Country

0.099**
(0.031)
Grp. Lvl. Neg. Eco. Per.
-0.026*
(0.018)
Neg.Grp.Eco X Per. High. Imm. Pop 0.033
(0.035)
Exclusionary Variables

0.099**
(0.029)
-0.036*
(0.014)
0.037
(0.027)

0.099**
(0.029)
-0.028*
(0.013)

Lit. Amt. TV View

0.094
(0.137)
0.247*
(0.121)
0.221
(0.150)
0.121
(0.161)
0.120
(0.170)
-0.238
(0.347)
0.257
(0.209)
0.023
(0.191)
-0.075***
(0.012)
-0.435***
(0.073)

0.096
(0.137)
0.248*
(0.121)
0.227
(0.150)
0.128
(0.161)
0.112
(0.170)
-0.254
(0.347)
0.263
(0.209)
0.023
(0.191)
-0.075***
(0.012)
-0.436***
(0.073)

Lar. Amt. TV View
Lit. Tim. List. Radio
Lar. Tim. List. Radio
Lit. Tim. Read. News
Lar. Tim. Read. News
Lit. Net. Use
Lar. Net. Use
Intpersonal Trust
Political Interest

0.095
(0.137)
0.247*
(0.121)
0.221
(0.150)
0.121
(0.161)
0.119
(0.170)
-0.245
(0.347)
0.256
(0.209)
0.024
(0.191)
-0.075***
(0.012)
-0.436***
(0.073)
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Pol. Easy to Und.
Eas of Pol. Dec.
National Trust
Supra-National Trust
Voter
Cont. Pol.
Wrk. Pol. Party
Wrk. Org.
Disp. Bad/Sticker
Sign. Pet.
Par. Dem
Boycott Prod.
Pol. Left
Pol. Right
Life Sat.

0.052
(0.055)
-0.019
(0.060)
-0.029***
(0.007)
-0.041*
(0.018)
-0.126
(0.142)
-0.075
(0.145)
0.129
(0.262)
-0.472
(0.144)
0.119
(0.209)
-0.146
(0.117)
-0.716***
(0.190)
-0.388**
(0.130)
-0.393**
(0.129)
0.360**
(0.132)
-0.112***
(0.018)

0.052
(0.055)
-0.019
(0.060)
-0.030***
(0.007)
-0.040*
(0.018)
-0.123
(0.142)
-0.079
(0.145)
0.122
(0.262)
-0.471**
(0.144)
0.118
(0.209)
-0.145
(0.117)
-0.713***
(0.190)
-0.388**
(0.130)
-0.391**
(0.129)
0.362**
(0.132)
-0.112***
(0.018)
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0.050
(0.055)
-0.016
(0.060)
-0.029***
(0.007)
-0.041*
(0.018)
-0.119
(0.142)
-0.075
(0.145)
0.132
(0.262)
-0.467**
(0.144)
0.117
(0.209)
-0.145
(0.117)
-0.721***
(0.190)
-0.393**
(0.130)
-0.391**
(0.129)
0.359**
(0.132)
-0.108***
(0.018)

Trad Val.
Imm. Rec. More than Con.
Man. Obt. Ben. Not Ent.
When Shld. Imm. Rec. Ben./Ser.
Uni. Val. #1
Uni. Val. #2
Dif. Std. Liv. Shld. Be Small
Soc. Ben./Ser. Pre. Pov.
Soc. Ben./Ser. Led. Eq. Soc.
Euro. Uni. Go Fur. Or Too Far
Low Soc. Cont.
High Soc. Cont.
Nobod. Dis. Int. Matters
Low Soc. Par.
High Soc. Par.

0.112***
(0.011)
0.686***
(0.028)
0.337***
(0.060)
0.809***
(0.056)
-0.083***
(0.013)
-0.199***
(0.019)
0.042
(0.054)
-0.055
(0.062)
-0.114
(0.061)
-0.432***
(0.022)
0.041
(0.170)
0.128
(0.113)
0.062
(0.208)
-0.303*
(0.122)
-0.083
(0.136)

0.112***
(0.011)
0.687***
(0.028)
0.341***
(0.060)
0.809***
(0.056)
-0.083***
(0.013)
-0.198***
(0.019)
0.043
(0.054)
-0.057
(0.062)
-0.115
(0.061)
-0.432***
(0.022)
0.049
(0.170)
0.131
(0.113)
0.059
(0.208)
-0.303**
(0.122)
-0.082
(0.136)
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0.112***
(0.011)
0.686***
(0.028)
0.337***
(0.060)
0.809***
(0.056)
-0.084***
(0.013)
-0.198***
(0.019)
0.037
(0.054)
-0.055
(0.062)
-0.116*
(0.061)
-0.432***
(0.022)
0.040
(0.170)
0.129
(0.113)
0.071
(0.208)
-0.308**
(0.122)
-0.085
(0.136)

Vic. Burg./Assault last 5 Yr.
Conc. Abt. Crime
Fel. Saf. Wlk. Alo. Aft. Dark
Per. Lik. Of Terr.
How Relig.
Relig. Pract.
R born in country
Father born in country
Mother born in country
Age 15-24
Age 25-34
Age 35-44
Age 45-54
Age 55-64

-0.007
(0.132)
0.066**
(0.021)
0.304***
(0.078)
0.067
(0.039)
0.004
(0.024)
-0.041
(0.022)
0.379
(0.269)
0.620**
(0.230)
0.535*
(0.236)
0.625
(0.513)
-0.171
(0.458)
-0.281
(0.447)
0.039
(0.437)
-0.002
(0.406)

-0.009
(0.132)
0.066**
(0.021)
0.305***
(0.078)
0.067
(0.039)
0.004
(0.024)
-0.042
(0.022)
0.376
(0.269)
0.617**
(0.230)
0.539*
(0.236)
0.620
(0.513)
-0.174
(0.457)
-0.287
(0.447)
0.035
(0.437)
-0.004
(0.406)
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-0.010
(0.132)
0.064**
(0.021)
0.301***
(0.078)
0.066
(0.039)
0.002
(0.024)
-0.041
(0.022)
0.381
(0.269)
0.631**
(0.230)
0.543*
(0.236)
0.572
(0.514)
-0.242
(0.460)
-0.327
(0.449)
0.021
(0.439)
-0.010
(0.406)

Age 65-74

-0.132
(0.379)
Age 75-80
0.606
(0.428)
Weak Sen. Bel. Age Grp.
-0.011
(0.165)
Str. Sen. Bel. Age Grp.
-0.013
(0.140)
Only Pd. Wrk. Lst. Mon.
-0.157
(0.259)
Vol. and Pd. Wrk. Lst. Mon.
-0.205
(0.273)
Neither Vol. or Pd. Wrk. Lst. Mon. -0.388
(0.222)
Num. Reg. Mem. Household
0.090
(0.062)
-0.171
Male
(0.119)
Liv. Small Pop. Area
0.033
(0.115)
Highest Lvl. Education
-0.033
(0.042)
Imp. Ed./Skill Lst. 12 Mon.
-0.117
(0.123)
Pd. Wrk Lst. 7 Days
-0.370
(0.571)
Ed. Lst. 7 Days
-0.700
(0.636)
Unemp. Lst. 7 Days
0.330
(0.610)

-0.142
(0.380)
0.602
(0.428)
-0.013
(0.165)
-0.014
(0.140)
-0.166
(0.259)
-0.210
(0.273)
-0.392
(0.222)
0.090
(0.062)
-0.171
(0.119)
0.036
(0.115)
-0.032
(0.042)
-0.116
(0.123)
-0.362
(0.571)
-0.692
(0.636)
0.331
(0.610)
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-0.122
(0.380)
0.604
(0.428)
-0.015
(0.165)
-0.011
(0.140)
-0.156
(0.259)
-0.212
(0.273)
-0.382
(0.222)
0.089
(0.062)
-0.175
(0.119)
0.030
(0.115)
-0.033
(0.042)
-0.116
(0.123)
-0.408
(0.572)
-0.738
(0.636)
0.156
(0.622)

Perm. Sick or Dis. Lst. 7 Days

0.085
(0.631)
Retired Lst. 7 Days
-0.029
(0.583)
Com. Wrk. or Military Lst. 7 Days -0.509
(2.502)
House Duty Lst. 7 Days
0.231
(0.584)
Blue Collar
0.126
(0.121)
Wrk. for Pub. Org.
-0.167
(0.384)
Wrk. for Priv. Ent.
-0.047
(0.376)
Wrk. Out Count. more 6 mon.
-0.143
within last 10 Yrs.
(0.227)
Currently Mem. Trd. Union
0.132
(0.169)
Nev. Mem. Trd. Union
-0.133
(0.143)
Leg. Attached to Par.
0.430
(0.225)
Nev. Leg. Attached to Par.
-0.001
(0.213)
Lives with Partner
-0.103
(0.183)
Nev. Liv. With Par. W/O Leg.
0.011
Attachment
(0.119)
Part. Highest Ed.
0.029
(0.029)

0.073
(0.631)
-0.029
(0.583)
-0.515
(2.502)
0.237
(0.584)
0.130
(0.121)
-0.167
(0.384)
-0.052
(0.376)
-0.134
(0.228)
0.128
(0.169)
-0.130
(0.143)
0.434
(0.225)
-0.001
(0.213)
-0.106
(0.183)
0.014
(0.119)
0.029
(0.029)
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0.079
(0.631)
-0.021
(0.583)
-0.522
(2.502)
0.206
(0.584)
0.127
(0.121)
-0.164
(0.384)
-0.059
(0.376)
-0.159
(0.228)
0.131
(0.169)
-0.132
(0.143)
0.427
(0.225)
-0.005
(0.214)
-0.098
(0.183)
0.014
(0.119)
0.029
(0.029)

Has Not Been Divorced

-0.222
(0.176)
Children Liv. at Home
0.153
(0.177)
Ever Had Chldrn. Liv. at Home 0.451**
(0.152)
Father Highest Ed.
-0.032
(0.049)
Father Wrk. when R was 14
-0.211
(0.221)
Father had Blue Collar Job
0.405**
(0.131)
Mother Highest Ed.
-0.068
(0.054)
Mother Wrk. when R was 14
0.081
(0.145)
Mother had Blue Collar Job
0.132
(0.157)

-0.225
(0.176)
0.152
(0.177)
0.449**
(0.152)
-0.032
(0.049)
-0.211
(0.221)
0.404**
(0.131)
-0.068
(0.054)
0.079
(0.145)
0.132
(0.157)
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-0.231
(0.176)
0.139
(0.177)
0.450**
(0.152)
-0.032
(0.049)
-0.205
(0.221)
0.402**
(0.131)
-0.068
(0.054)
0.078
(0.145)
0.138
(0.157)

Intercept

R2
Model change in R2

14.791***
(1.280)

14.737***
(1.280)

14.599***
(1.309)
.498
.000

.498
.001

Note: Standard errors for coefficients are in parentheses.
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.
Number of cases = 7,144
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.498
.000

Table A-4. Results of Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analysis Predicting Animosity Toward the Effect of Immigrants: European
Social Survey, Self-identified majority population, 2008.

Inclusive variables
Collectivistic-Civic Regime Type
Individualistic-Civic Regime Type
Focal Independent Variables
Per. level negative economic Percep.

b

Model 10

b

0.503**
(0.160)
0.026
(0.130)

0.005
(0.029)
R has exp. Unemploy. 12 mon. more -0.237
(0.185)
R has exp. unemploy. with. last 5 year. 0.0319
(0.191)
Borrow money to make ends meet
-0.011
(0.046)
Low Income
-0.028
(0.149)
High Income
-0.115
(0.140)
Low Imm. Pop. Percep.
-0.641***
(0.136)
High Imm. Pop. Percep.
-0.858
(0.485)
Neg.Per.Eco X Per. High. Imm. Pop
0.115*
(0.052)
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Model 11

b

Model 12

-0.390
(0.624)
-0.278
(0.145)

-0.392
(0.624)
-0.290*
(0.145)

0.020
(0.027)
-0.212
(0.185)
0.366
(0.191)
-0.011
(0.046)
0.028
(0.149)
-0.204
(0.142)
-0.516***
(0.136)
0.232
(0.172)

-0.001
(0.029)
-0.223
(0.185)
0.370
(0.191)
-0.011
(0.046)
0.033
(0.149)
-0.205
(0.142)
-0.538***
(0.137)
-0.788
(0.484)
0.106*
(0.052)

Eco. Dis. Country
Grp. Lvl. Neg. Eco. Per.
Neg.Grp.Eco X Per. High. Imm. Pop

0.100**
(0.029)
-0.035*
(0.015)
0.024
(0.027)

0.110**
(0.029)
-0.013
(0.013)

GDP Per Capita (US)

-2.403E-5
(0.000)
1.160E-5*
(0.000)
-0.425
(0.341)
0.077
(0.094)
-0.095
(0.077)
-1.874E-7*
(0.000)

Foreign Direct Investment
(Incoming)
Inflation Growth Percentage
(On all items)
Purchasing Power Parities
(USD)
Unemployment Rate
(Total Civilian Labor Force)
Number of Foreigners
(EUROSTAT)

0.110**
(0.029)
-0.018*
(0.015)
0.021
(0.027)
-2.499E-5
(0.000)
1.153E-5*
(0.000)
-0.425
(0.341)
-0.075
(0.094)
-0.093
(0.077)
-1.887E-7
(0.000)

Exclusionary Variables
Lit. Amt. TV View
Lar. Amt. TV View
Lit. Tim. List. Radio
Lar. Tim. List. Radio

0.098
(0.137)
0.254*
(0.121)
0.233
(0.150)
0.134
(0.161)

0.099
(0.137)
0.240*
(0.121)
0.197
(0.150)
0.055
(0.161)
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0.101
(0.137)
0.246*
(0.121)
0.203
(0.150)
0.061
(0.161)

Lit. Tim. Read. News
Lar. Tim. Read. News
Lit. Net. Use
Lar. Net. Use
Intpersonal Trust
Political Interest
Pol. Easy to Und.
Eas of Pol. Dec.
National Trust
Supra-National Trust
Voter
Cont. Pol.
Wrk. Pol. Party
Wrk. Org.

0.120
(0.170)
-0.234
(0.347)
0.273
(0.209)
0.026
(0.191)
-0.074***
(0.012)
-0.436***
(0.073)
0.047
(0.055)
-0.013
(0.060)
-0.029***
(0.007)
-0.040*
(0.018)
-0.107
(0.142)
-0.079
(0.145)
0.126
(0.262)
-0.471**
(0.144)

0.170
(0.170)
-0.317
(0.346)
0.264
(0.209)
-0.051
(0.190)
-0.079***
(0.012)
-0.460***
(0.074)
0.059
(0.055)
0.010
(0.060)
-0.032***
(0.007)
-0.036*
(0.018)
-0.028
(0.144)
-0.058
(0.145)
0.095
(0.262)
-0.347*
(0.145)
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0.176
(0.170)
-0.298
(0.346)
0.272
(0.209)
-0.048
(0.190)
-0.079***
(0.012)
-0.460***
(0.074)
0.056
(0.055)
0.013
(0.060)
-0.032***
(0.007)
-0.037*
(0.018)
-0.119
(0.144)
-0.063
(0.145)
0.089
(0.262)
-0.352*
(0.145)

Disp. Bad/Sticker
Sign. Pet.
Par. Dem
Boycott Prod.
Pol. Left
Pol. Right
Life Sat.
Trad Val.
Imm. Rec. More than Con.
Man. Obt. Ben. Not Ent.
When Shld. Imm. Rec. Ben./Ser.
Uni. Val. #1
Uni. Val. #2
Dif. Std. Liv. Shld. Be Small

0.111
(0.209)
-0.140
(0.117)
-0.723***
(0.190)
-0.390**
(0.130)
-0.389**
(0.129)
0.360**
(0.132)
-0.107***
(0.018)
0.112***
(0.011)
0.686***
(0.028)
0.340***
(0.060)
0.811***
(0.056)
-0.082***
(0.013)
-0.196***
(0.019)
0.040
(0.054)

0.049
(0.209)
-0.218
(0.118)
-0.553**
(0.192)
-0.365**
(0.131)
-0.343**
(0.129)
0.349**
(0.132)
-0.113***
(0.018)
0.119***
(0.011)
0.684***
(0.028)
0.342***
(0.060)
0.796***
(0.056)
-0.083***
(0.013)
-0.199***
(0.019)
0.058
(0.055)
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0.044
(0.209)
-0.213
(0.118)
-0.557**
(0.192)
-0.361**
(0.131)
-0.342**
(0.129)
0.350**
(0.132)
-0.112***
(0.018)
0.119***
(0.011)
0.684***
(0.028)
0.345***
(0.060)
0.798***
(0.056)
-0.082***
(0.013)
-0.198***
(0.019)
0.059
(0.055)

Soc. Ben./Ser. Pre. Pov.
Soc. Ben./Ser. Led. Eq. Soc.
Euro. Uni. Go Fur. Or Too Far
Low Soc. Cont.
High Soc. Cont.
Nobod. Dis. Int. Matters
Low Soc. Par.
High Soc. Par.
Vic. Burg./Assault last 5 Yr.
Conc. Abt. Crime
Fel. Saf. Wlk. Alo. Aft. Dark
Per. Lik. Of Terr.
How Relig.
Relig. Pract.
R born in country

-0.058
(0.062)
-0.119
(0.061)
-0.432***
(0.022)
0.048
(0.170)
0.134
(0.113)
0.062
(0.208)
-0.311*
(0.122)
-0.086
(0.136)
-0.010
(0.132)
0.064**
(0.021)
0.305***
(0.078)
0.065
(0.039)
0.002
(0.024)
-0.041
(0.022)
0.384
(0.269)

-0.068
(0.062)
-0.126*
(0.061)
-0.416***
(0.022)
0.054
(0.170)
0.088
(0.113)
0.006
(0.208)
-0.373**
(0.122)
-0.142
(0.136)
-0.057
(0.132)
0.063**
(0.021)
0.302***
(0.078)
0.123**
(0.040)
-0.007
(0.024)
-0.036
(0.022)
0.415
(0.268)
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-0.070
(0.062)
-0.128*
(0.061)
-0.416***
(0.022)
0.062
(0.170)
0.093
(0.113)
-0.002
(0.208)
-0.375**
(0.122)
-0.143
(0.136)
-0.056
(0.132)
0.063**
(0.021)
0.305***
(0.078)
0.122**
(0.040)
-0.007
(0.024)
-0.037
(0.022)
0.418
(0.268)

Father born in country

0.618**
(0.230)
Mother born in country
0.561*
(0.236)
Age 15-24
0.567
(0.514)
Age 25-34
-0.239
(0.459)
Age 35-44
-0.324
(0.449)
Age 45-54
0.026
(0.438)
Age 55-64
-0.003
(0.406)
Age 65-74
-0.126
(0.380)
Age 75-80
0.594
(0.428)
Weak Sen. Bel. Age Grp.
-0.014
(0.165)
Str. Sen. Bel. Age Grp.
-0.012
(0.140)
Only Pd. Wrk. Lst. Mon.
-0.153
(0.259)
Vol. and Pd. Wrk. Lst. Mon.
-0.207
(0.273)
Neither Vol. or Pd. Wrk. Lst. Mon. -0.375
(0.222)
Num. Reg. Mem. Household
0.090
(0.062)

0.642**
(0.230)
0.620**
(0.236)
0.658
(0.513)
-0.186
(0.459)
-0.247
(0.448)
0.100
(0.437)
0.076
(0.405)
-0.047
(0.379)
0.670
(0.427)
-0.011
(0.165)
-0.022
(0.140)
-0.164
(0.258)
-0.262
(0.272)
-0.373
(0.222)
0.132
(0.062)
128

0.629**
(0.230)
0.635*
(0.236)
0.653
(0.513)
-0.183
(0.459)
-0.245
(0.448)
0.104
(0.437)
0.082
(0.405)
-0.052
(0.379)
0.660
(0.427)
-0.010
(0.165)
-0.022
(0.140)
-0.162
(0.258)
-0.255
(0.272)
-0.367
(0.222)
0.133
(0.062)

Male

-0.173
(0.119)
Liv. Small Pop. Area
0.036
(0.115)
Highest Lvl. Education
-0.032
(0.042)
-0.111
Imp. Ed./Skill Lst. 12 Mon.
(0.123)
Pd. Wrk Lst. 7 Days
-0.369
(0.572)
Ed. Lst. 7 Days
-0.715
(0.636)
Unemp. Lst. 7 Days
0.159
(0.622)
Perm. Sick or Dis. Lst. 7 Days
0.112
(0.632)
Retired Lst. 7 Days
0.008
(0.583)
Com. Wrk. or Military Lst. 7 Days -0.511
(2.502)
House Duty Lst. 7 Days
0.239
(0.584)
Blue Collar
0.131
(0.121)
Wrk. for Pub. Org.
-0.174
(0.384)
Wrk. for Priv. Ent.
-0.070
(0.376)
Wrk. Out Count. more 6 mon.
-0.147
within last 10 Yrs.
(0.228)

-0.155
(0.118)
-0.049
(0.116)
-0.023
(0.042)
-0.164
(0.123)
-0.256
(0.570)
-0.636
(0.634)
0.240
(0.620)
0.021
(0.629)
0.036
(0.582)
-0.546
(2.494)
0.248
(0.582)
0.149
(0.121)
-0.193
(0.383)
-0.059
(0.375)
-0.135
(0.227)
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-0.153
(0.118)
-0.044
(0.116)
-0.022
(0.042)
-0.159
(0.123)
-0.220
(0.570)
-0.616
(0.634)
0.243
(0.620)
0.054
(0.630)
0.062
(0.582)
-0.534
(2.493)
0.279
(0.582)
0.153
(0.121)
-0.203
(0.383)
-0.069
(0.375)
-0.124
(0.227)

Currently Mem. Trd. Union

0.127
(0.169)
Nev. Mem. Trd. Union
-0.128
(0.143)
Leg. Attached to Par.
0.434
(0.225)
Nev. Leg. Attached to Par.
-0.011
(0.214)
Lives with Partner
-0.111
(0.183)
Nev. Liv. With Par. W/O Leg.
0.018
Attachment
(0.119)
Part. Highest Ed.
0.028
(0.029)
Has Not Been Divorced
-0.226
(0.176)
Children Liv. at Home
0.131
(0.177)
Ever Had Chldrn. Liv. at Home 0.442**
(0.152)
Father Highest Ed.
-0.033
(0.049)
Father Wrk. when R was 14
-0.208
(0.221)
Father had Blue Collar Job
0.402**
(0.131)
Mother Highest Ed.
-0.068
(0.054)
Mother Wrk. when R was 14
0.083
(0.145)

0.055
(0.173)
-0.093
(0.145)
0.403
(0.225)
0.016
(0.214)
-0.004
(0.183)
0.089
(0.120)
0.018
(0.029)
-0.184
(0.175)
0.084
(0.184)
0.392*
(0.167)
-0.011
(0.049)
-0.243
(0.220)
0.435**
(0.132)
-0.058
(0.054)
0.066
(0.145)
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0.051
(0.173)
-0.089
(0.145)
0.410
(0.225)
0.012
(0.214)
-0.017
(0.183)
0.090
(0.120)
0.017
(0.029)
-0.188
(0.175)
0.080
(0.184)
0.390**
(0.167)
-0.011
(0.049)
-0.247
(0.220)
0.436**
(0.132)
-0.057
(0.054)
0.072
(0.145)

Mother had Blue Collar Job

Intercept

R2
Model change in R2

0.134
(0.157)

0.140
(0.156)

14.653***
(1.309)

0.137
(0.156)

16.675***
(2.538)

.499
.001

.502
.003

Note: Standard errors for coefficients are in parentheses.
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.
Number of cases = 7,144
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16.759***
(2.538)
.503
.001

Variable Coding
-A dummy variable was created to control for potential differences between East and West
Germany. West Germany was included in the various regression analyses.
-Dummy variables were created for the different citizen-regime types. Countries were
pooled into their correct ethnic regime type and assigned a score of “1” other regime types
were then scored as “0”
-The ESS variable “STFECO” “How satisfied with present state of economy in country” had
the following response categories:
00 Extremely dissatisfied
01 1
02 2
03 3
04 4
05 5
06 6
07 7
08 8
09 9
10 Extremely satisfied
77 Refusal
88 Don't know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into “STFECO2” “Country economy dissatisfaction”. The
range of responses are reverse coded whereas an original response of 00 is recoded to count
as 10 and an original response of 10 is coded to count as 00 and so on. Responders who gave
a response of 77-99 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “UEMPLWK” “Of every 100 working age how many unemployed and
looking for work” had the following response categories:
01 0-4
02 5-9
03 10-14
04 15-19
05 20-24
06 25-29
07 30-34
08 35-39
09 40-44
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10 45-49
11 50 or more
77 Refusal
88 Don't know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into “UEMPLWK2” “Of every 100 working age how many
unemployed and looking for work”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders
who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “NMNYBSC” “Of every 100 working age how many not money for basic
necessities” had the following response categories:
01 0-4
02 5-9
03 10-14
04 15-19
05 20-24
06 25-29
07 30-34
08 35-39
09 40-44
10 45-49
11 50 or more
77 Refusal
88 Don't know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into “NMNYBSC” “Of every 100 working age how many not
money for basic necessities”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who
gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.
The variables “Of every 100 working age how many unemployed and looking for work” and
“Of every 100 working age how many not money for basic necessities” are combined into an
additive index named, “Group level negative economic perception index”. Whereas a higher
score indicates a more negative perception
-The ESS variable “LKUEMP” “How likely unemployed and looking for work next 12
months” had the following response categories:
1 Not at all likely
2 Not very likely
3 Likely
4 Very likely
5 Never worked OR no longer working and not looking for work
7 Refusal
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8 Don't know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into “LKUEMP2” “How likely unemployed and looking for
work next 12 months”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave a
response of 5 are coded as 0 and responders who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “LKLPWCF” “How likely less time paid work than like because care for
family next 12 months” had the following response categories:
1 Not at all likely
2 Not very likely
3 Likely
4 Very likely
6 Not applicable
7 Refusal
8 Don't know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into “LKLPWCF2” How likely less time paid work than like
because care for family next 12 months”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except
responders who gave a response of 6 are coded as 0 and responders who gave a response of
77-99 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “LKNEMNY” “How likely not enough money for household necessities
next 12 months” had the following response categories:
1 Not at all likely
2 Not very likely
3 Likely
4 Very likely
7 Refusal
8 Don't know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into “LKNEMNY2” “How likely not enough money for
household necessities next 12 months”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except
responders who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “HINCFEL” “Feeling about household’s income nowadays” had the
following response categories:
1 Living comfortably on present income
2 Coping on present income
3 Finding it difficult on present income
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4 Finding it very difficult on present income
7 Refusal
8 Don't know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into “HINCFEL2” Feeling about household’s income
nowadays”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave a response of
77-99 are excluded.
The variables “How likely unemployed and looking for work in next 12 months”, “How
likely less time paid work than like because care for family next 12 months”, “How likely not
enough money for household necessities next 12 months”, and “Feeling about households
income nowadays” are combined into an additive index named, “Personal level negative
economic perception index”. A higher score indicates a more negative perception.
-The ESS variable “UEMP12M” “Any period of unemployment and work seeking lasted
12 months or more” had the following response categories:
1 Yes
2 No
6 Not applicable
7 Refusal
8 Don't know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables, “R has experienced unemployment
lasting 12 months or more”, “R has not experienced unemployment lasting 12 months or
more” and “Not applicable”. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “UEMP5YR” “Any period of unemployment and work seeking within last
5 years” had the following response categories:
1 Yes
2 No
6 Not applicable
7 Refusal
8 Don't know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables, “R has experienced unemployment
and work seeking within last 5 years”, “R has not experienced unemployment and work
seeking within last 5 years”, and “Not applicable”. Respondents who gave a response of 7-9
are excluded.
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-The ESS variable “HINCTNTA” “Household’s total net income, all sources” had the
following response categories:
01 J
02 R
03 C
04 M
05 F
06 S
07 K
08 P
09 D
10 H
77 Refusal
88 Don't know
99 No answer
The ESS variable was recoded into three dummy variables, “Low income”, “Average
income”, and “High income”. Responders who gave a response of 01-04 are classified as
“low income”. Responders who gave a response of 05-06 are classified as “average income”.
Responders who gave a response of 07-10 are classified as “high income”. Responders who
gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “BRWMNY” “Borrow money to make ends meet, difficult or easy” had
the following response categories:
1 Very difficult
2 Quite difficult
3 Neither easy nor difficult
4 Quite easy
5 Very easy
7 Refusal
8 Don't know
9 No answer
The ESS variable was recoded into “BRWMNY2” “Borrow money to make ends meet,
difficult or easy”. The range of responses in the ESS were reverse coded whereas an original
response of 1 is recoded into 5 and an original response of 5 is counted as 1 and so on.
Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “BRNOCNT” “Of every 100 working age how many born outside of
country” had the following response categories:
01 0-4
02 5-9
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03 10-14
04 15-19
05 20-24
06 25-29
07 30-34
08 35-39
09 40-44
10 45-49
11 50 or more
77 Refusal
88 Don't know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables, “Low immigrant population
perception”, “Moderate immigrant population perception”, and “high immigrant population
perception”. “Low immigrant population perception” is comprised of responders who gave a
response of 01-04. “Moderate immigrant population perception” is comprised of responders
who gave a response of 05-06. “High immigrant population perception” is comprised of
responders who gave a response of 07-11. Responders who gave a response of 77-99 are
excluded.
-There is a variable measuring the interaction effect of negative personal economic
perception and the perception of a high immigrant population
-There is a variable measuring the interaction effect of negative group level economic
perception and the perception of a high immigrant population
-The ESS variable “IMBGECO” “Immigration bad or good for country’s economy” had the
following response categories:
00 Bad for the economy
01 1
02 2
03 3
04 4
05 5
06 6
07 7
08 8
09 9
10 Good for the economy
77 Refusal
88 Don't know
99 No answer
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The ESS variable is recoded into “IMBGECO” “Immigration bad or good for country’s
economy”. The range of responses in the ESS are reverse coded whereas an original
response of 0 is recoded to count as 10 and an original response of 10 is coded to count as 0
and so on. Respondents who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “IMUECLT” “Country’s cultural life undermined or enriched by
immigrants” had the following response categories:
00 Cultural life undermined
01 1
02 2
03 3
04 4
05 5
06 6
07 7
08 8
09 9
10 Cultural life enriched
77 Refusal
88 Don't know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into “IMUECLT2” “Country’s cultural life undermined or
enriched by immigrants”. The range of responses in the ESS are reverse coded whereas an
original response of 0 is recoded to count as 10 and an original response of 10 is coded to
count as 0 and so on. Respondents who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “IMWBCNT” “Immigrants make country worse or better place to live”
had the following response categories:
00 Worse place to live
01 1
02 2
03 3
04 4
05 5
06 6
07 7
08 8
09 9
10 Better place to live
77 Refusal
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88 Don't know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into “IMWBCNT2” “Immigrants make country worse of better
place to live”. The range of responses in the ESS are reverse coded whereas an original
response of 0 is recoded to count as 10 and an original response of 10 is coded to count as 0
and so on. Respondents who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.
The variables “Immigration bad or good for country’s economy”, “Country’s cultural life
undermined or enriched by immigrants” and “Immigrants make country worse or better place
to live” are combined into an additive index named, “Animosity toward the effect of
immigrants”. A higher score indicates higher animosity.
-The ESS variable “IMSMETN” “Allow many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic group as
majority” had the following response categories:
1 Allow many to come and live here
2 Allow some
3 Allow a few
4 Allow none
7 Refusal
8 Don't know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into “IMSMETN2” “Allow many/few immigrants of same
race/ethnic group as majority”. Identical coding as the ESS is used except responders who
gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “IMDFETN” “Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group
from majority” had the following response categories:
1 Allow many to come and live here
2 Allow some
3 Allow a few
4 Allow none
7 Refusal
8 Don't know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into “IMDFETN2” “Allow many/few immigrants of different
race/ethnic group from majority”. Identical coding as the ESS is used except responders
who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “IMPCNTR” “Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside
Europe” had the following response categories:
1 Allow many to come and live here
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2 Allow some
3 Allow a few
4 Allow none
7 Refusal
8 Don't know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into “IMPCNTR2” “Allow many/few immigrants from poorer
countries outside Europe”. Identical coding as the ESS is used except responders who gave a
response of 7-9 are excluded.
The variables “Allow many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority”, “Allow
many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority” and “Allow many/few
immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe” are combined into an additive index
named, “Animosity for the allowance of more immigrants index”. A higher score indicates
increased animosity.
-2008 GDP, 2008 GDP Per Capita, 2008 Foreign Direct Investment, 2008 Purchasing Power
Parity rates, and 2008 Unemployment rates are taken from the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development, from their website:
http://www.oecd.org
2008 Immigration population was taken from Eurostat, a program run by the European
Commission of the European Union that tracks vital statistics for EU member nations and
select non-member nations, from their website:
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/population/data/database
Specific chart:
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do
Control Variable Coding
-The ESS variable “TVTOT” “TV watching, total time on average weekday” had the
following response categories:
00 No time at all
01 Less than 0.5 hour
02 0.5 hour to 1 hour
03 More than 1 hour up to 1.5 hours
04 More than 1.5 hours up to 2 hours
05 More than 2 hours, up to 2.5 hours
06 More than 2.5 hours, up to 3 hours
07 More than 3 hours
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer
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The ESS variable is recoded into three separate dummy variable categories, “Little amount of
TV viewing”, “Moderate amount of TV viewing, and “Large amount of TV viewing”.
“Little amount of TV viewing” is comprised of responses 00-02, “Moderate amount of TV
viewing is comprised of responses 03-04, and “Large amount of TV viewing” is comprised
of responses 05-07. Responders who gave responses of 77-99 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “RDTOT” “Radio listening, total time on average weekday” had the
following response categories:
00 No time at all
01 Less than 0.5 hour
02 0.5 hour to 1 hour
03 More than 1 hour, up to 1.5 hours
04 More than 1.5 hours up to 2 hours
05 More than 2 hours up to 2.5 hours
06 More than 2.5 hours up to 3 hours
07 More than 3 hours
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into three separate dummy variable categories, “Little time
listening to radio”, “Moderate time listening to radio”, and “Large time listening to radio”.
“Little TV time viewing politics” is comprised of responses 00-02, “Moderate time listening
to radio” is comprised of responses 03-04, “Large time listening to radio” is comprised of
responses 05-07. Responders who gave responses of 77-99 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “NWSPTOT” “Newspaper reading, total time on average weekday” had
the following response categories:
00 No time at all
01 Less than 0.5 hour
02 0.5 hour to 1 hour
03 More than 1 hour, up to 1.5 hours
04 More than 1.5 hours, up to 2 hours
05 More than 2 hours, up to 2.5 hours
06 More than 2.5 hours, up to 3 hours
07 More than 3 hours
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into three separate dummy variable categories, “Little time
reading newspaper”, “Moderate time reading newspaper”, and “Large time reading
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newspaper”. “Little time reading newspaper” is comprised of responses 00-02, “Moderate
time reading newspaper” is comprised of responses 03-04, and “Large time reading
newspaper” is comprised of responses 05-07. Responders who gave responses 77-99 are
excluded.
-The ESS variable “NETUSE” “Personal use of internet/e-mail/www” had the following
response categories:
00 No access at home or work
01 Never Use
02 Less than once a month03 Once a month
04 Several times a month
05 Once a week
06 Several times a week
07 Every day
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into three separate dummy variable categories, “Little net use”,
“Moderate net use”, and “Large net use”. “Little net use” is comprised of responses 00-03,
“Moderate net use” is comprised of responses 04-05, and “Large net use” is comprised of
responses 06-07. Responders who gave responses 77-99 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “PPLTRST” “Most people can be trusted or you can’t be too careful” had
the following response categories:
00 You can’t be too careful
01 1
02 2
03 3
04 4
05 5
06 6
07 7
08 8
09 9
10 Most people can be trusted
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “Personal trust”. Identical coding from the
ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 77-99 are excluded.
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-The ESS variable “PPLFAIR” “Most people try to take advantage of you, or try to be fair”
had the following response categories:
00 Most people would try to take advantage of me
01 1
02 2
03 3
04 4
05 5
06 6
07 7
08 809 9
10 Most people would try to be fair
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “People are fair”. Identical coding from the
ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 77-99 are excluded.

-The ESS variable “PPLHLP” “Most of the time people helpful or mostly looking out for
themselves” had the following response categories:
00 People mostly look out for themselves
01 1
02 2
03 3
04 4
05 5
06 6
07 7
08 8
09 9
10 People mostly try to be helpful
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “People are helpful”. Identical coding from the
ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 77-99 are excluded.
-The variables, “Personal trust”, “People are fair”, and “People are helpful” are combined
into an additive index named “Interpersonal Trust Index”.
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-The ESS variable “POLINTR” “How interested in politics” had the following response
categories:
1 Very interested
2 Quite interested
3 Hardly interested
4 Not at all interested
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “Political interest”. The range of responses is
reverse coded whereas an original response of 1 was recoded to count as 4 and an original
response of 4 was recoded to count as 1 and so on. Responders who gave responses of 7-9
are excluded.
-The ESS variable “POLCMPL” “Politics too complicated to understand” had the following
response categories:
1 Never
2 Seldom
3 Occasionally
4 Regularly
5 Frequently
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “Politics easy to understand”. The range of
responses is reverse coded whereas an original response of 1 was recoded to count as 5 and
an original response of 5 was recoded to count as 1 and so on. Responders who gave
responses of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “POLDCS” “Making mind up about political issues” had the following
response categories:
1 Very difficult
2 Difficult
3 Neither difficult nor easy
4 Easy
5 Very easy
7 Refusal
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8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “Ease of political decisions”. Identical coding
from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “TRSTPRL” “Trust in country’s parliament” had the following response
categories:
00 No trust at all
01 1
02 2
03 3
04 4
05 506 6
07 7
08 8
09 9
10 Complete trust
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “TRSTPRL2” “Trust in country’s parliament”.
Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 77-99 are
excluded.
-The ESS variable “TRSTLGL” “Trust in the legal system” had the following response
categories:
00 No trust at all
01 1
02 2
03 3
04 4
05 5
06 6
07 7
08 8
09 9
10 Complete trust
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer
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The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “TRSTLGL2” “Trust in the legal system”.
Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 77-99 are
excluded.
-The ESS variable “TRSTPLC” “Trust in the police” had the following response categories:
00 No trust at all
01 1
02 2
03 3
04 4
05 5
06 6
07 708 8
09 9
10 Complete trust
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “TRSTPLC2” “Trust in police”. Identical
coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 77-99 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “TRSTPLT” “Trust in politicians” had the following response categories:
00 No trust at all
01 1
02 2
03 3
04 4
05 5
06 6
07 7
08 8
09 9
10 Complete trust
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “TRSTPLT2” “Trust in politicians”. Identical
coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 77-99 are excluded.
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-The ESS variable “TRSTPRT” “Trust in political parties” had the following response
categories:
00 No trust at all
01 1
02 2
03 3
04 4
05 5
06 6
07 7
08 809 9
10 Complete trust
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “TRSTPRT2” “Trust in political parties”.
Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 77-99 are
excluded.
-The ESS variable “STFGOV” “How satisfied with the national government” had the
following response categories:
00 Extremely dissatisfied
01 1
02 2
03 3
04 4
05 5
06 6
07 7
08 8
09 9
10 Extremely satisfied
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “STFGOV2” “How satisfied with the national
government”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses
of 77-99 are excluded.
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-The ESS variable “STFDEM” “How satisfied with the way democracy works in country”
had the following response categories:
00 Extremely dissatisfied
01 1
02 2
03 3
04 4
05 5
06 6
07 7
08 8
09 9
10 Extremely satisfied
77 Refusal88 Don’t know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “STFDEM2” “How satisfied with the way
democracy works in country”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who
gave responses of 77-99 are excluded.
The variables “Trust in country’s parliament”, “Trust in the legal system”, “Trust in the
police”, “Trust in politicians”, “Trust in political parties”, “How satisfied with the national
government”, and “How satisfied with the way democracy works in country” are combined
into an additive index named “National trust”.
-The ESS variable “TRSTEP” “Trust in the European Parliament” had the following
response categories:
00 No trust at all
01 1
02 2
03 3
04 4
05 5
06 6
07 7
08 8
09 9
10 Complete trust
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer
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The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “TRSTEP2” “Trust in the European
Parliament”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of
77-99 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “TRSTUN” “Trust in the United Nations” had the following response
categories:
00 No trust at all
01 1
02 2
03 3
04 4
05 5
06 6
07 7
08 8
09 9
10 Complete trust77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “TRUSTUN2” “Trust in the United Nations”.
Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 77-99 are
excluded.
The variables “Trust in the European Parliament” and “Trust in the United Nations” are
combined into an additive index named “Supra-National Trust Index”.
-The ESS variable “VOTE” “Voted last national election” had the following response
categories:
1 Yes
2 No
3 Not eligible to vote
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the dummy variable “R is a voter”. Respondents who gave
a response of 1 are classified as a voter. Respondents who gave a response of 7-9 are
excluded.
-The ESS variable “CONTPLT” “Contacted politician or government official last 12
months” had the following response categories:
1 Yes
2 No
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7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the dummy variable “Contacted Politician”. Respondents
who gave a response of 1 are classified as having contacted a politician. Respondents who
gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “WRKPRTY” “Worked in political party or action group last 12 months”
had the following response categories:
1 Yes
2 No
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the dummy variable “Worked in political party”.
Respondents who gave a response of 1 are classified as having worked in a political party.
Respondents who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “WRKORG” “Worked in another organisation or association last 12
months” had the following response categories:
1 Yes
2 No
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the dummy variable “Worked for organization”.
Respondents who gave a response of 1 are classified as having worked for an organization.
Respondents who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “BADGE” “Worn or displayed campaign badge/sticker last 12 months”
had the following response categories:
1 Yes
2 No
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
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The ESS variable is recoded into the dummy variable “Displayed a badge or sticker”.
Respondents who gave a response of 1 are classified as having displayed a badge or sticker.
Respondents who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “SGNPTIT” “Signed petition last 12 months” had the following response
categories:
1 Yes
2 No
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the dummy variable “Signed petition”. Respondents who
gave a response of 1 are classified as having signed a petition. Respondents who gave a
response of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “PBLDMN” “Taken part in lawful public demonstration last 12 months”
had the following response categories:
1 Yes
2 No
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the dummy variable “Participated in demonstration”.
Respondents who gave a response of 1 are classified as having participated in a public
demonstration. Respondents who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “BCTPRD” “Boycotted certain products last 12 months” had the
following response categories:
1 Yes
2 No
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the dummy variable “Boycott Products”. Respondents who
gave a response of 1 are classified as having participated in boycotting products.
Respondents who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.
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-The ESS variable “LRSCALE” “Placement on left right scale” had the following response
categories:
00 Left
01 1
02 2
03 3
04 4
05 5
06 6
07 7
08 8
09 9
10 Right
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables, “Political left”, “Political middle
and “Political right”. “Political left” is comprised of responders who gave responses 00-04,
“Political middle” is comprised of responders who gave a response of 5 and “Political Right”
is comprised of responders who gave responses 06-10. Respondents who gave a response of
77-99 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “STFLIFE” “How satisfied with life as a whole” had the following
response categories:
00 Extremely dissatisfied
01 1
02 2
03 3
04 4
05 5
06 6
07 7
08 8
09 9
10 Extremely satisfied
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “Satisfaction with life”. Identical coding from
the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 77-99 are excluded.
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-The ESS variable “HAPPY” “How happy are you had the following response categories:
00 Extremely unhappy
01 1
02 2
03 3
04 4
05 5
06 6
07 7
08 8
09 9
10 Extremely happy
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “Level of happiness”. Identical coding from
the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 77-99 are excluded.
The variables “Satisfaction with life” and “Level of happiness” are combined into an additive
index named “Life satisfaction index”
-The ESS variable “IMPSAFE” “Important to live in secure and safe surroundings” had the
following response categories:
1 Very much like me
2 Like me
3 Somewhat like me
4 A little like me
5 Not like me
6 Not like me at all
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “IMPSAFE2” “Important to live in secure and
safe surroundings”. The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original response of
1 was recoded to count as 6 and an original response of 6 was recoded to count as 1 and so
on. Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “PRTYBAN” “Ban political parties that wish overthrow democracy” had
the following response categories:
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1 Agree strongly
2 Agree
3 Neither agree nor disagree
4 Disagree
5 Disagree strongly
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “PRTYBAN2” “Ban political parties that wish
overthrow democracy”. The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original
response of 1 was recoded to count as 5 and an original response of 5 was recoded to count
as 1 and so on. Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “HRSHSNT” “People who break the law much harsher sentences” had the
following response categories:
1 Agree strongly
2 Agree
3 Neither agree nor disagree
4 Disagree
5 Disagree strongly
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “HRSHSNT2” “People who break the law
much harsher sentences”. The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original
response of 1 was recoded to count as 5 and an original response of 5 was recoded to count
as 1 and so on. Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “IPFRULE” “Important to do what is told and follow rules” had the
following response categories:
1 Very much like me
2 Like me
3 Somewhat like me
4 A little like me
5 Not like me
6 Not like me at all
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
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The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “IPFRULE2” “Important to do what is told and
follow rules”. The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original response of 1 was
recoded to count as 6 and an original response of 6 was recoded to count as 1 and so on.
Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “IPMODST” “Important to be humble and modest, not draw attention”
had the following response categories:
1 Very much like me
2 Like me
3 Somewhat like me
4 A little like me
5 Not like me
6 Not like me at all
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “IPMODST2” “Important to be humble and
modest, not draw attention”. The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original
response of 1 was recoded to count as 6 and an original response of 6 was recoded to count
as 1 and so on. Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “IPSTRGV” “Important that government is strong and ensures safety” had
the following response categories:
1 Very much like me
2 Like me
3 Somewhat like me
4 A little like me5 Not like me
6 Not like me at all
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “IPSTRGV2” “Important that government is
strong and ensures safety”. The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original
response of 1 was recoded to count as 6 and an original response of 6 was recoded to count
as 1 and so on. Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “IPBHPRP” “Important to behave properly” had the following response
categories:
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1 Very much like me
2 Like me
3 Somewhat like me
4 A little like me
5 Not like me
6 Not like me at all
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “IPBHPRP2” “Important to behave properly”.
The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original response of 1 was recoded to
count as 6 and an original response of 6 was recoded to count as 1 and so on. Responders
who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “IMPTRAD” “Important to follow traditions and customs” had the
following response categories:
1 Very much like me
2 Like me
3 Somewhat like me
4 A little like me
5 Not like me
6 Not like me at all
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “IMPTRAD2” “Important to follow traditions
and customs”. The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original response of 1
was recoded to count as 6 and an original response of 6 was recoded to count as 1 and so on.
Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.
The variables, “Important to live in secure and safe surroundings”, “Ban political parties that
wish overthrow democracy”, “People who break the law much harsher sentences”,
“Important to do what is told and follow rules”, “Important to be humble and modest, not
draw attention”, “important that government is strong and ensures safety”, “Important to
behave properly”, and “Important to follow traditions and customs” are combined into an
additive index named “Conservative Values- Tradition, Conformity, Security focused”.
-The ESS variable “IMRCCON” “Immigrants receive more or less than they contribute” had
the following response categories:
00 Receive much more than they contribute
01 1
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02 2
03 3
04 4
05 5
06 6
07 7
08 8
09 9
10 Contribute much more than they receive
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “IMRCCON2” “Immigrants receive more or
less than they contribute”. The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original
response of 00 is coded as 10 an original response of 10 is coded as 00 and so on.
Responders who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “BENNENT” “Many manage to obtain benefits/services not entitled to”
had the following response categories:
1 Agree strongly
2 Agree
3 Neither agree nor disagree
4 Disagree
5 Disagree strongly
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “BENNENT2” “Many manage to obtain
benefits/services not entitled to”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders
who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “IMSCLBN” “When should immigrants obtain rights to social
benefits/services” had the following response categories:
1 Immediately on arrival
2 After living in [country] for a year, whether or not they have worked
3 Only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year
4 Once they have become a [country] citizen
5 They should never get the same rights
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
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9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “IMSCLBN2” “When should immigrants
obtain rights to social benefits/services”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except
responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “SBSTREC” “Social benefits/services place too great strain on economy”
had the following response categories:
1 Agree strongly
2 Agree
3 Neither agree nor disagree
4 Disagree
5 Disagree strongly
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “SBSTREC2” “Social benefits/services place
too great strain on economy” had the following response categories. Identical coding from
the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “SBENCCM” “Social benefits/services encourage people other countries
to come live here” had the following response categories:
1 Agree strongly
2 Agree
3 Neither agree nor disagree
4 Disagree
5 Disagree strongly
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “SBENCCM2” “Social benefits/services
encourage people other countries to come live here”. Identical coding from the ESS is used
except responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “Social benefits/services cost businesses too much in taxes/charges” had
the following response categories:
1 Agree strongly
2 Agree
3 Neither agree nor disagree
4 Disagree
5 Disagree strongly
7 Refusal
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8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “SBBSNTX2” “Social benefits/services cost
businesses too much in taxes/charges”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except
responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “SBLAZY” “Social benefits/services make people lazy” had the following
response categories:
1 Agree strongly
2 Agree
3 Neither agree nor disagree
4 Disagree
5 Disagree Strongly
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “SBLAZY2” “Social benefits/services make
people lazy”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses
of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “SBLWCOA” “Social benefits/services make people less willing care for
one another” had the following response categories:
1 Agree strongly
2 Agree
3 Neither agree nor disagree
4 Disagree
5 Disagree Strongly
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “SBLWCOA2” “Social benefits/services make
people less willing care for one another”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except
responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “SBLWLKA” “Social benefits/services make people less willing look
after themselves/family” had the following response categories:
1 Agree strongly
2 Agree
3 Neither agree nor disagree
4 Disagree
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5 Disagree Strongly
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “SBLWLKA2” “Social benefits/services make
people less willing look after themselves/family”. Identical coding from the ESS is used
except responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “DFINCAC” “Large differences in income acceptable to reward talents
and efforts” had the following response categories:
1 Agree strongly
2 Agree
3 Neither agree nor disagree
4 Disagree
5 Disagree strongly
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “DFINCAC2” “Large differences in income
acceptable to reward talents and efforts”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except
responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.
The variables, “Social benefits/services place too great strain on economy”, “Social
benefits/services encourage people other countries come live here”, “Social benefits/services
cost businesses too much in taxes/charges”, “Social benefits/services make people lazy”,
“Social benefits/services make people less willing care for one another”, “Social
benefits/services make people less willing look after themselves/family” and “Large
differences in income acceptable to reward talents and efforts” are combined into an additive
index named “Self transcendent values 1- Universalism, benevolence focus index #1”.
Whereas the higher the score the more benevolence is valued.
-The ESS variable “IPEQOPT” “Important that people are treated equally and have equal
opportunities” had the following response categories:
1 Very much like me
2 Like me
3 Somewhat like me
4 A little like me
5 Not like me6 Not like me at all
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
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The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “IPEQOPT2” “Important that people are
treated equally and have equal opportunities”. The range of responses is reverse coded
whereas an original response of 1 was recoded to count as 6 and an original response of 6
was recoded to count as 1 and so on. Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “IPUDRST” “Important to understand different people” had the following
response categories:
1 Very much like me
2 Like me
3 Somewhat like me
4 A little like me
5 Not like me
6 Not like me at all
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “IPUDRST2” “Important to understand
different people”. The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original response of 1
was recoded to count as 6 and an original response of 6 was recoded to count as 1 and so on.
Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “IPHLPPL” “Important to help people and care for others well-being” had
the following response categories:
1 Very much like me
2 Like me
3 Somewhat like me
4 A little like me
5 Not like me
6 Not like me at all
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “IPHLPPL2” “Important to help people and
care for others well-being”. The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original
response of 1 was recoded to count as 6 and an original response of 6 was recoded to count
as 1 and so on. Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.
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-The ESS variable “IPLYLFR” “Important to be loyal to friends and devote to people close”
had the following response categories:
1 Very much like me
2 Like me
3 Somewhat like me
4 A little like me
5 Not like me
6 Not like me at all
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “IPLYLFR2” “Important to be loyal to friends
and devote to people close”. The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original
response of 1 was recoded to count as 6 and an original response of 6 was recoded to count
as 1 and so on. Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “IMPENV” “Important to care for nature and environment” had the
following response categories:
1 Very much like me
2 Like me
3 Somewhat like me
4 A little like me
5 Not like me
6 Not like me at all
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “IMPENV2” “Important to care for nature and
environment”. The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original response of 1
was recoded to count as 6 and an original response of 6 was recoded to count as 1 and so on.
Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.
The variables “Important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”,
“Important to understand different people”, “Important to help people and care for others
well-being”, “Important to be loyal to friends and devote to people close”, and “Important to
care for nature and environment” are combined into an additive index named, “Self
Transcendence Value 2- Universalism, benevolence focus index #2”.
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-The ESS variable “SMDFSLV” “For fair society, differences in standard of living should be
small” had the following response categories:
1 Agree strongly
2 Agree
3 Neither agree nor disagree
4 Disagree
5 Disagree strongly
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “SMDFSLV2” “For fair society, differences in
standard of living should be small”. The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an
original response of 1 was recoded to count as 5 and an original response of 5 was coded to
count as 1 and so on. Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “SBPRVPV” “Social benefits/services prevent widespread poverty” had
the following response categories:
1 Agree strongly
2 Agree
3 Neither agree nor disagree
4 Disagree
5 Disagree strongly
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “SBPRVPV2” “Social benefits/services
prevent widespread poverty”. The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original
response of 1 was recoded to count as 5 and an original response of 5 was coded to count as 1
and so on. Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “SBEQSOC” “Social benefits/services lead to a more equal society” had
the following response categories:
1 Agree strongly
2 Agree
3 Neither agree nor disagree
4 Disagree
5 Disagree strongly
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
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The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “SBEQSOC2” “Social benefits/services lead to
a more equal society”. The range of responses is reverse coded whereas an original response
of 1 was recoded to count as 5 and an original response of 5 was coded to count as 1 and so
on. Responders who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “EUFTF” “European Union: European unification go further or gone too
far” had the following response categories:
00 Unification has already gone too far
01 1
02 2
03 3
04 4
05 5
06 6
07 7
08 8
09 9
10 Unification should go further
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “EUFTF2” “European unification go further or
gone too far”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses
of 77-99 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “SCLMEET” “How often socially meet with friends, relatives or
colleagues” had the following response categories:
01 Never
02 Less than once a month
03 Once a month
04 Several times a month
05 Once a week
06 Several times a week
07 Every day
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables, “Low social contact”, “Moderate
social contact”, and “High social contact”. “Low social contact” is comprised of responses
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01-03, “Moderate social contact” is comprised of responses 04-05, and “high social contact”
is comprised of responders who gave a response of 06-07. Responders who gave responses
of 77-99 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “INMDISC” “Anyone to discuss intimate and personal matters with” had
the following response categories:
1 Yes
2 No
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into two dummy variables, “R has personal discussions” and
“Nobody to discuss intimate and personal matters with”. “Nobody to discuss intimate and
personal matters with” is comprised of responders who gave a response of 2. Responders
who gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “SCLACT” “Take part in social activities compared to others of same
age” had the following response categories:
1 Much less than most
2 Less than most
3 About the same
4 More than most
5 Much more than most
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables, “Low social participation”,
“Average social participation” and “High social participation”. “Low social participation” is
comprised of responders who gave a response of 1-2, “Average social participation” is
comprised of responders who gave a response of 3, and “High social participation” is
comprised of responders who gave a response of 4-5. Responders who gave responses of 7-9
are excluded.
-The ESS variable “CRMVCT” “Respondent or household member victim of
burglary/assault last 5 years” had the following response categories:
1 Yes
2 No
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
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The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “CRMVCT2” “Respondent or household
member victim of burglary/assault last 5 years”. The responses are reverse coded whereas an
original response of 1 was recoded to count as 2 and an original response of 2 was coded to
count as 1. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “BRGHMWR” “How often worry about your home being burgled” had
the following response categories:
1 All or most of the time
2 Some of the time
3 Just occasionally
4 Never
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “BRGHMWR2” “How often worry about your
home being burgled”. The responses are reverse coded whereas an original response of 1
was recoded to count as 4 and an original response of 4 were coded to count as 1 and so on.
Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “BRGHMEF” “Worry about home burgled has effect on quality of life”
had the following response categories:
1 Serious effect on quality of life
2 Some effect
3 Or, no real effect on quality of life
6 Not applicable
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “BRGHMEF2” “Worry about home burgled
has effect on quality of life”. The responses are reverse coded whereas an original response
of 1 was recoded to count as 3 and an original response of 3 was coded to count as 1.
Responses of 6 were coded to count as 0. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are
excluded.
-The ESS variable “CRVCTWR” “How often worry about becoming a victim of violent
crime” had the following response categories:
1 All or most of the time
2 Some of the time
3 Just occasionally
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4 Never
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “CRVCTWR2” “How often worry about
becoming a victim of violent crime”. The responses are reverse coded whereas an original
response of 1 was recoded to count as 4 and an original response of 4 was coded to count as 1
and so on. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “CRVCTEF” “Worry about becoming victim of violent crime has effect
on quality of life” had the following response categories:
1 Serious effect on quality of life
2 Some effect
3 Or, no real effect on quality of life
6 Not applicable
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “CRVCTEF2” “Worry about becoming victim
of violent crime has effect on quality of life”. The responses are reverse coded whereas an
original response of 1 was recoded to count as 3 and an original response of 3 was coded to
count as 1. Responses of 6 were coded to count as 0. Responders who gave a response of 79 are excluded.
The variables, “Respondent or household member victim of burglary/assault last 5 years”,
“How often worry about your home being burgled”, “Worry about home burgled has effect
on quality of life”, “How often worry about becoming a victim of violent crime”, and “Worry
about becoming victim of violent crime has effect on quality of life” are combined into an
additive index named, “Concern about crime index”. A higher score indicates more concern
about crime from the respondent.
-The ESS variable “AESFDRK” “Feeling of safety of walking alone in local area after dark”
had the following response categories:
1 Very safe
2 Safe
3 Unsafe
4 Or, very unsafe
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
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The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “AESFDRK2” “Feeling of safety of walking
alone in local area after dark”. Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who
gave responses of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “TRRENYR” “How likely terrorist attack in Europe coming next twelve
months” had the following response categories:
1 Very likely
2 Likely
3 Not very likely
4 Not at all likely
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “TRRENYR2” “How likely terrorist attack in
Europe during next twelve months”. The responses are reverse coded whereas an original
response of 1 was recoded to count as 4 and an original response of 4 was coded to count as 1
and so on. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “TRRCNYR” “How likely terrorist attack in country during next twelve
months” had the following response categories:
1 Very likely
2 Likely
3 Not very likely
4 Not at all likely
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “TRRCNYR2” “How likely terrorist attack in
country during next twelve months”. The responses are reverse coded whereas an original
response of 1 was recoded to count as 4 and an original response of 4 was coded to count as 1
and so on. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.
The variables “How likely terrorist attack in Europe during next twelve months” and “How
likely terrorist attack in country during next twelve months” are combined into an additive
index named, “Perception on the likelihood of terrorism”. Responders who score higher
have a higher perception of a likely terrorist attack.
-The ESS variable “RLDGDGR” “How religious are you” had the following response
categories:
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00 Not at all religious
01 1
02 2
03 3
04 4
05 5
06 6
07 7
08 8
09 910 Very religious
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “RLGDGR2” “How religious are you”.
Identical coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 77-99 are
excluded.
-The ESS variable “RLGATND” “How often attend religious services apart from special
occasions” had the following response categories:
01 Every day
02 More than once a week
03 Once a week
04 At least once a month
05 Only on special holy days
06 Less often
07 Never
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “RLGATND2” “How often attend religious
services apart from special occasions”. The responses are reverse coded whereas an original
response of 01 was recoded to count as 07 and an original response of 07 was coded to count
as 01 and so on. Responders who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “PRAY” “How often pray apart from at religious services” had the
following response categories:
01 Every day
02 More than once a week
03 once a week
04 At least once a month
05 Only on special holy days
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06 Less often
07 Never
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “PRAY2” “How often pray apart from at
religious services”. The responses are reverse coded whereas an original response of 01 was
recoded to count as 07 and an original response of 07 was coded to count as 01 and so on.
Responders who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.
The variables “How often attend religious services apart from special occasions” and “How
often pray apart from at religious services” are combined into an additive index named,
“Religious practice index”. A higher score indicates a higher frequency of religious practice.
-The ESS variable “DSCRGRP” “Member of a group discriminated against in this country”
had the following response categories:
1 Yes
2 No
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into two dummy variables “Member of a non-discriminated
group” and “Member of a discriminated group”. Responders who gave a response of 1 are
placed in the discriminated group category and responders who gave a response of 2 are
placed in the non-discriminated category. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are
excluded. Responders who are in the discriminated group category are excluded because
they stand outside the criteria for unit of analysis, which is based on majority group
membership.
-The ESS variable “CTZCNTR” “Citizen of country” had the following response categories:
1 Yes
2 No
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into two dummy variables “R is a citizen of country” and “R is
not a citizen of country”. Responders are given a score of 1 depending on which category
they fit. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded. Responders who are not
citizens are excluded because they stand outside the criteria for unit of analysis, which is
based on majority group membership; furthermore, if a respondent is not a citizen then it is
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likely that they are an immigrant and thus their attitudes toward other immigrants will be
biased.
-The ESS variable “BRNCNTR” “Born in country” had the following response categories:
1 Yes
2 No
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into two dummy variables “R was born in country” and “R was
not born in country”. Responders are given a score of 1 depending on which category they
fit. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “BLGETMG” “Belong to minority ethnic group in country” had the
following response categories:
1 Yes
2 No
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into two dummy variables “R is not a member of an ethnic
minority” and “R is a member of an ethnic minority”. Responders are given a score of 1
depending on which category they fit. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.
Responders who are an ethnic minority are excluded because they stand outside the criteria
for unit of analysis, which is based on majority group membership.
-The ESS variable “FACNTR” “Father born in country” had the following response
categories:
1 Yes
2 No
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into two dummy variables “Father born in country” and “Father
not born in country”. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “MOCNTR” “Mother born in country” had the following response
categories:
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1 Yes
2 No
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into two dummy variables “Mother born in country” and
“Mother not born in country”. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “AGEA” “Age of respondent” was calculated based on the information
given by the respondent.
The ESS variable is recoded into eight dummy variables, “Age of R is 15-24”, “Age of R is
25-34”, “Age of R is 35-44”, “Age of R is 45-54”, “Age of R is 55-64”, “Age of R is 65-74”,
“Age of R is 75-80” and “Age of R is 81 or over”. Responders who did not provide an age
are excluded.
-The ESS variable “AGRPBLG” “Strong or weak sense of belonging to age group” had the
following response categories:
00 Very weak sense of belonging
01 1
02 2
03 3
04 4
05 5
06 6
07 7
08 8
09 9
10 Very strong sense of belonging
55 I have no sense of belonging to any/this age group
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into the variable “AGRPBLG2” “Strong or weak sense of
belonging to age group”. The variable was recoded so that a response of 00 counts as 01, a
response of 01 counts as 02 and so on; a response of 55 is counted as 00. Responders who
gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.
The variable “AGRPBLG2” is recoded into three dummy variables, “Weak sense of
belonging to age group”, “Average sense of belonging to age group” and “Strong sense of
belonging to age group”. Responders who gave a response of 00-05 are placed in the “Weak
sense of belonging to age group” category. Responders who gave a response of 06 are
placed in the “Average sense of belonging to age group” category. Responders who gave a
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response of 07-11 are placed in the “Strong sense of belonging to age group” category.
Responders who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “PREDETN” “How often past year treated with prejudice because of
ethnic background” had the following response categories:
0 Never
11
22
33
4 Very often
7 Refusal8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into two dummy variables “R does not experience ethnic
prejudice frequently” and “R experiences ethnic prejudice frequently”. Responders who
gave a response of 0-2 are placed in the “does not experience ethnic prejudice frequently”
category”. Responders who gave a response of 3-4 are placed in the “experiences ethnic
prejudice frequently” category. Responders who were placed in the “experiences ethnic
prejudice frequently category are excluded, because if a respondent is frequently
experiencing prejudice then they probably are not a member of the majority and therefore
stand outside of the unit of analysis of majority members. Respondents who do not
experience ethnic prejudice frequently are included because it is possible that a majority
member may face infrequent accidental discrimination based on a mistake or misjudgment on
behalf of the prejudiced party. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “PVOLWRK” “Done paid or voluntary work last month” had the
following response categories:
1 Yes- Paid work only
2 Yes- Voluntary work only
3 Yes- Paid and voluntary work
4 No- Neither
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into four dummy variables “R has done only paid work in last
month”, “R has done only voluntary work in last month”, “R has done voluntary and paid
work in last month”, and “R has not done either voluntary or paid work in last month”.
Respondents are placed in the appropriate category depending on their response.
Respondents who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.

173

-The ESS variable “HHMMB” “Number of people living regularly as member of household”
was an integer given by the respondent. Respondents who did not provide an integer had the
following response categories:
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into “HHMMB2” “Number of people living regularly as
member of household”. Respondents who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “GNDR” “Gender” had the following response categories:
1 Male
2 Female
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into two dummy variables “Male” and “Female”. Responders
were placed into each category depending on their response. Responders who gave a
response of 9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “DOMICIL” “Domicile, respondent’s description” had the following
response categories:
1 A big city
2 The suburbs or outskirts of a big city
3 A town or a small city
4 A country village
5 A farm or home in the countryside
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into two dummy variables “R lives in large population center”
and “R lives in small population center”. Respondents who gave a response of 1-2 are placed
in the “large population center” category. Respondents who gave a response of 3-5 are
placed in the “small population center” category. Respondents who gave a response of 7-9
are excluded.
-The ESS variable “EDULVLA” “Highest level of education” had the following response
categories:
0 Not possible to harmonise into 5-level ISCED
1 Less than lower secondary education (ISCED 0-1)
2 Lower secondary education completed (ISCED 2)
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3 Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3)
4 Post-secondary non-tertiary education completed (ISCED 4)
5 Tertiary education completed (ISCED 5-6)
55 Other
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into “EDULVLA2” “Highest level of education”. Identical
coding from the ESS is used except responders who gave responses of 55 are recoded to
count as 0 and responders who gave an original response of 0 or 77-99 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “Improve knowledge/skills: course/lecture/conference, last 12 months”
had the following response categories;
1 Yes
2 No
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into two dummy variables, “Improve knowledge/skills:
course/lecture/conference, last 12 months” and “Not improve knowledge/skills:
course/lecture/conference, last 12 months”. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are
excluded.
-The ESS variable “MNACTIC” “Main activity, last 7 days. All respondents. Post coded.”
Had the following response categories:
01 In paid work (or away temporarily) (employee, self-employed, working for your family
business)
02 In education (not paid for by employer), even if on vacation
03 Unemployed actively looking for a job
04 Unemployed, wanting a job but not actively looking for a job
05 Permanently sick or disabled
06 Retired
07 In community or military service
08 Doing housework, looking after children or other persons
09 Other
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into eight dummy variables, “R was in paid work last 7 days”,
“R was in education last 7 days”, “R was unemployed last 7 days”, “R was permanently sick
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or disabled last 7 days”, “R was retired last 7 days”, “R was in community or military service
last 7 days” “R was in house duty last 7 days”, and “R was engaged in other activity”.
Respondents were placed in each category based on their response. Respondents who
responded with 3-4 are consolidated into the “unemployed” category. Respondents who
gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “NACER11” “Industry, NACE rev. 1.1” had the following response
categories:
01 Agriculture, hunting and related service activities
02 Forestry, logging and related service activities
05 Fishing, fish farming and related service activities
10 Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat
11 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas; service activities incidental to oil and gas
extraction, excluding surveying
12 Mining of uranium and thorium ores
13 Mining of metal ores
14 Other mining and quarrying
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages
16 Manufacture of tobacco products
17 Manufacture of textiles
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and
footwear
20 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture of
articles of straw and plaiting materials
21 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media
23 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
27 Manufacture of basic metals
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
30 Manufacture of office machinery and computers
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.
37 Recycling
40 Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply
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41 Collection, purification and distribution of water
45 Construction
50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of automotive
fuel
51 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
52 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal and household
goods
55 Hotels and restaurants
60 Land transport; transport via pipelines
61 Water transport
62 Air transport
63 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies
64 Post and telecommunications
65 Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding
66 Insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security
67 Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation
70 Real estate activities
71 Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal and household
goods
72 Computer and related activities
73 Research and development
74 Other business activities
75 Public administration and defence; compulsory social security
80 Education
85 Health and social work
90 Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities
91 Activities of membership organizations n.e.c.
92 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities
93 Other service activities
95 Activities of households as employers of domestic staff
96 Undifferentiated goods producing activities of private households for own use
97 Undifferentiated services producing activities of private households for own use
99 Extra-territorial organizations and bodies
666 Not applicable
777 Refusal
888 Don’t know
999 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables, “Blue collar job classifications”,
“White collar job classifications” and “R has no industry”. Respondents who gave a
response of 1-55, 71, 90, 93, 95, 96, and 97 are classified as “blue collar”. Respondents who
gave a response of 60-67, 70, 72-75, 80, 85, 91-92, and 99 are classified as “white collar”.
Respondents who gave a response of 666 are classified has having no industry. Respondents
who gave a response of 777-999 are excluded.
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-The ESS variable “TPORGWK” “What type of Organisation work/worked for”
01 Central or local government
02 Other public sector (such as education and health)
03 A state owned enterprise
04 A private firm
05 Self employed
06 Other
66 Not applicable
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into four dummy variables, “R works for public organization”,
“R works for private enterprise”, “R works for other type of entity”, and “R works for no
entity”. Responders who gave a response of 01-03 are placed into the “public organization”
category. Responders who gave a response of 04-05 are placed into the “private entity”
category. Responders who gave a response of 05 or 66 are placed into their respective
categories. Responders who gave a response of 77-99 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “WRKAC6M” “Paid work in another country, period more than 6 months
last 10 years” had the following response categories:
1 Yes
2 No
6 Not applicable
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables “R has worked outside of country
for more than 6 months within last 10 years”, “R has not worked outside country for more
than 6 months within last 10 years” and “Not applicable for R”. Responders who gave a
response of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “MBTRU” “Member of trade union or similar organisation” had the
following response categories:
1 Yes, currently
2 Yes, previously
3 No
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
178

The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables “R is currently a member of a trade
union”, “R was a member of a trade union” and “R was never a member of a trade union”.
Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “MARITALA” “Legal marital status” had the following response
categories:
01 Married
02 In a civil partnership
03 Separated (still legally married)
04 Separated (still in a civil partnership)
05 Divorced
06 Widowed
07 Formerly in a civil partnership, now dissolved08 Formerly in a civil partnership, partner
died”
09 Never married AND never in a civil partnership
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables, “R is legally attached to partner”,
“R is legally apart from partner”, and “R has never been legally attached”. Respondents who
gave a response of 01-04 are classified as “legally attached”. Respondents who gave a
response of 05-08 are classified as “legally apart”. Respondents who gave a response of 09
are classified as having never been “legally attached”. Respondents who gave a response of
77-99 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “Partner” “Lives with husband/wife/partner at F4” had the following
response categories:
1 Lives with husband/wife/partner at F4
2 Does not
9 Not available
The ESS is recoded into three dummy variables “R lives with partner” and “R does not live
with partner” and “R has no partner info”.
-The ESS variable “LVGPTNE” “Ever lived with a partner without being married” had the
following response categories:
1 Yes
2 No
6 Not applicable
7 Refusal
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8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables, “R has lived with a partner without
legal attachment”, “R has not lived with a partner without legal attachment” and “R has no
partner info”. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “EDULVLPA” “Partner’s highest level of education” had the following
response categories:
0 Not possible to harmonise into 5-level ISCED
1 Less than lower secondary education (ISCED 0-1)
2 Lower secondary education completed (ISCED 2)
3 Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3)
4 Post-secondary non-tertiary education completed (ISCED 4)
5 Tertiary education completed (ISCED 5-6)
55 Other
66 Not applicable77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into “EDULVLPA2” “Partner’s highest level of education”.
Identical coding to the ESS is used except, respondents who gave a response of 55-66 are
recoded to count as 0. Respondents who gave a response of 0 or 77-99 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “DVRCDEV” “Ever been divorced” had the following response
categories:
1 Yes
2 No
6 Not applicable
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables, “R has been divorced”, “R has not
been divorced”, and “R has no partner info”. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are
excluded.
-The ESS variable “CHLDHM” “Children living at home or not” had the following response
categories:

180

1 Respondent has children living at home (code at F4)
2 Does not
9 Not available
The ESS variable is recoded into 3 dummy variables “Children living at home”, “No children
living at home” and “R has no child info”.
-The ESS variable “CHLDHHE” “Ever had children living in household” had the following
response categories:
1 Yes
2 No
6 Not applicable
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables, “Ever had children living in
household”, “Not ever had children living in household”, and “R has no child info”.
Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “EDULVLFA” “Father’s highest level of education” had the following
response categories:
0 Not possible to harmonise into5-level ISCED
1 Less than lower secondary education (ISCED 0-1)
2 Lower secondary education completed (ISCED 2)
3 Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3)
4 Post-secondary non-tertiary education completed (ISCED 4)
5 Tertiary education completed (ISCED 5-6)
55 Other
77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into “EDULVLFA2” “Father’s highest level of education”.
Identical coding to the ESS is used except responders who gave a response of 55 are recoded
to count as 0 and responders who gave a response of 0 or 77-99 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “EMPRF14” “Father’s employment status when respondent 14”
1 Employee
2 Self-employed
3 Not working
4 Father dead/absent when respondent was 14
7 Refusal
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8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables, “R’s father was working when R
was 14”, “R’s father was not working when R was 14”, and “R’s father was dead/absent
when respondent was 14”. Responders who gave a response of 1-2 are classified into the
“employed father category”. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “OCCF14B” “Father’s occupation when respondent 14” had the following
response categories:
01 Professional and technical occupations such as: doctor-teacher-engineer-artist-accountant
02 Higher administrator occupations such as: banker – executive in big business – high
government official – union official
03 Clerical occupations such as: secretary – clerk – office manager – book keeper
04 Sales occupations such as: sales manager – shop owner – shop assistant – insurance agent
05 Service occupations such as: restaurant owner – police officer – waiter – caretaker –
barber – armed forces
06 Skilled worker such as: foreman – motor mechanic – printer – tool and die maker –
electrician
07 Semi-skilled worker such as: bricklayer – bus driver – cannery worker – carpenter – sheet
metal worker – baker
08 Unskilled worker such as: labourer – porter – unskilled factory worker
09 Farm worker such as: farmer – farm labourer– tractor driver– fisherman
66 Not applicable
77 Refusal
88 Don't know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables, “R’s father had blue collar job”,
“R’s father had white collar job”, and “”R has no father info”. Responders who gave a
response of 05-09 are classified in the “blue collar” category. Responders who gave a
response of 01-04 are classified in the “white collar” category. Responders who gave a
response of 66 are classified in the “no info” category. Responders who gave a response of
77-99 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “EDULVLMA” “Mother’s highest level of education” had the following
response categories:
0 Not possible to harmonise into5-level ISCED
1 Less than lower secondary education (ISCED 0-1)
2 Lower secondary education completed (ISCED 2)
3 Upper secondary education completed (ISCED 3)
4 Post-secondary non-tertiary education completed (ISCED 4)
5 Tertiary education completed (ISCED 5-6)
55 Other
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77 Refusal
88 Don’t know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into “EDULVLMA2” “Mother’s highest level of education”.
Identical coding to the ESS is used except responders who gave a response of 55 are recoded
to count as 0 and responders who gave a response of 0 or 77-99 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “EMPRM14” “Mother’s employment status when respondent 14” had the
following response categories:
1 Employee
2 Self-employed
3 Not working
4 Father dead/absent when respondent was 14
7 Refusal
8 Don’t know
9 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables, “R’s mother was working when R
was 14”, “R’s mother was not working when R was 14”, and “R’s mother was dead/absent
when respondent was 14”. Responders who gave a response of 1-2 are classified into the
“employed mother category”. Responders who gave a response of 7-9 are excluded.
-The ESS variable “OCCM14B” “Mother’s occupation when respondent 14” had the
following response categories:
01 Professional and technical occupations such as: doctor-teacher-engineer-artist-accountant
02 Higher administrator occupations such as: banker – executive in big business – high
government official – union official
03 Clerical occupations such as: secretary – clerk – office manager – book keeper
04 Sales occupations such as: sales manager – shop owner – shop assistant – insurance agent
05 Service occupations such as: restaurant owner – police officer – waiter – caretaker –
barber – armed forces
06 Skilled worker such as: foreman – motor mechanic – printer – tool and die maker –
electrician
07 Semi-skilled worker such as: bricklayer – bus driver – cannery worker – carpenter – sheet
metal worker – baker
08 Unskilled worker such as: labourer – porter – unskilled factory worker
09 Farm worker such as: farmer – farm labourer– tractor driver– fisherman
66 Not applicable
77 Refusal
88 Don't know
99 No answer
The ESS variable is recoded into three dummy variables, “R’s mother had blue collar job”,
“R’s mother had white collar job”, and “”R has no mother info”. Responders who gave a
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response of 05-09 are classified in the “blue collar” category. Responders who gave a
response of 01-04 are classified in the “white collar” category. Responders who gave a
response of 66 are classified in the “no info” category. Responders who gave a response of
77-99 are excluded.
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